scholarly journals Evaluation of New Zealand’s Trade and Direct Investment Intensities with Major Trading Partners

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Satya Gonuguntla

New Zealand (NZ) has been implementing liberal economic policies since 1980s. Accordingly, NZ has negotiated Free Trade Agreements with several countries. NZ is also the founding member of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) which aims to achieve sustainable economic growth and prosperity among the countries in the Asia-Pacific Region, through free trade, investment and rapid regional economic integration. The bilateral FTAs include the Closer Economic Relations Agreement (CER) with Australia in 1983, Singapore (2001), and China (2008), Malaysia (2010), Hong Kong, China (2011) which are also member economies of the APEC. The consequence is an increase in trade as well as investment flows from Australia, Japan, Singapore, USA, and China. Presently, Australia is the largest export destination for New Zealand accounting for about 20% of merchandise exports, and a similar percent of merchandise imports. Australia is also the largest investor in NZ accounting for 56% of FDI in New Zealand. Singapore is NZ’s 6th largest trading partner and China is the second largest trading partner. Singapore, and Hong Kong, China each account for 4.5% of NZ’s FDI stock. The aim of this paper is to investigate the changing pattern of NZ’s total trade with these countries and inward FDI stock from these countries. The methodology consists of calculating and interpreting the Trade Intensity Indices and FDI Intensity Indices to gauge the significance of these two ratios at bilateral and regional level.

Author(s):  
Monika Jain

India dropped out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan and Australia, after negotiating for almost seven years in November 2018 on the grounds of national interest and also that free trade agreements (FTAs) did not amount to free trade and led to more trade diversion than trade creation. The cost and benefit of a regional agreement depend on the amount of trade creation with respect to trade diversion (Panagriya, 2000). This study tries to examine India’s concerns and at the same time, highlights the cost of not joining RCEP. India’s trade deficit with 11 out of the 15 RCEP nations has been a major cause of concern. Unfavourable trade balance, concerns about the impact on dairy sector, economic slowdown, past experience with FTA’s, China factor, data localisation, rules of origin, the experience of ASEAN countries with Sino-FTA have been some of the reasons behind India’s decision to opt-out of this mega multilateral agreement. Also, bilateral trade agreements with some RCEP countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea were operational. A multilateral trade agreement with ASEAN countries was very much in place. So, trade between India and 12 of the RCEP member countries would not have changed much after India’s inclusion in RCEP. The impact of lower tariffs would have been evident for the remaining three countries: China, Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, there was fear of a massive surge in imports of manufactures from China, dairy imports from Australia and New Zealand. This study also examines the long term impact of this decision and if India has missed out on becoming a part of the global value chain and gaining greater market access in the Asia Pacific region. India’s policy of import substitution and protectionism did not capitulate desired results in the past. Hence, a critical evaluation of India’s decision and some validation on her concerns and fears have been done.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Adrian Castle

<p>Most commentators view the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement as a remarkable example of bilateral integration. CER is not usually regarded, however, as a platform for Australia and New Zealand to jointly engage with third parties. Yet, more than a decade of CER-ASEAN relations culminated, in 2010, in a Free Trade Agreement (the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, AANZFTA) between the two regions. This suggests that intra-regional trans-Tasman integration might “spill over” into external cooperation with third parties. Close cooperation and joint approaches have not, however, eventuated in other cases. Australia and New Zealand applied separately to join the interregional Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) forum in 2008 and 2009, indicating that their ability to act as a region is not consistent across policy or issue areas. This is an intriguing empirical puzzle, given that most observers of interregionalism elsewhere understand the ability of regions to act in international relations (‘actorness’) as a general, rather than variable, characteristic. Why, then, did Australia and New Zealand negotiate as a single entity with ASEAN on an FTA, but did not coordinate their approach in the ASEM case? This thesis argues that the process of trans-Tasman integration has produced a set of issue-specific institutions, which present Australian and New Zealand policy makers with a ready-made framework for cooperation with third parties in some, but not all, issue areas. Once these institutions were established, it proved a relatively simple step to extend the scope of their operation beyond the trans-Tasman level. This suggests that in the trans-Tasman case, ‘actorness’, understood as the basis on which regions can engage in international relations, may be issue-specific rather than generalised. This thesis makes its case by critically analysing the emergence and evolution of CER-ASEAN relations and by documenting Australia and New Zealand’s separate applications to join ASEM. It draws on extensive archival research and interviews with key actors and decision makers. The thesis adds to the nascent field of interregionalism by offering a new empirical case in which to test and develop theories. It makes a contribution to our understanding of the way institutions shape the scope for regions to “act” in international relations. More broadly, this study provides insights into the relationship between institutional design, individual actors and policy outcomes.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 476-489
Author(s):  
Cynthia White ◽  
Janet Holmes ◽  
Vijay Bhatia

In referencing the title of Chris Candlin's (2008) plenary, this paper focuses on the continuing concern to align research and practice in applied linguistics, and more particularly in language for specific purposes (LSP) and professional communication. We examine how Candlin identified practices for trading places between research and practice and for creating synergies between them – and in so doing opened up new spaces for enquiry and understanding in the field. We identify and critically examine four approaches that Candlin developed to promote the alignment of research and practice: through particular research tools and methodologies, through the investigation of professional settings and inter-domain constructs (such as quality, trust and risk), through a concern with both rigour and relevance in relation to research and training, and through a focus on ‘critical moments of interaction’ in ‘crucial sites of engagement’ (Candlin 2008). To this end, we draw on the diverse domains and trajectories of enquiry outlined in the opening plenary symposium at the 4th Asia-Pacific Language for Specific Purposes & Professional Communication Association Conference from five standpoints: in recent impact case studies of professional communication in the Hong Kong context (Cheng 2017), in a ‘multi-perspectival’ account of Candlin's enacted philosophy of teaching and learning (Moore 2017), in examining the communicative basis of expertise (Sarangi 2017) and the concept of interdiscursivity (Jones 2017), and in the extensive fieldwork and analysis of workplace talk underlying the development of resources for new migrants in New Zealand (Holmes & Riddiford 2017). In conclusion, we pay tribute to an inspirational researcher and teacher whose influence will continue to impact applied linguistics for decades to come.


Author(s):  
Bao-Linh Tran ◽  
Chi-Chung Chen ◽  
Wei-Chun Tseng ◽  
Shu-Yi Liao

This study examines how experience of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) influences the impact of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on international tourism demand for four Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, and New Zealand, over the 1 January–30 April 2020 period. To proceed, panel regression models are first applied with a time-lag effect to estimate the general effects of COVID-19 on daily tourist arrivals. In turn, the data set is decomposed into two nation groups and fixed effects models are employed for addressing the comparison of the pandemic-tourism relationship between economies with and without experiences of the SARS epidemic. Specifically, Taiwan and Hong Kong are grouped as economies with SARS experiences, while Thailand and New Zealand are grouped as countries without experiences of SARS. The estimation result indicates that the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases has a significant negative impact on tourism demand, in which a 1% COVID-19 case increase causes a 0.075% decline in tourist arrivals, which is a decline of approximately 110 arrivals for every additional person infected by the coronavirus. The negative impact of COVID-19 on tourist arrivals for Thailand and New Zealand is found much stronger than for Taiwan and Hong Kong. In particular, the number of tourist arrivals to Taiwan and Hong Kong decreased by 0.034% in response to a 1% increase in COVID-19 confirmed cases, while in Thailand and New Zealand, a 1% national confirmed cases increase caused a 0.103% reduction in tourism demand. Moreover, the effect of the number of domestic cases on international tourism is found lower than the effect caused by global COVID-19 mortality for the economies with SARS experiences. In contrast, tourist arrivals are majorly affected by the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Thailand and New Zealand. Finally, travel restriction in all cases is found to be the most influencing factor for the number of tourist arrivals. Besides contributing to the existing literature focusing on the knowledge regarding the nexus between tourism and COVID-19, the paper’s findings also highlight the importance of risk perception and the need of transmission prevention and control of the epidemic for the tourism sector.


Worldview ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 15 (10) ◽  
pp. 13-17
Author(s):  
Gunnar Myrdal

Just so there is no misunderstanding: I do not believe economic policies can make much of a contribution to peacekeeping. During the nineteenth century and up to the present there has been a tendency to stress too much the economic factors in international relations. Liberal economic theory, from the classical writers on, is in this respect strikingly similar to what we now identify as the “Marxist” tradition. It is glibly assumed in both camps that trade is an important contributor to peaceful relations on the political level. That trade and economic relations generally worked for peace was an important corollary to the free-trade doctrine, and as a general proposition it now receives almost universal acclaim.


2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-912 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin M. Barry ◽  
Katja B. Kleinberg

AbstractScholarship on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has produced valuable insights into the role of host state characteristics and home-host relations. This study draws attention to another factor in investment decisions—the political and economic relations that home and host states maintain with third-party states. More narrowly, we focus on how investors respond to their home-state's imposition of economic sanctions against a trading partner. Greater economic integration has allowed states to use economic sanctions more frequently in recent decades. At the same time, economic sanctions are thought to have a distorting effect on global trade and financial flows as firms and governments adjust to new constraints. We argue that as firms at home in the sanctioning state respond to coercive measures against a trading partner by looking for alternative sources of profit, they will shift investments to states that can provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. In particular, those states that are perceived as prospective sanctions-busters—major trading partners of the sanctions target or states with a history of sanctions-busting behavior—will benefit disproportionately from the misfortune of others. We test this conjecture using data on US economic sanctions and global flows of US FDI from 1966 to 2000. The findings reveal that investor decision making in part responds to political developments beyond the home-host dyad.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Castle

The regionalisation of the world economy is one of the most important developments in global governance in the past two decades. This process has seen 'inter-regional' economic agreements emerge between two or more regional groupings. Drawing mainly on the European Union's external relations, observers accordingly point to the growing importance of regional actors, explaining their agency (or 'actorness') with regional attributes such as (supranational) institutional design, size, and member state cohesion. This article challenges this dominant explanation of regional agency. It argues that regional actors are socially, politically, and historically 'embedded'. Agency reflects the contingency of regional integration processes, the motivations that underpin those processes, and the specific relationships between regions and third parties. This approach explains an important case of inter-regionalism from the Asia-Pacific: CER-ASEAN relations. Since the early 1990s, Australia and New Zealand have used their 'Closer Economic Relations' trade agreement for relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This reflects the ambitions of Australasian officials to shape processes of Asian-Pacific regionalism, and the interests of ASEAN officials in consolidating their own process of transnational market-making. Here, regional agency owed to a transforming world economy and the reconceptualisation of regions within new networks of trade governance.


Author(s):  
Roberto Zepeda

Canada is Mexico’s third largest trading partner in terms of the overall bilateral trade, and both countries have become strategic allies during the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) era, between 1994 and 2020. Canada, Mexico, and the United States have been members of the NAFTA since 1994. For both Canada and Mexico, the United States is their first trading partner, in terms of exports, imports, and foreign direct investment. NAFTA has paved the way for economic integration between Canada and Mexico during the period of this agreement. It is significant to highlight the notable expansion of Mexico’s exports to Canada, but also of Canada’s investment in Mexico. From a subnational perspective, the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta are among Mexico’s most important trading partners. Economic relations between Mexico and Canada has also facilitated international cooperation from subnational governments and important interchanges in education, science, culture, and environment. Quebec is the only Canadian province with a general delegation in Mexico and representations in several subnational states. The Canadian province of Saskatchewan has established important agreements in education with government agencies and universities in Mexico. Relations between Mexico and Canada have strengthened during the NAFTA era. Not only central governments but also subnational governments define the characteristics and dynamics of this relation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Castle

AbstractThe regionalisation of the world economy is one of the most important developments in global governance in the past two decades. This process has seen ‘inter-regional’ economic agreements emerge between two or more regional groupings. Drawing mainly on the European Union’s external relations, observers accordingly point to the growing importance of regional actors, explaining their agency (or ‘actorness’) with regional attributes such as (supranational) institutional design, size, and member state cohesion. This article challenges this dominant explanation of regional agency. It argues that regional actors are socially, politically, and historically ‘embedded’. Agency reflects the contingency of regional integration processes, the motivations that underpin those processes, and the specific relationships between regions and third parties. This approach explains an important case of inter-regionalism from the Asia-Pacific: CER-ASEAN relations. Since the early 1990s, Australia and New Zealand have used their ‘Closer Economic Relations’ trade agreement for relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This reflects the ambitions of Australasian officials to shape processes of Asian-Pacific regionalism, and the interests of ASEAN officials in consolidating their own process of transnational market-making. Here, regional agency owed to a transforming world economy and the reconceptualisation of regions within new networks of trade governance.


Author(s):  
David R. Meyer

China’s extraordinary economic growth over recent decades underpins the top global rank of its financial centres of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing. Hong Kong is China’s window to global capital, an Asia-Pacific leader, and one of the top three global financial centres, along with London and New York. Shanghai is the commercial-financial centre, and Beijing is the political-regulatory centre of China. Government policy supports stock- and bond-connect programmes among its exchanges, Fintech, internationalization of the renminbi, and its ‘Belt and Road’ initiative and associated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These directly and indirectly strengthen China’s internal financial centre networks and the centres’ global links. The government’s political and economic policies maintain Hong Kong as a premier global centre. China controls its banks, and its strength as a large economy will help mitigate the impacts of a global financial crisis.


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