Kindergartners’ Engagement in an Epistemic Practice of Engineering: Persisting and Learning from Failure

This chapter argues that academic freedom is justified because it is an inherently epistemic practice that serves the ideals of democracy. With Dewey, it is argued that “The one thing that is inherent and essential [to the idea of a university] is the ideal of truth.” But far from being apolitical, the value of pursuing truth and knowledge—the value that justifies academic freedom, both within and without the public mind—is a fundamental democratic value, and for three reasons: the practices of academic inquiry exemplify rational inquiry of the kind needed for democratic deliberation; those practices serve to train students to pursue that kind of inquiry; and those practices are important engines of democratic dissent.

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Factors to assess teacher design knowledge competencies: data literacies practice, design practice, and distributed epistemic practice (3Ds)

International Journal of Technology and Design Education ◽

10.1007/s10798-021-09683-5 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Mi Song Kim

Keyword(s):

Design Knowledge ◽

Design Practice ◽

Epistemic Practice ◽

Knowledge Competencies ◽

Teacher Design

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Trust in the time of corona: epistemic practice beyond hard evidence

Cultural Studies of Science Education ◽

10.1007/s11422-021-10045-9 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Jessica S. C. Leung ◽

Maurice M. W. Cheng

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Practice ◽

Hard Evidence

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Epistemic corruption and the research impact agenda

Theory and Research in Education ◽

10.1177/14778785211029516 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 148-167

Author(s):

Ian James Kidd ◽

Jennifer Chubb ◽

Joshua Forstenzer

Keyword(s):

Research Impact ◽

Interview Data ◽

Empirical Methods ◽

Epistemic Practice ◽

Academic Researchers ◽

Critical Scrutiny ◽

The Impact

Contemporary epistemologists of education have raised concerns about the distorting effects of some of the processes and structures of contemporary academia on the epistemic practice and character of academic researchers. Such concerns have been articulated using the concept of epistemic corruption. In this article, we lend credibility to these theoretically motivated concerns using the example of the research impact agenda during the period 2012–2014. Interview data from UK and Australian academics confirm that the impact agenda system, at its inception, facilitated the development and exercise of epistemic vices. As well as vindicating theoretically motivated claims about epistemic corruption, inclusion of empirical methods and material can help us put the concept to work in ongoing critical scrutiny of evolving forms of the research impact agenda.

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