scholarly journals Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: An Effective Means of Combatting Health Insurers' Discrimination Against Individuals with HIV/AIDS?

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Spenser G. Benge
Keyword(s):  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
The Affordable Care Act ◽  
Health Insurers ◽  
Hiv Aids

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 223-226
Author(s):  
Dan Royles
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
United States ◽  
Health Equity ◽  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Year ◽  
Communities Of Color ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Affordable Care Act ◽  
Hiv Aids

This chapter considers what it means to write the history of a crisis that has not yet ended, and briefly traces connections among the stories told in previous chapters. It connects these stories to the ongoing fight for health equity in the United States, including the author’s involvement in the fight to preserve the Affordable Care Act in the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency. Finally, it compares HIV/AIDS to climate change, as both are existential crises that will disproportionately affect poor communities of color.

Accounting-Based Regulation: Evidence from Health Insurers and the Affordable Care Act

2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000
Author(s):  
Evan M. Eastman ◽  
David L. Eckles ◽  
Andrew Van Buskirk
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Minimum Amount ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Patient Protection ◽  
The Affordable Care Act ◽  
Health Insurers

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that insurers spend a minimum amount of their premium revenue on policyholder benefits. The Act specifies enforcement via a combination of insurer self-reporting, government examinations, and payment of policyholder rebates in cases where insurers fail to meet the required spending amount. We find that insurers' reported estimates are consistently overstated in situations where more accurate estimates would have triggered rebate payments; publicly-traded insurers (particularly those exhibiting poor financial reporting quality) exhibit the strongest evidence of strategic over-estimating. In aggregate, we estimate that approximately 14 percent of insurers engage in strategic overestimates, and that insurer overestimates resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in underpaid policyholder rebates. Our study illustrates how a combination of regulatory design choices and lax oversight can weaken the effectiveness of accounting-based regulation and have substantial economic consequences.

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