Monopolistic credit market in the conditions of imperfect information

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karel Janda
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Credit Guarantees ◽  
Government Credit

Imperfect information in the monopolistic credit market could lead to the rejection of credit provision to some applicants for credit. The choice of which class of borrowers is rejected credit depends on the relations among some characteristics of borrowers. The inefficiency of credit market could be alleviated by government credit guarantees.

A Theory of Subnational Government Capital Market Information

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-20
Author(s):  
Christine R. Martell ◽  
Tima T. Moldogaziev ◽  
Salvador Espinosa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Finance ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Theoretical Base ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Market Information ◽  
Credit Quality ◽  
Subnational Government ◽  
Government Credit

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical base for why and how information resolution is expected to relate to subnational government capital market borrowing by reviewing and extending the corporate finance literature. Based on theories of information, it argues that although countries must have a certain level of maturity along economic, financial and market, political, and legal institutions before successfully managing a well-functioning capital market, the crowning factor behind an efficient subnational government credit market, beyond the fundamental dimensions of institutional maturity, is credit contractibility in the system and tools of information certification and monitoring available to subnational governments. This chapter details how information problems manifest in credit contractibility, reviews how information relates to capital finance, and applies theories of capital markets to subnational government borrowing, debt size, and debt composition. It discusses how information resolution institutions and credit quality can enhance subnational government capital markets and proposes testable hypotheses.

Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs

2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Monitoring ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Environment Monitoring ◽  
Nature Protection ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Effective System

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

The Systemic Effects of Prudential Regulation Toughening:The Results of a Stress-test for Russian Banks

2012 ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Mamonov ◽  
A. Pestova ◽  
O. Solntsev
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Stress Test ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Prudential Regulation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

The stability of Russian banking sector is threatened by three negative tendencies - overheating of the credit market, significant decrease of banks capital adequacy ratios, and growing problems associated with banks lending to affiliated non-financial corporations. The co-existence of these processes reflects the crisis of the model of private investments in Russian banking sector, which was observed during the last 20 years. This paper analyzes the measures of the Bank of Russia undertaken to maintain the stability of the banking sector using the methodology of credit risk stress-testing. Based on this methodology we conclude that the Bank of Russias actions can prevent the overheating of the credit market, but they can also lead to undesirable effects: further expansion of the government ownership in Russian banking sector and substitution of domestic credit supply by cross-border corporate borrowings. The later weakens the competitive positions of Russian banks. We propose a set of measures to harmonize the prudential regulation of banks. Our suggestions rely on design and further implementation of the programs aimed at developing new markets for financial services provided by Russian banks to their corporate and retail customers. The estimated effects of proposed policy measures are both the increase in profitability and capitalization of Russian banks and the decrease of banks demand for government support.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document