scholarly journals Tax Competition in the European Union and Its Influence on the Shift in the Tax Burden

2007 ◽  
Vol 2007 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-72
Author(s):  
Danuše Nerudová ◽  
Svatopluk Kapounek ◽  
Jitka Poměnková
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Burden ◽  
The European Union

scholarly journals The empirical study of the tax competition in the European Union

2007 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danuše Nerudová ◽  
Svatopluk Kapounek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Cointegration Analysis ◽  
Tax Burden ◽  
Capital Taxation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Time Period

The increase in the capital mobility forces the Member States to decrease tax burden on capital. Lower revenues from capital taxation have to be compensated by the increase in tax burden on labor. The aim of the article is verify the hypothesis that increasing capital mobility leads to the decrease in the tax burden on capital and also that decrease in the tax burden on capital leads to the increase in the tax burden on labor. The hypothesis will be tested for EU Member States in the time period 1991–2005 by using cointegration analysis.

scholarly journals Tax Competition in the European Union

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIVEK H. DEHEJIA ◽  
PHILIPP GENSCHEL
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
The European Union

Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union

1996 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Hallerberg
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
National Government ◽  
Common Denominator ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Data Set ◽  
State Tax

The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I. This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator state, but pressure from the national government, especially to increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates. These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor.

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