scholarly journals O nieadekwatności Bertranda Russella rozróżnienia na prymarne i sekundarne użycie zwrotów denotujących

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-284
Author(s):  
Piotr Lipski
Keyword(s):  

W swojej przełomowej pracy „Denotowanie” Bertrand Russell wprowadza rozróżnienie pomiędzy prymarnym i sekundarnym użyciem zwrotów denotujących. Rozróżnienie umożliwia opis wieloznaczności niektórych zdań zawierających zwroty denotujące. Jak zauważył Saul Kripke, chociaż rozróżnienie Russella wydaje się być dychotomiczne, niektóre wieloznaczne zdania zawierające zwroty denotujące można interpretować na więcej niż tylko dwa sposoby. W niniejszym artykule argumentuję, że istnieją jeszcze inne możliwe interpretacje, niewzmiankowane ani przez Russella, ani Kripkego. Ponadto pokazuję, że te inne możliwe interpretacje różnią się również od tzw. odczytań Fodor.

2019 ◽  
pp. 14-37
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau

Kant famously declared that existence is not a (real) predicate. This famous dictum has been seen as echoed in the doctrine of the founders of modern logic, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that existence isn’t a first-order property possessed by individuals, but rather a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier. Russell in 1905 combined this doctrine with his new theory of descriptions and declared the paradox of nonexistence to be resolved without resorting to his earlier distinction between existence and being. In recent years, however, logicians and philosophers like Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, and Nathan Salmon have argued that there is no defensible reason to deny that existence is a property of individuals. Kant’s dictum has also been re-evaluated, the result being that the paradox of nonexistence has not, after all, disappeared. Yet it’s not clear how exactly Kripke et al. propose to resolve the paradox.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-122
Author(s):  
Fernando Raul Neto ◽  
Jeferson Santos

O objetivo deste artigo, como expresso em seu título, é a tradução de “Reference and Definite Descriptions” (1966) de Keith Donnellan (1931-2015). A tradução é precedida por uma introdução ao texto. Nela os autores trazem uma contextualização do artigo e um resumo de cada uma das suas nove partes. O artigo de Donnellan, “On Denoting” (1905) de Bertrand Russell e “On Referring” (1950) de P. F. Strawson serão alvos das críticas de Saul Kripke em seu livro “Naming and Necessity” (1972). Há traduções disponíveis em língua portuguesa dos artigos de Russell, Strawson e do livro de Kripke. Não havia ainda do artigo de Donnellan. A tradução aqui apresentada pretende preencher essa lacuna, ainda mais quando se sabe que o “Reference and Definite Descriptions” é texto obrigatório das disciplinas de filosofia da linguagem das universidades brasileiras.


Author(s):  
G. W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Leemon B. McHenry

What kinds of things are events? Battles, explosions, accidents, crashes, rock concerts would be typical examples of events and these would be reinforced in the way we speak about the world. Events or actions function linguistically as verbs and adverbs. Philosophers following Aristotle have claimed that events are dependent on substances such as physical objects and persons. But with the advances of modern physics, some philosophers and physicists have argued that events are the basic entities of reality and what we perceive as physical bodies are just very long events spread out in space-time. In other words, everything turns out to be events. This view, no doubt, radically revises our ordinary common sense view of reality, but as our event theorists argue common sense is out of touch with advancing science. In The Event Universe: The Revisionary Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead, Leemon McHenry argues that Whitehead's metaphysics provides a more adequate basis for achieving a unification of physical theory than a traditional substance metaphysics. He investigates the influence of Maxwell's electromagnetic field, Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum mechanics on the development of the ontology of events and compares Whitehead’s theory to his contemporaries, C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell, as well as another key proponent of this theory, W. V. Quine. In this manner, McHenry defends the naturalized and speculative approach to metaphysics as opposed to analytical and linguistic methods that arose in the 20th century.


Author(s):  
James McElvenny

This book is a historical study of influential currents in the philosophy of language and linguistics of the first half of the twentieth century, explored from the perspective of the English scholar C. K. Ogden (1889–1957). Although no ‘Great Man’ in his own right, Ogden had a personal connection, reflected in his work, to several of the most significant figures of the age. The background to the ideas espoused in Ogden’s book The Meaning of Meaning, co-authored with I.A. Richards (1893–1979), is examined in detail, along with the application of these ideas in his international language project Basic English. A richly interlaced network of connections is revealed between early analytic philosophy, semiotics and linguistics, all inevitably shaped by the contemporary cultural and political environment. In particular, significant interaction is shown between Ogden’s ideas, the varying versions of ‘logical atomism’ of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgensten (1889–1951), Victoria Lady Welby’s (1837–1912) ‘significs’, and the philosophy and political activism of Otto Neurath (1882–1945) and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) of the Vienna Circle. Amid these interactions emerges a previously little known mutual exchange between the academic philosophy and linguistics of the period and the practically oriented efforts of the international language movement.


Author(s):  
Michael Ruse

In 1914, Europe went to war, because of German expansionism, but without a central moral purpose as in 1939. Christian leaders had to scramble to find justification, which they soon located in our sinful nature, and most particularly the sinful nature of the opponents. In major respects, therefore, the First World War was a religious war, battling against the infidel. Anglican leaders, like the Bishop of London, Arthur F. Winnington Ingram, urged the necessity of killing Germans; and Lutheran leaders on the other side, like Adolf von Harnack, were no less bloodthirsty. There was an often-despised pacifist minority. In England, this included the philosopher Bertrand Russell, who was very much not a Christian, and members of the “Fellowship of Reconciliation,” who very much were Christians. In America, the Episcopalian bishop of Utah, Paul Jones, got the sack because of his pacifism, and the Catholic Ben Salmon was sent to jail and refused communion by his church.


Ethics ◽  
1945 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-77
Author(s):  
Everett W. Hall
Keyword(s):  

Elements ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Sheridan

The analytic tradition in philosophy stems from the work of German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege. Bertrand Russell brough Frege's program to render language-particularly scientific language-in formal logical terms to the forefront of philosophy in the early twentieth century. The quest to clarify language and parse out genuine philosophical problems remains a cornerstone of analytic philosophy, but investigative programs involving the broad application of formal symbolic logic to language have largely been abandoned due to the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. This article identifies the key philosophical moves that must be performed successfully in order for Frege's "conceptual notation" and other similar systems to adequately capture syntax and semantics. These moves ultimately fail as a result of the nature of linguistic meaning. The shift away from formal logical analysis of language and the emergence of the current analytic style becomes clearer when this failure is examined critically.


1930 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 435-436
Author(s):  
C. Delisle Burns
Keyword(s):  

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