The Concept of Spiritual Sense-Perception and Its Significance in Spiritual Theology

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (0) ◽  
pp. 123-169
Author(s):  
Daniel J Kim
Keyword(s):  
Sense Perception ◽  
Spiritual Theology

Are We Mad? Intensity and the Problems of Modern Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-215
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Bell
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
The Relationship

In this essay Deleuze's concept of intensity is placed into the context of the problem of accounting for the relationship between sense perception and our conceptual categories. By developing the manner in which Kant responds to Hume's critique of metaphysics, this essay shows how Deleuze develops a Humean line of thought whereby the heterogeneous as heterogeneous is embraced rather than, as is done in Kant, being largely held in relationship to an already prior unity.

Space, Color, Sense Perception and the Epistemology of Logic

The Monist ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dallas Willard ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Sense Perception ◽  
Color Sense ◽  
Epistemology Of Logic

Uninstantiability

Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (208) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
John Deely
Keyword(s):  
Concept Formation ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Triadic Relation ◽  
Species Specific ◽  
Internal Sense ◽  
Late Modern ◽  
Modern Sense ◽  
Stimulation Of

AbstractJohn Poinsot (1589–1644), aka Joannes a Sancto Thoma, was the first of St Thomas’ followers among the Latins to demonstrate that the origins of animal knowledge in sensation is already – from the first – a matter of the action of signs. This action, “semiosis,” results in the formation of an irreducibly triadic relation apart from which there is no awareness at all on the part of animals. At the level of internal sense, and then again at the level of intellect (the two having in common dependency upon concept-formation in order to interpret the data provided by sensation), Poinsot shows how the concept serves to make objects known only by serving as the foundation for relations which, exactly as those in sensation, exhibit an irreducibly triadic character, with only this difference: that, whereas the triadic relations of sensation are directly founded upon or “provenate from” species impressa (stimulation of sense powers in bodily interaction with the surroundings) determining the external sense powers, the triadic relations of perceptual and intellectual awareness have as their immediate foundations or “sources of provenation” species expressae (“ideas” or concepts) actively formed by the cognitive powers of memory, imagination, estimation, and intellect. Being relations, all of these triadic relations exhibit no direct instantiation as signate matter, and it is this which makes them only indirectly knowable to sense powers. Intellect, by contrast, in being able to know relations precisely in their difference from related objects and things, manifests the species-specific distinctness of human animals in being able to construct and to know and to communicate about objects – beginning with relations – which admit of no direct sensory instantiation. The purpose of this paper is to show how the ability of the human mind to consider objects which admit of no direct instantiation in sense perception is what distinguishes the human being as “semiotic animal” from what the Latins identified as “brute animals,” not because brutes (the “alloanimals,” to use a term from late modern anthropology) are not “rational” in the modern sense of being able creatively to work through problems (indeed they are rational in this sense!), but because human animals are not confined to the consideration of objects as perceptually instantiable.

The Lever, or How to Act at a Distance: A Backdrop to Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
André Laks
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Extreme Caution ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Physiological Alteration ◽  
Material Process ◽  
Theoretical Frame

AbstractIt is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

Sense-Perception, Reasoning and Forms in Plotinus

Phronesis ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Eyjólfur K. Emilsson
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Concept Formation ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Human Beings

Abstract This paper discusses the role of innate concepts derived from Intellect in Plotinus’ account of cognition of the sensible realm. Several passages have been claimed as evidence for such innateness, but an analysis of them shows that they do not support this claim. It is tentatively suggested that, nevertheless, some very general concepts such as difference, sameness and being are integral to the faculty of sense and play a crucial role in concept formation. It is further argued that reasoning about the sensible realm takes place to a large extent without the involvement of the higher realms of Plotinus’ hierarchy of being. Clearly, however, for value concepts such as those of goodness, justice and beauty human beings are dependent upon an illumination from Intellect.

“Our eyes are sentinels unto our judgments”: Embodied Perception in The Changeling

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-87
Author(s):  
M. Burdick Smith
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Thomas Middleton ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Embodied Perception ◽  
Perceptual Theory ◽  
Dramatic Action

This essay argues that Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's The Changeling (1622) draws on debates about sense perception in the period to interrogate the effects of dramatic representation. After a brief overview of early modern perceptual theory, this essay demonstrates that the play's villain, De Flores, manipulates other characters’ perception through language. In fact, De Flores uses theatrical language to manipulate how other characters perceive their environment, indicating the theater's ability to manipulate audiences. By affecting how characters perceive, De Flores affects other characters’ ability to process and react to their environment, which impedes their judgment. The essay argues that much of The Changeling's dramatic action unfolds through a conflict between two models of perception—presentational and representational—that undergird much of the play's dramatic conflict. In the play, pervasive anxiety about judgment, particularly how perception affects judgment, is structured around the distinction between these two models of perception. Considering the play alongside representational and presentational models indicates how early modern dramatists engage with intellectual theories to consider how representation works and how spaces are experienced. In this way, the theater refracts and dramatizes theories about perception.

Sense Perception of Creolized Text

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-59
Author(s):  
M. O. Matveev ◽  
A. A. Nistratov ◽  
D. M. Polikarpov ◽  
E. F. Tarasov
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Differential ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Mental Images ◽  
Cultural Objects ◽  
Cultural Object

The article deals with the problem of semantic perception of a creolized text consisting of an image and a word denoting the depicted cultural object. The experiment is aimed at solving the problem of the influence of the non-speech component on the understanding of a speech message. In the course of the experiment carried out using Ch. Osgood’s method of semantic differential, the subjects recorded the results of the experiment using questionnaires, in which they reflected their mental images formed during the semantic perception of the creolized text. The study showed that the content of the creolized text differs from the content of both the image and the word denoting it. These differences arise due to the functional and substantial qualities of the depicted cultural objects, since the content of these objects is the content of the words themselves that denote them. Consequently, CT has an enriched content that is different from the content of the object’s image and its verbal designation.

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