scholarly journals Dreaming the Chinese Dream

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan R. Landsberger

On 1 October 2014, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will observe the 65th anniversary of its founding which ended a decades’ long period of oppression by imperialism, internal strife and (civil) war. Under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), modernisation became the most important task. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought guided the nation along this path that would lead to modernisation and the recognition of the new, strong China. As the first three decades passed, it became clear that ideological purity and revolutionary motivation did not lead to the realisation of the dream of rejuvenation. In late 1978, the Maoist revolutionary goals were replaced by the pragmatic policies that turned China into today’s economic powerhouse. How has this radical turn from revolution to economic development been realised? How has it affected China’s political, social and artistic cultures? Is China’s present Dream structurally different from the one cherished in 1949?

1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (14) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Marian Tadeusz Mencel

This lecture includes an attempt to answer the question: what the connection of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De was, and what conditions contributed to the fact that both Zhou Enlai and Zhu De did not share the fate of the political opponents of Mao Zedong, inter alia Liu Shaoqi, Wang Ming, Gao Gang and others. Recognizing the political reality of China of the period from the creation of the CPC to the death of the heroes, the synthetic approach shows their resumes, and an attempt was taken to involve the most important facts to answer the questions, inter alia about civil, war of national liberation, domestic and foreign policy of China implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Communist Party of China and the role of the heroes in shaping the cultural and civilisation order after the declaration of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Zhai

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who seized power in Beijing in 1949 viewed Tibet as Chinese territory. In this respect, they were no different from previous rulers of China. The chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, carefully devised a plan to re-annex Tibet, which had been effectively independent of China since 1911. The CCP's recent victory in the Chinese civil war gave Mao high confidence that he could reclaim Tibet without provoking outside intervention. Such a move not only would bring international political benefits but would also carry a symbolic meaning at home and thereby legitimize the rule of the CCP. Although Mao sent troops to Tibet, he also planned to rely on negotiations and coercive diplomacy. This article highlights the complicated relationships that emerged on the international scene as a result of China's actions in the early 1950s.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilker Gündoğan ◽  
Albrecht Sonntag

Football has become a field of high priority for development by the central government of the People's Republic of China. After Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, a football development strategy was launched, including four “comprehensive” reforms. The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of these reforms by Chinese football supporters – a fundamental stakeholder group – through an online survey. Particular emphasis was laid on how nationalistic attitudes underpin supporters' expectations, especially with regard to the concept of the “Chinese Dream.” In addition, issues of football governance were also addressed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-114
Author(s):  
Sergey Radchenko

This article reconsiders the 1945 Chongqing peace talks between the Kuo-mintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a key turning point on the road to the Chinese civil war. The article shows that the talks represented a lost opportunity to avert the slide into fratricidal warfare. The CCP leader, Mao Zedong, under pressure from Iosif Stalin, was prepared to compromise with his rival Chiang Kai-shek on the basis of dividing China into two separately administered territories (roughly, north and south). Chiang was unwilling to consider such a step, which from his perspective was unpatriotic. His resistance to the division of China doomed the talks and precipitated the outbreak of war.


2021 ◽  
pp. 256-287
Author(s):  
John T. Sidel

This chapter starts with the introduction of Thanh Niên dissolution as a coherent organization, leaving in its wake a welter of new groupings: an Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), a rival Annamese Communist Party in Cochinchina, and the Annam-based Tân Việt (New Việtnam). The chapter demonstrates the onset, unfolding, and ultimate outcomes of the Việtnamese Revolution, which were shaped by World War II, successive seismic shifts in neighboring China, from the overthrow of the Qing and the warlord era to the rise and fall of the KMT (Kuomintang)-CCP (Chinese Communist Party) United Front, the Japanese invasion and occupation, the civil war, and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The chapter also highlights the establishment of an armed united front effectively under ICP control but aimed to encompass — or overshadow — a broader array of groups active in southern China, the Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh (Việtnam Independence League, or Việt Minh). Ultimately, the chapter exemplifies the broader importance of China's role in enabling Việtnamese revolutionary mobilization, from the heyday of Phan Bội Châu through Thanh Niên, and the ICP and the Việt Minh.


2006 ◽  
Vol 188 ◽  
pp. 870-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
William C. Kirby

The People's Republic of China, like the Chinese Communist Party that ruled it, was from its conception internationalist in premise and in promise. The PRC in its formative years would be Moscow's most faithful and self-sacrificing ally, a distinction earned in blood in Korea and by the fact that, unlike the East European “people's democracies,” the PRC's allegiance was not bought at gunpoint. This article researches one of the most ambitious international undertakings of that era: the effort to plan the development of half the world and to create a socialist world economy stretching from Berlin to Canton. What was China's role in this undertaking, and how did it shape the early PRC? How did this socialist world economy work (or not work)? How successfully internationalist was a project negotiated by sovereign (and Stalinist) states? Why did Mao Zedong ultimately destroy it, and with it, the dream of communist internationalism?


2020 ◽  
Vol 249 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-294
Author(s):  
Julian Gewirtz

Abstract This article examines how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interpreted HIV/AIDS in the period from 1984, when the Chinese government first introduced policies reacting to the disease’s emergence, to 2000, when China’s devastating epidemic began to receive worldwide media attention. Important new sources show how the CCP cast HIV/AIDS as a staging ground for debates about the risks of liberalization and an evolving metaphor for deviance from socialism even in an era of capitalistic changes. Just as anti-capitalist ideology shaped official understandings of HIV/AIDS, so too did HIV/AIDS shape official views about the perils of China’s ‘reform and opening’ and the risks of capitalism to China. This two-way flow of meanings, which carried epidemiological and human consequences, illustrates the need for scholars of this period to foreground the evolving official ideology and forms of resistance to global capitalism — in politics, culture, society and even public health — rather than only the more common and sanguine narrative of rapid growth and economic development. Far more than previously understood, the interplay between AIDS and CCP ideology in this period reveals crucial dynamics in the evolution of China’s ongoing encounter with global capitalism.


1981 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 518-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. G. Goodman

The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met in Beijing from 27 to 29 June 1981. On its agenda were two items: changes in the highest-level leadership of the CCP, and the “ Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic of China.” ‘ Though the Plenum's decisions to a large extent confirmed and made official trends and policies that had become apparent during most of the previous year, they were nonetheless remarkable. The western press has, not unsurprisingly, focused on the replacement of Hua Guofeng by Hu Yaobang as Chairman of the CCP's Central Committee. However, the Plenum's reassessment of the Party's history since 1949; of the roles of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng and other CCP leaders; and of the nature of Mao Zedong Thought, are undoubtedly of greater significance in terms of the development of the People's Republic of China (PRC): as indeed is the fact of Hua Guofeng's demotion rather than his outright dismissal or “ purge.”


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