Public Procurement and Innovative Economy Forming

2010 ◽  
pp. 108-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Smotritskaya ◽  
S. Chernykh
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Innovative Activity ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Effective Management ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Innovative Economy ◽  
Procurement System

The article analyzes the conceptual framework of public procurement system as an integral part of public regulation to ensure effective management of public resources. The authors consider the problems of transition to a new "quality" of the procurement system, increasing its innovative activity. They put forward proposals for institutional framework and mechanisms of regulating procurement, meeting the needs in innovative upgrading and modernization of the Russian economy.

Veiled Theory: The Transmutation of Anthropology in T. S. Eliot's Critical Method

Paragraph ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Trexler
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Literary Criticism ◽  
Literary Theory ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
Institutional History ◽  
Human History ◽  
Critical Practice ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Historical Moment

While literary criticism is often seen as an unself-reflective forerunner to literary theory, this article argues that T.S. Eliot's theory of critical practice was a philosophically informed methodology of reading designed to create a disciplinary and institutional framework. To reconstruct this theory, it enriches theoretical methodology with intellectual and institutional history. Specifically, the article argues that Eliot's early critical theory depended on the paradigms of anthropology and occultism, developed during his philosophical investigation of anthropology and Leibniz. From this investigation, Eliot created an occult project that used spiritual monads as facts to progress toward the Absolute. The article goes on to argue that Eliot's methodology of reading was shaped by anthropology's and occultism's paradigms of non-academic, non-specialist reading societies that sought a super-historic position in human history through individual progress. The reconstruction of Eliot's intellectual and institutional framework for reading reveals a historical moment with sharp differences and surprising similarities to the present.

CORRUPTION IN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF DEMOCRACY

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 221-241
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Weinstock
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Central Task ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
Positive Traits ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract:In this essay I argue that adversarial institutional systems, such as multi-party democracy, present a distinctive risk of institutional corruption, one that is particularly difficult to counteract. Institutional corruption often results not from individual malfeasance, but from perverse incentives that make it the case that agents within an institutional framework have rival institutional interests that risk pitting individual advantage against the functioning of the institution in question. Sometimes, these perverse incentives are only contingently related to the central animating logic of an institution. In these cases, immunizing institutions from the risk of corruption is not a theoretically difficult exercise. In other cases, institutions generate perverse or rival incentives in virtue of some central feature of the institution’s design, one that is also responsible for some of the institution’s more positive traits. In multi-party democratic systems, partisanship risks giving rise to too close an identification of the partisan’s interest with that of the party, to the detriment of the democratic system as a whole. But partisanship is also necessary to the functioning of such a system. Creating bulwarks that allow the positive aspects of partisanship to manifest themselves, while offsetting the aspects of partisanship through which individual advantage of democratic agents is linked too closely to party success, is a central task for the theory and practice of the institutional design of democracy.

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