Maximizing the Residual Surplus in Position Auctions

Optimal Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms in Common-Value Position Auctions

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2512084 ◽

2013 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Maryam Farboodi ◽

Amin Jafarian

Keyword(s):

Common Value ◽

Position Auctions

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Multi-Score Position Auctions

Proceedings of the Ninth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining - WSDM '16 ◽

10.1145/2835776.2835822 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Denis Charles ◽

Nikhil R. Devanur ◽

Balasubramanian Sivan

Keyword(s):

Position Auctions

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Position Auctions with Bidder-Specific Minimum Prices

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Internet and Network Economics ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_64 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 577-584 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Eyal Even-Dar ◽

Jon Feldman ◽

Yishay Mansour ◽

S. Muthukrishnan

Keyword(s):

Position Auctions

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Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Internet and Network Economics ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_13 ◽

2007 ◽

pp. 108-118

Author(s):

Danny Kuminov ◽

Moshe Tennenholtz

Keyword(s):

Safety Strategies ◽

Position Auctions

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Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions

Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '09 ◽

10.1145/1566374.1566382 ◽

2009 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

David Robert Martin Thompson ◽

Kevin Leyton-Brown

Keyword(s):

Computational Analysis ◽

Perfect Information ◽

Position Auctions

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Pricing in Position Auctions and Online Advertising

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1338656 ◽

2010 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

M. Bumin Yenmez

Keyword(s):

Online Advertising ◽

Position Auctions

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Optimal Design of Revenue-Maximizing Position Auctions With Consumer Search

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3653750 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Ying-Ju Chen

Keyword(s):

Optimal Design ◽

Consumer Search ◽

Position Auctions

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Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking

Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics ◽

10.3103/s0278641916040026 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 40 (4) ◽

pp. 165-170

Author(s):

N. G. Blinov

Keyword(s):

Two Stage ◽

Game Analysis ◽

Groves Mechanism ◽

Position Auctions

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Position auctions

International Journal of Industrial Organization ◽

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.002 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 25 (6) ◽

pp. 1163-1178 ◽

Cited By ~ 532

Author(s):

Hal R. Varian

Keyword(s):

Position Auctions

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Matching through position auctions

Journal of Economic Theory ◽

10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 148 (4) ◽

pp. 1700-1713 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

T.R. Johnson

Keyword(s):

Position Auctions

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