scholarly journals Evolution of Government’s Performance Through Yardstick Competition in the Spatial Game of Gubernatorial Elections

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanzhe Tang ◽  
Ke Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Gubernatorial Elections ◽  
Spatial Game

Gubernatorial Elections in Japan

Asian Survey ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 646-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young C. Kim
Keyword(s):  
Gubernatorial Elections

Is Democracy Exportable?

2019 ◽  
pp. 724-742
Author(s):  
Pierre Salmon
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Private Life ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
The People

Among many aspects to the question of whether democracy is exportable, this contribution focuses on the role of the people, understood not as a unitary actor but as a heterogeneous set: the citizens. The people matter, in a different way, both in the countries to which democracy might be exported and in the democratic countries in which the question is about promoting democracy elsewhere. The mechanisms or characteristics involved in the discussion include yardstick competition, differences among citizens in the intensity of their preferences, differences among autocracies regarding intrusion into private life, citizens’ assessments of future regime change, and responsiveness of elected incumbents to the views of minorities. The second part of the contribution explains why promotion of democracy is more likely to work through citizens’ concern with human rights abuses than with regime characteristics.

scholarly journals Managerial Accountability Under Yardstick Competition

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele G. Giuranno ◽  
Marcella Scrimitore ◽  
Giorgos Stamatopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Good Practices ◽  
Direct Competition

AbstractTwo well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers’ accountability are yardstick competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment. Monitoring is used by firms to detect managers’ rent-seeking activities. While common wisdom suggests that the joint use of the two means would reinforce each other in promoting managers good practices, we find that their interplay distorts managers’ behavior who may end up acting in a less accountable way. Furthermore, differences in monitoring across firms bias that distortion, yielding even more counterintuitive results.

Tensions between tiers of Bolivian government may grow

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Far Right ◽  
La Paz ◽  
Gubernatorial Elections ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Modus Vivendi ◽  
El Alto ◽  
The Government

Significance The MAS’s national-level appeal tends not to translate into support in localised elections, and a poor choice of candidates, particularly in El Alto, has proved self-defeating. Impacts Second-round gubernatorial elections will probably take place in six out of nine departments. Camacho, a far-right businessman turned politician, will use his newly gained legitimacy to harry the government. The Arce government will seek a modus vivendi with opposition mayors such as those of La Paz and Cochabamba.

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