Analytical Philosophy in the Service of Contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy of Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (null) ◽  
pp. 147-179
Author(s):  
Kyunghwi Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
American Philosophy ◽  
Anglo American

The History and Foundations of Criticism of H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Positivism in R. Dworkin’s Philosophy of Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (7) ◽  
pp. 124-142
Author(s):  
Sofya V. Koval
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
American Philosophy ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
History Of ◽  
Competing Models ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

The paper discusses the Anglo-American philosophy of law of the 20th century, more specifically the philosophy of law of Ronald Myles Dworkin and his criticism of the legal positivism of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. The author presents the history of the criticism of legal positivism in Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law and distinguishes historical stages. The subject of the study is the critique of legal positivism but not the Hart-Dworkin debate itself, well known in Western philosophy of law. The reason is that the discussion was conducted between Dworkin and Hart’s supporters but not between Dworkin and Hart by himself. The latter responded to the criticism only after twenty seven years. The article explains why Dworkin chose for his criticism Herbert Hart’s version of legal positivism. This is due to the fact that Dworkin highly appreciated Hart’s positivist theory of law and characterized it as the “most clear.” The article presents the methodological foundations of criticism of Hart’s legal positivism in Dworkin’s philosophy of law. It reveals a methodological divergence between the two legal theories, which directly affects the understanding of the concept of law and its content. Therefore, we can assume that the legal theories of Hart and Dworkin are two competing models of law: Dworkin’s model considers law as a set of rules and principles and Hart’s model acknowledges only rules and court decisions as a source of law. The article also presents the key principles of positivism criticized by Dworkin. These principles, firstly, interpret law as a set of legal rules determined through a special legal criterion, secondly, provide the judge with an opportunity to make a decision “at his own discretion” in a situation not regulated by law, and, thirdly, recognize only legal rights and obligations enshrined in legal regulations. It is important to note that in this article the author describes criticism as an independent phenomenon of legal philosophy with a particular focus on the history and foundations of this phenomenon.

The Diremption of Love: Gillian Rose on Agency, Mortality, and Hegelian Feminism

Hypatia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-328
Author(s):  
Asaf Angermann
Keyword(s):  
Feminist Philosophy ◽  
American Philosophy ◽  
Jewish Thought ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Gillian Rose ◽  
Power And Powerlessness ◽  
Philosophical Writings ◽  
British Philosopher

Gillian Rose (1947–1995) was an influential though idiosyncratic British philosopher whose work helped introduce the Frankfurt School's critical theory and renew interest in Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Jewish thought in Anglo‐American philosophy. After years of relative oblivion, her life and thought have recently received new attention in philosophy, sociology, and theology. However, her work's critical Hegelian contribution to feminist philosophy still remains unexplored. This article seeks to reassess the place and the meaning of feminism and gender identity in Rose's work by addressing both her philosophical writings and her personal memoir, written in the months preceding her untimely death. It argues that although Rose's overall work was not developed in a feminist context, her philosophy, and in particular her ethical‐political notion of diremption, is valuable for developing a critical feminist philosophy that overcomes the binaries of law and morality, inclusion and exclusion, power and powerlessness—and focuses on the meaning of love as negotiating, rather than mediating, these oppositions.

Cavell, Stanley (1926–)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Mulhall
Keyword(s):  
Literary Criticism ◽  
Literary Theory ◽  
Film Studies ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Stanley Cavell ◽  
American Philosophy ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Theory Of Value

Born in Atlanta, Georgia, Stanley Cavell has held the Walter M. Cabot Chair in Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University since 1963. The range, diversity and distinctiveness of his writings are unparalleled in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. As well as publishing essays on modernist painting and music, he has created a substantial body of work in film studies, literary theory and literary criticism; he has introduced new and fruitful ways of thinking about psychoanalysis and its relationship with philosophy; and his work on Heidegger and Derrida, taken together with his attempts to revitalize the tradition of Emersonian Transcendentalism, have defined new possibilities for a distinctively American contribution to philosophical culture. This complex oeuvre is unified by a set of thematic concerns – relating to scepticism and moral perfectionism – which are rooted in Cavell’s commitment to the tradition of ordinary language philosophy, as represented in the work of J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein.

Cavell on Skepticism and the Importance of Not-Knowing

2014 ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Macarthur
Keyword(s):  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
American Pragmatism ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
American Philosophy ◽  
Early Essay ◽  
Anglo American

In an early essay Cavell set his sights on trying to make Wittgenstein’s philosophy available to Anglo-American philosophy in the first decade after the publication of Philosophical Investigations when it was hard to see what Wittgenstein was up to through the haze of logical positivism, linguistic conventionalism and American pragmatism. In this paper I would like to make an analogous attempt to make Cavell’s philosophy available to Anglo-American philosophy against a perception of it as being slighted, missed, or avoided in contemporary philosophical discussion. 

Emotion

2020 ◽  
pp. 966-982
Author(s):  
Michael Spitzer ◽  
Derek Matravers
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Future Of Work ◽  
American Philosophy ◽  
Expression Of Emotion ◽  
Dual Perspective ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
Psychology Of Music ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Jerrold Levinson

This chapter considers the expression of emotion by music, the most interesting of the relations between music and the emotions. It is written from the dual perspective of Anglo-American philosophy and of musicology. The former focuses on the conceptual analysis of emotion, the latter on the underlying causes of the listeners’ experience. The theories of Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson are considered and criticized, and recent work in the psychology of music is examined in the light of the pioneering account of expression from Leonard Meyer. Finally, there is some speculation as to the future of work in this area.

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