scholarly journals Moving Faster Than the Speed of Regulation: Can State-Authorized Sports Wagering Dodge a Game-Fixing Bullet Without the Help of the Feds?

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Anthony Cabot ◽  
Keith Miller

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), was a 1992 law that, as has been well-documented, effectively restricted sports betting to Nevada. PASPA accomplished this by dictating that states could not "sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact," sports wagering. A separate provision forbade private parties from operating state-authorized sportsbooks. In 2018, the Supreme Court invalidated PASPA as a violation of the 10th Amendment to the US Constitution. The Court held that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to tell a state how to legislate and PASPA's provision that states could not authorize sports betting dictated to state legislatures what they were permitted to do and not do. The Court's ruling unleashed an explosion of pent-up energy for sports betting that had been building since PASPA became effective in 1993. Since that decision, several states have authorized sports betting in one of the most rapid expansions of a form of gambling in US history. Even more states are considering legislation that would permit sports betting, and the number of states legalizing and regulating sports betting will inevitably increase in 2020 and beyond. The controversy over sports betting has pivoted from whether states could legally offer sports betting, to whether they should legalize sports wagering, and if so, how they should go about regulating it.

2021 ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Elliott Young

Although the Supreme Court limited detention for non-citizens in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Zadvydas [2000] and Martinez [2005]), its most recent decisions indicate that under certain circumstances non-citizens can be held indefinitely behind bars with no possibility of even a bond hearing. In practice, non-citizens deemed excludable from the United States are like the forever prisoners of Guantanamo, exposed to massive state power with few constitutional protections. Khalid Qassim is one of the forty Guantanamo detainees held for more than eighteen years to date with no charges and no trial. Although Guantanamo prisoners are not voluntary immigrants, they share with immigrants a lack of protection by the US Constitution and a vulnerability to indefinite detention. Immigrant detention today is part of a carceral landscape in the United States that includes more than 2 million citizens behind bars.


Quarters ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 236-244
Author(s):  
John Gilbert McCurdy

This chapter concludes the book by asking what effects quartering in Revolutionary America has had on US history. Opposition to quartering appeared in the Declaration of Independence and informed the Third Amendment to the US Constitution, but the Americans also ignored restraints on quartering during the Revolutionary War and have never tested the Third Amendment before the US Supreme Court. However, the ideas of place that appeared between 1754 and 1775 because of quartering have continued to inform American ideas about military geography as well as places like the home, city, and nation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (03) ◽  
pp. 742-774
Author(s):  
Kellen Funk

The Supreme Court of the New Deal era transformed the US Constitution, making the Constitution's original protection of property rights give way to democratically popular regulations. In The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution (2014), John W. Compton argues that twentieth-century progressives turned the Court toward this “living” interpretation of the Constitution by relying on legislative methods and judicial precedents created by nineteenth-century evangelicals. Evangelical reformers accomplished national prohibition of liquor and lotteries, but their regulations destroyed property rights that were legally valid and socially acceptable at the inauguration of the Constitution. Courts ultimately acquiesced in these novel economic proscriptions because of overwhelming majoritarian sentiment driven by evangelical populism. Relying on a recent literature of law and religion, Compton alters conventional accounts of the US constitutional tradition of protecting property. This essay reverses the path of analysis and argues that evangelical concerns with constitutional property rights challenge standard accounts of law and religion in US history. Rather than a simplistic imposition of moralism, evangelical reform was derived from antislavery liberalism. The legal and religious pluralism that had impeded antislavery, however, also hindered prohibition and spurred evangelicals to seek federal remedies to national sins. Thus national prohibition, no less than New Deal constitutionalism, centered on the US dilemma of how to wield illiberal regulations to safeguard liberalism.


Author(s):  
Jack M. Balkin

In periods of advanced constitutional rot, judicial decisions become especially polarized. Judicial majorities tend to reach decisions that increase economic inequality, shrink the electorate, and help maintain political oligarchy. Members of the dominant party want judges to help them stay in power, to support politicians’ self-entrenching behavior, to defend and protect politicians from charges of corruption, and to enrich their financial supporters. As a result, the judiciary tends to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Ordinarily, the US Constitution relies on the judiciary to protect democracy and republican government, and to prevent political corruption and self-entrenching behavior. But in periods of advanced constitutional rot, the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary are likely to be ineffective and may even make matters worse.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-315
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer

High-profile cases in the Supreme Court of the United States (‘SCOTUS’) on religion tend to attract a certain amount of academic comment in the United Kingdom but US judgments are cited only infrequently by the superior courts in the UK. In return, SCOTUS rarely cites foreign judgments at all. The reason, it is suggested, is that the effect given by the First Amendment to the US Constitution is to render US case law of less relevance to the UK than, for example, judgments from jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pille Põiklik

The article presents an analysis of the majority and minority opinions from the Supreme Court of the United States issued on District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008. The court case addressed the meaning of the Second Amendment to the US Constitution that establishes gun rights in a famously confusing wording. The analysis applies parts of Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2011, 2012) model of analysing argumentation and also discusses intertextuality to account for how the justices construct their arguments. The analysis shows how the justices shape their arguments on the basis of their values and beliefs, presenting contradictory readings of the amendment, sources of evidence and the preferred application of the amendment.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.


2021 ◽  
pp. 31-68
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton

The conventional account of judicial review starts with a US Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison. But judicial review in truth starts with the state courts and the state constitutions, not the US Supreme Court and the US Constitution. Before the US Constitution existed, the state courts established American judicial review and were the first courts to wrestle with the complexities of exercising it. Judicial review also is foremost a structural story, not an individual-rights story. The delegation of power to the judiciary to decide the meaning of our constitutions laid the groundwork for the growth in power of American courts—especially the federal courts, which have become the go-to answer for so many who-decides questions in American government over the last seventy-five years. This chapter begins a search for insights in resolving the dilemma of judicial review by looking at how the state courts innovated the concept and the ways they initially practiced it. It shows that the early state courts were deferential to the democratic branches of government. They rarely invalidated state laws and did so only when these laws violated a clear constitutional rule. That approach offers lessons for federal and state courts alike.


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Iaryczower ◽  
Matthew Shum

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K10)


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