scholarly journals The Revival of Substance Dualism

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
Howard Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Substance Dualism

I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.

On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Reza Tahmasbi
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Substance Dualism ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Over Time

Abstract The diachronic question of persons deals with personal identity over time: “In virtue of what conditions is a person, P 1, at t 1, the same person, P 2, at t 2?” To answer the question, I suggest expanding the constitution theory from a static definition to a dynamic definition. ‘Life’ is an event and the stream of consciousness is an event too. Reflective self-consciousness—which I take to be definitive of persons—is an event. Persons are irreducible constituted events who remain the same through time while they undergo change. This idea faces neither the problem of substance dualism nor the fission problem.

scholarly journals No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Main Element ◽  
Substance Dualism ◽  
Over Time

A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalyzable.

Ethnic Identity and Personal Identity.

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph H. Turner
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Identity ◽  
Personal Identity
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