scholarly journals The "H5N1 publication case" and its conclusions.

2012 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregor Becker

The request of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to the editors of the scientific journals SCIENCE and NATURE not to publish details on the modified H5N1-virus has surprisingly not caused a discussion on censorship within the scientific community (NSABB, 2012a, P.1). This may show that science generally acknowledges the necessity to cut out sensitive data from research results in publications that may serve as a manual for weapons of mass destruction. In this article the policy of the NSABB and the reaction of the scientific community is discussed, as well as the meaning of censorship in dual use research and how an appropriate organisation of future surveillance in sensitive science fields could be organised: To guarantee future undisturbed work in sensitive science fields, the establishment of an internationally organised frame for scientists dealing with dual-use-research is suggested.

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-713
Author(s):  
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley ◽  

Since 2000 a number of controversial research projects have raised concerns that states or terrorist groups might use published research results to replicate the work for malevolent purposes. The issue came into greater focus in December 2011, after it was revealed that the U.S.-based National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity had requested one U.S. and another Dutch lab to halt publication of work describing what was done to enhance the transmissibility of the H5N1 flu virus to mammals. In spite of a decade of debate and policy development to prevent bio-attacks and the misuse of dual-use research, little effort has been made to determine whether scientific publications can indeed help replication by untrained individuals. This paper taps into the extensive science and technology literature and recent studies in the security field, to show that replication of scientific work is inherently difficult and probably inaccessible to untrained individuals. The paper also offers new policy options designed to more effectively prevent the misuse of dual-use research.


Author(s):  
Oleksandr Boguslavskyy ◽  

The article is devoted to the study of economic contradictions related to the use and transfer of dual-use goods and technologies. The article highlights different approaches to defining the categories «technology» and «dual-use technology». Types of dual-use technologies are outlined. The main economic contradictions related to the use and transfer of dual- use goods and technologies are identified: 1) contradictions related to the creation of new technologies that can be both useful in the civilian and military spheres; 2) contradictions related to the manufacture and use of dual-use goods; 3) Contradictions are related to the creation of new means of production that can be used both for the production of civilian goods and for CBRN; 4) contradictions in the use of technological processes for the civilian and military spheres; 5) contradictions related to the development of transport and improvement of methods of delivery of CBRN; 6) contradictions between the interests of economic development of different countries on the basis of the introduction of new technologies and non-proliferation of CBRN; 7) interstate political and economic contradictions regarding the CBRN; 8) contradictions between groups of countries and individual countries regarding the non-proliferation of CBRN; 9) contradictions related to environmental pollution in the process of manufacturing and testing of CBRN; 10) contradictions in the realization of economic and political interests between countries that have modern weapons of mass destruction and countries that do not possess these weapons; 11) contradictions regarding the protection of their national interests etc. The peculiarities of the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies in the modern economy are shown and it is determined that it acquires a network character. The need to apply export controls to the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies is emphasized.


2021 ◽  
pp. 13-30
Author(s):  
Jan van Lieshout ◽  
Robert Beeres

AbstractTaking an economic perspective, and underpinned by a literature review, this chapter analyses the development of explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent variables in the international arms trade from 1995 onwards. We distinguish five main categories within the markets of military and dual-use goods and services, comprising weapons of mass destruction, major weapon systems, small arms and light weapons, dual-use goods, and services. Per category, papers are ordered by research type and methodology. Based on our findings thus far, the final section of the chapter offers a research agenda for further studies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-45
Author(s):  
Vasile Dinu ◽  
Cristina Lazar ◽  
Ion-Stelian Chihai

Abstract This study addresses a very special issue, i.e. the import-export of those products, goods and technology that normally have civilian uses, but which, because of their nature, may also have military applications. In our opinion, the subject is particularly interesting since these products are related to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we aimed at highlighting the most important aspects of the marketing standards and practices for the control on dual-use items, with reference to the national and international legal systems in the field. We used the latest bibliography, focusing on documentary sources for certain credibility.


mSphere ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Imperiale ◽  
Arturo Casadevall

ABSTRACT This year, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) will be making recommendations to the U.S. Government regarding the ongoing saga of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments with highly infectious respiratory pathogens, such as influenza virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus.


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