Some Secrets Do Not Hurt Everyone: The Case for Additional Discount Window Reform in the United States' Federal Reserve

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-180
Author(s):  
Ryan W. Tanselle
Ekonomika ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaidotas Pajarskas ◽  
Aldona Jočienė

The main purpose of this article is to determine which factors and how contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007–2008, what their causal links and effects on the markets and the whole economy were, and to assess what actions could have been taken by the Federal Reserve and the Government in order to mitigate or prevent the consequences of subprime mortgage crisis and housing bubble. In order to obtain the research results, the authors performed a qualitative analysis of the scientific literature on the course of events and their development that led to the subprime mortgage crisis, and focused on the insufficiently regulated home mortgage market expansion, the impact on the subprime mortgage crisis of financial innovations and financial engineering, poorly evaluated systemic risks and policy undertaken by both the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve before and after the crisis. The quantitative research focused on two main parts: firstly, analysis of the dependence between the causes of subprime mortgage crisis and the consequences, using a statistical and regression analysis, and secondly, an alternative path the Government and the Federal Reserve could have taken in their policy actions and the results they could have produced. The authors believe that the results of the research could give useful guidelines to the central bankers and government officials on how to make long-term decisions that can help in preparing for the financial distress, mitigating the consequences when the crisis strikes, accelerating the recovery and even preventing the crisis it in the future. The second part of the qualitative research will appear in the next issue of the journal.


Author(s):  
Мехти Галиб Мехтиев ◽  
Mekhti Galib Mekhtiev

The present article evaluates history of swap agreements’ application and their functioning system in the framework of intercentral bank relations (in particular by the Federal Reserve System of the United States (the Fed)). Swap includes two transactions: the first is a currency exchange on the spot market rate and the second is a future transaction on the rate defined in advance. This mechanism proved its efficiency within its application through history. In 1970s, during a radical transformation period of an entire global currency architecture caused by collapse of Bretton Woods’s system the Fed applied swap agreements to promote stability on financial markets and particularly on currency markets. Later during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 these agreements again have become rescue measures for the global financial system, as the financial shock caused liquidity deficit for financial institutions and thus cut dramatically credit supply. And finally nowadays the global financial system is badly in need of swap agreements. The swaps’ force of attraction is that firstly it differs from crediting as the latter is one way currency extension, while swap agreement is the exchange of equivalent values. And secondly it fixes the rate of the future currency transaction what lightens both monetary regulation within national jurisdiction and regulation on the level of public international law.


Author(s):  
John Kenneth Galbraith ◽  
James K. Galbraith

This chapter examines the impact of the Federal Reserve System on money and banking in the United States. The Federal Reserve System was created in 1913 by virtue of the Federal Reserve Act passed by Congress and signed by President Woodrow Wilson. The Federal Reserve Act (1913) provided not for one but for as many as twelve central banks. It was conceived as an answer to the great panics, but in this respect the System was notably defective. Nor was the System better as an antidote for an alarming epidemic of bank failures. Furthermore, the most severe inflation ever in peacetime occurred under its watch. The chapter considers the successes and failures of the Federal Reserve System and looks at another body established to study the management of money in the United States: the National Monetary Commission.


Author(s):  
Rosemarie Reynolds ◽  
Yusuke Ishikawa ◽  
Amanda Macchiarella

Second Life is a virtual world designed to be a free, laissez-faire market economy in which Linden Dollars are used to buy and sell goods and services. This study investigated the relationship between the economies of Second Life and the United States, using financial data collected from Linden Lab and the Federal Reserve. Partial correlation analyses were computed between two pairs of economic measures, and our results indicated that there was a significant relationship between the two economies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-184
Author(s):  
Calum Watt

Ten years on from the 2008 global financial crisis, this article sets in dialogue two French treatments – by the novelist Mathieu Larnaudie and the philosopher Bernard Stiegler – of footage of the 2008 testimony of Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The article introduces and compares the concepts of ‘effondrement’ and ‘prolétarisation’ developed by the two writers in relation to the Greenspan hearing, and analyses how both understand the question of ideology as it emerges in the hearing. Informed by interviews conducted by the author with Larnaudie and Stiegler, the piece concludes by discussing the notion common to both writers that Greenspan is a ‘saint’ of the crisis.


1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil T. Skaggs

From the 1880s until after the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 the United States was a hotbed of monetary controversy. The secular price deflation that began in 1865 prompted a host of efforts to increase the money supply, in the belief that more money would check the decline of prices. The agitation for free coinage of silver that arose in the 1870s and carried into the 1880s and 1890s generated a maelstrom of arguments and counterarguments. Such theoretical support as the “cheap money advocates” provided was in the form of a crude application of the quantity theory of money. Not surprisingly, using the quantity theory in such a manner brought the theory itself under fire.


Author(s):  
Laurence Seidman

Stimulus without debt is a policy that would increase aggregate demand for goods and services in a recession without increasing government debt. Stimulus without debt consists of a transfer (not loan) from the central bank to the national treasury (or to national treasuries in the case of the eurozone) so that the treasury does not have to borrow to finance fiscal stimulus enacted by the legislature. In the United States, Congress would enact a fiscal stimulus package that consists mainly of cash tax rebates to households but also other temporary expenditures and temporary tax cuts; the fiscal stimulus would raise aggregate demand. The Federal Reserve would use new money to give a large transfer (not loan) to the Treasury equal to the fiscal stimulus package so that the Treasury does not have to borrow to pay for the package. Hence, there would be no increase in government debt.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hoag

Before the founding of the Federal Reserve, bank clearinghouse associations served as an emergency lending facility during the National Bank Era (1863–1913). This article clarifies the operation of clearinghouse loan certificates during panic periods. If clearinghouse loan certificates do not circulate among the general public, then they bear similarities to interbank loans among clearinghouse member banks. In general, the central clearinghouse organization does not act alone as a lender of last resort to make loans from the central clearinghouse to individual member banks.


2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuo Ueda

As the U.S. economy works through a sluggish recovery several years after the Great Recession technically came to an end in June 2009, it can only look with horror toward Japan's experience of two decades of stagnant growth since the early 1990s. In contrast to Japan, U.S. policy authorities responded to the financial crisis since 2007 more quickly. Surely, they learned from Japan's experience. I will begin by describing how Japan's economic situation unfolded in the early 1990s and offering some comparisons with how the Great Recession unfolded in the U.S. economy. I then turn to the Bank of Japan's policy responses to the crisis and again offer some comparisons to the Federal Reserve. I will discuss the use of both the conventional interest rate tool—the federal funds rate in the United States, and the “call rate” in Japan—and nonconventional measures of monetary policy and consider their effectiveness in the context of the rest of the financial system.


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