scholarly journals El Estado hegeliano: la auctoritas y la potestas de la época moderna = The Hegelian State: the auctoritas and potestas of the modern epoch

Author(s):  
José Morales Fabero

RESUMEN: La época moderna como es sabido modificó el sentido de la autoridad, porque venía a impugnar la auctoritas y la potestas de la todopoderosa Iglesia de Roma y, con ello, se quería sustituir la autoridad del papa por la de la conciencia de cada uno, es decir, la razón individual o subjetiva se constituye en la nueva autoridad. Fue Hegel quien, en su filosofía política, da un lugar central a la noción de Estado, constituyendo la culminación del pensamiento moderno y fuente de gran parte de la crítica de la modernidad y del pensamiento contemporáneo en general, en sus vertientes ideológicas de izquierda, centro y derecha.ABSTRACT: The modern epoch since it is known it modified the sense of the authority, because it was coming to contest it auctoritas and potestas of the all-powerful Church of Rome and, with it, the authority of the dad wanted to be replaced with that of the conscience of each one, that is to say, the individual or subjective reason is constituted in the new authority. It was Hegel, who in his political philosophy, gives a central place to the notion of State, constituting the culmination of the modern thought and source of great part of the critique of the Modernity and of the contemporary thought in general, in his ideological slopes of left side, center and right.PALABRAS CLAVE: época moderna, estado hegeliano, auctoritas y potestasKEYWORDS: modern epoch, hegelian state, auctoritas and potestas

Author(s):  
Paul Silas Peterson

Abstract The monthly magazine Hochland was probably the most influential Catholic cultural periodical in Germany in the Weimar Period. According to Georg Cardinal von Kopp’s assessment in 1911, it was “unfortunately the most read periodical in all of the educated circles of Germany, Austria and German Switzerland”. Moving beyond the simple rejection of modern culture in Germany, the journal tried to follow a new program of mediatory engagement, although it did continue to hold to traditional positions in many regards. In this article the reception of modern, Enlightenment-affirmative philosophy of religion in the journal is introduced with reference to reviews and essays from the later 1910s to the early 1930s. The journal’s treatment of a few critical subject areas is given close interpretive analysis, including the journal’s treatment of Gertrud Simmel’s Über das Religiöse, individually conceptualized forms of personalist moral theory, and the general shift to phenomenological discourses and the individual in the philosophy of religion. The fundamental rejections of these ideas and these schools of thought in reviews and essays, which are also found in the journal at this time (as in most all German language Catholic cultural journals of the period), are not addressed in this article. The article thus sheds light on an often-forgotten and relatively small minority phenomenon in German Catholic intellectual circles of the Weimar Period, namely the positive embrace of Enlightenment-oriented modern thought. By promoting these ideas at this time, this group made themselves highly vulnerable to disciplinary measures by the Catholic Church. (The journal was put on the Index in 1911.)


1991 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Little

The rational-choice paradigm has been attractive to many area specialists in their efforts to arrive at explanations of social and political behavior in various parts of the world. This model of explanation is simple yet powerful; we attempt to explain a pattern of social behavior or an enduring social arrangement as the aggregate outcome of the goal-directed choices of large numbers of rational agents. Why did the Nian rebellion occur? It was the result of the individual-level survival strategies of north China peasants (Perry 1980). Why did the central places of late imperial Sichuan conform to the hexagonal arrays predicted by central-place theory? Because participants—consumers, merchants, and officials—made rational decisions based on considerations of transport cost (Skinner 1964–65). Why was late imperial Chinese agriculture stagnant? Because none of the actors within the agricultural system had both the incentive and the capacity to invest in agricultural innovation (Lippit 1987).


Author(s):  
Barbara E. Bullock ◽  
Lars Hinrichs ◽  
Almeida Jacqueline Toribio

In this chapter, it is argued that the study of World Englishes (WE) should assume a more central place in the analysis of variation and change in the context of language contact. Because they emerge from situations of bilingualism and contact, WE varieties are highly informative with regard to the structural issues of code-switching and convergence (also termed structural borrowing, transfer, interference, imposition). The inherently mixed nature of WE is shown here to mirror the diverse structural patterns that are commonly encountered in bilingual speech. It is argued that different mixing patterns arise in response to the social and medial embedding of WE vernaculars at the community, the individual, and the interactional levels. Social evaluations of relative prestige, individual projections of style, stance, and identity, and the complex nature of multilingual interaction conspire to bring about complex, new language structures.


2002 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-66
Author(s):  
Theodor Jørgensen

Grundtvig’s »The Rejoinder of the Church« - in a Modem Perspective By Theodor Jørgensen The article maintains the view that the most profitable approach to a reading of Grundtvig is to take him seriously as a true 19th century man. In that case, his conflict with his own time will be a great deal more relevant for our own approach to the present and its problems. Four views, typical for the present, are adduced as crucial for Grundtvig, too, and thus also profitable when considering Grundtvig’s polemical pamphlet from 1825 in a modern perspective, in which he presents his ‘church view’.The four views are: 1. Faith must be a matter of experience, 2. Faith must be a matter of certainty, 3. Faith needs to have criteria for its Christian identity, and 4. Theology, of course, plays an essential role in the clarification of these issues, but which one?By way of introduction, the occasion and aim of the pamphlet is explained, and it is made clear that two views of the church clash, that of Professor H.N. Clausen, which is founded on a doctrinal idea of the church, and Grundtvig’s own, which invokes the evidence of history, i.e., the concrete historical experience of the individual. After that the pamphlet is analyzed from the four points of view mentioned.Re 1. Grundtvig’s emphasis on faith as experience serves a two-fold purpose: The immersion of faith in supra-individual contexts of life, here above all history, on one hand, and faith as the most fundamental act of life of the individual, on the other. Experience has truth on its side, because truth is always given in advance, and thus only accessible to experience. It must be sensed, heard. Grundtvig’s concept of experience is closely linked with his view of man, according to which man is a divine experiment of dust and spirit. To Grundtvig, the heart is a manifestation of this unity of the physical and the spiritual, just as human speech is a unity of sound and meaning. True experience is the experience of the heart, as different from that of reason. Grundtvig’s defence of freedom in the individual’s experience of God through faith is a defence of the autonomy of the heart, meaning every single individual’s immediate relationship to God.Re 2. The immediacy of the relationship through faith is its certainty. But the message which faith relates to, is always received through intermediary communication, and the process of historical communication is as such of a relative character. In the consciousness of the present, the certainty of faith is thus endangered. This is seen in particular in the relativism which the Scripture as canon has been exposed to through the exegetic sciences. In fact, Grundtvig abandons the Scripture as the basis of communication and rule of faith. Instead he substitutes the Apostolicum, understood as the promised divine Covenant Word and Baptism and Communion. From the beginning of Christianity they have been distinctive signs of the true church of Christ. With their central place in the church service, these words and sacraments have the resurrected Christ Himself as their subject. In other words: In His living presence in the word of faith and the sacraments in the church service, Christ is Himself the communicator, and thus the immediacy, so indispensable for the certainty of faith, is secured. Christ Himself is thus regula fidei.Re 3. Hence, according to Grundtvig, the Christian service is the criterion of Christian identity, as it is the place where one meets the living Christ. Unlike Clausen’s theologically doctrinal and thus intellectual criterion, Grundtvig’s has been deduced from historical experience, that of the individual and that of Christendom. Grundtvig’s view is elucidated by means of a comparison with the criteria of Christian identity proposed by S.W.Sykes in his .The Identity of Christianity which correspond to Grundtvig’s.Re 4. Grundtvig’s ‘church view’ must necessarily lead to the conclusion that the importance of exegetic and dogmatic theology for the origin of faith becomes relative. In comparison with the living presence of Christ in the word of faith and the sacraments, theology will naturally take second place. It cannot create faith. What it can do, however, according to Grundtvig, is to enlighten faith and the life of Christ in faith, partly by interpreting the New Testament as the evidence of faith of the first Christian congregations, partly, in the context of the present, by throwing light on Christian life and its interchange with everything human. When it is understood like this, theology, of course, does not belong in the church, but in the .church school.. Evidently, theology can only accomplish its task in freedom and it must necessarily contain differences like life itself.The conclusion points out that the applicability of Grundtvig’s .church view. in our day is in question because the church service is alien to many people and is consequently celebrated by few. Thus the foundation of experience for the free choice of faith is missing. In present-day theology, two paths stand out as typical in the face of this challenge. One way to go is to make the liturgical and sacramental experience comprehensible, partly in order to motivate people to make that experience themselves, partly in order to help the church to celebrate its service in greater agreement with its content. G. Wainwright and S.W.Sykes represent this attitude. The other way to go is to distinguish consciously between the church as a community of faith and Christianity as a view of life, and to accept fully that the relationship between faith and view of life is reversed on the conditions of modernity. By arguing for the view of life, it is thus attempted to create a convincing foundation for the choice of faith. W.Pannenberg represents this approach.


Author(s):  
Shahrough Akhavi

The doctrine of salvation in Islam centers on the community of believers. Contemporary Muslim political philosophy (or, preferably, political theory) covers a broad expanse that brings under its rubric at least two diverse tendencies: an approach that stresses the integration of religion and politics, and an approach that insists on their separation. Advocates of the first approach seem united in their desire for the “Islamization of knowledge,” meaning that the epistemological foundation of understanding and explanation in all areas of life, including all areas of political life, must be “Islamic.” Thus, one needs to speak of an “Islamic anthropology,” an “Islamic sociology,” an “Islamic political science,” and so on. But there is also a distinction that one may make among advocates of this first approach. Moreover, one can say about many, perhaps most, advocates of the first approach that they feel an urgency to apply Islamic law throughout all arenas of society. This article focuses on the Muslim tradition of political philosophy and considers the following themes: the individual and society, the state, and democracy.


Author(s):  
José Gomes André ◽  

This paper is concerned with the political philosophy of Richard Price, analysing the way this author has developed the concept of liberty and the problem of human rights. The theme of liberty will be interpreted in a double perspective: a) in a private dimension, that sets liberty in the inner side of the individual; b) in a public dimension, that places it in the domain of a manifest action of the individual. We will try to show how this double outlook of liberty is conceived under the optics of a necessary complementarity, since liberty, which is primarily understood as a feature of the subject taken as an individual, acquires only a full meaning when she becomes efective in a comunitary field, as a social and political expression. The concept of human rights will appear located in this analysis, being defined simultaneously as condition and expression of the human dignity and happiness, at the same time natural attributes of an individual that should be cultivated and public effectiveness that contributes to the development of society.


Author(s):  
Wes Furlotte

Chapter ten, therefore, examines the opening section of Hegel’s Rechtphilosophie, “Abstract Right,” in order develop a ‘preliminary sketch’ of the concepts of right and juridical personhood. The chapter historically contextualizes Hegel in relation to the mechanical deterministic conception of the individual (Hobbes) and abstract, though free, conceptions (Rousseau, Kant, Fichte). The chapter then moves to point out Hegel’s uniqueness in this context. Synthesizing Hobbesian and Fichtean standpoints, Hegel argues that the natural dimension of the individual (impulse, drive, and whim) is crucial to the genesis of actual freedom in the social world. Reconstructing Hegel’s analysis, the chapter shows that freedom is not undermined by acting out on one’s desires, impulses etc. but is brought into the world by these very drives. Although these drives are historically and socially conditioned they are, nevertheless, immediate and therefore constitutive of the basal level of juridical personhood. Thereby the chapter argues that a new sense of nature arises within Hegel’s political philosophy. The task, then, is to pursue what nature must mean within the fields constituting the socio-political.


1969 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-320
Author(s):  
Indira Rothermund

The problem of the relation of the individual to society and to the state was central to Gandhi's political thought and action. It has been said that Gandhi's “deliberate onslaught on the creed of individualism as it has been in operation during the last two or three centuries gave it a mortal blow.” How are statements like this to be reconciled with the fact that Gandhi appealed to individual conviction in his campaigns?In analyzing this problem we should look at the main concepts of social and political philosophy which had an impact on Gandhi's life and thought. Indian philosophy is of special importance in this context and therefore a major part of this paper is devoted to the discussion of Indian concepts and ideas as they were understood and interpreted by Gandhi. Much of Gandhi's thought and action can be explained only in terms of the historical situation and the social setting of his day and age. But Gandhi's campaigns and his contribution to the Indian freedom movement have been described by many authors and therefore no attempt is made in this paper to outline the course of events.


Author(s):  
Edward Sankowski

I argue that autonomy should be interpreted as an educational concept, dependent on many educative institutions, including but not limited to government. This interpretation will improve the understanding of autonomy in relation to questions about institutional and societal legitimate authority. I aim to make plausible three connected ideas. (1) Respecting individual autonomy, properly understood, is consistent with an interest in institutions in social and political philosophy. Such interest, however, does require a broadening of questions about institutional and societal legitimacy. (2) Individual autonomy can and should be re-conceived as a multi-institutional educational notion. We must appreciate the manifold institutional process. There are diverse questions about legitimacy as institutional and societal authority that generate normative demands binding on the individual. (3) There is some uncertainty about which institutions do or should educate for autonomy. The shift to an educational, multi-institutional model of autonomy renders more questionable and probably de-emphasizes the role of blame and punishment as paradigmatically institutionalized expressions of respect for autonomy in educating for autonomy. Nonetheless, such an educational model does not eliminate concern about autonomy, blame and punishment. Rather, it broadens questions about the legitimacy of the normative function of various institutions, and of society as a whole.


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