The Importance of Regional Seismic Networks in Monitoring Nuclear Test-Ban Treaties

2019 ◽  
Vol 91 (2A) ◽  
pp. 573-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith D. Koper
Keyword(s):  
Detection Threshold ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Global Networks ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Seismic Networks ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban

Abstract The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits the testing of all nuclear weapons, no matter how small. Although the CTBT is not yet in force, its verification is supported by the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is about 90% complete. Using IMS data, seismologists are able to detect well-coupled underground nuclear explosions with yields larger than ∼0.5–1  kt anywhere in the world with high confidence. Lowering the detection threshold significantly, say to yields of 10−4–10−1  kt fully coupled, will require augmenting IMS data with records from thousands of seismometers that are deployed in various regional, national, and global networks. It will also require routine analysis (detection, location, and characterization) of small seismic events (M 0–3) that are well recorded only at local distances (<150–200  km). This is the same problem faced by operators of regional seismic networks, who are tasked with developing earthquake catalogs as complete as possible without contamination from explosions and other nonearthquake sources. In the future, verification seismology is likely to become increasingly intertwined with the data, methods, and expertise of regional seismic network operators. Here, I highlight some of the important contributions to verification seismology that have recently been made using data recorded by regional seismic networks in North America, with a focus on small events recorded at local distances.

scholarly journals On site inspection for nuclear test ban verirication

1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. D. Marschall
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
The Political ◽  
Chemical Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Chemical Weapon Convention ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

The problem of verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty is mainly a technical one. However the problem of detecting, locating and identifying nuclear explosions has, since the late 1950s, been intimately involved with the political problems associated with negotiating a treaty. In fact there are few other areas in which policy, diplomacy and science have been so interwoven. This paper attempts to illustrate how technology can. be applied to solve some of the political problems which arise when considering the role of an On Site Inspection (OSI) to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion, in violation of a treaty, has occurred or not. It is hoped that the reader, with a scientific background, but with little or no experience of treaty negotiations, will gain an. insight as to how technical matters can interact with political requirements. The demands made on scientists to provide technical support for negotiating and rnonitoring compliance of a treaty have increased significanfly over the last 40 years. This is a period in which a number of major treaties have contained a significant technical component e.g. the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Treaty) and the Chemical Weapon Convention. This paper gives an indication of some of the political decisions which will have to be made and suggests some of the technical methods which are of value in the identification of a clandestine nuclear explosion.

scholarly journals Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty – a peace-keeping initiative with scientific impact

1969 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 49-52
Author(s):  
Tine B. Larsen ◽  
Peter H. Voss ◽  
Trine Dahl-Jensen ◽  
Søren Gregersen
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Frequency Content ◽  
Similar Frequency ◽  
Scientific Impact ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Earthquake Research ◽  
Test Ban

Any major shaking of the Earth can be recorded on a seismograph regardless of the nature of the source. Earthquakes and large explosions generate waves with similar frequency content. This fact has been used for decades to construct systems to monitor detonations of underground nuclear explosions. The quality of the monitoring system has increased significantly in recent years, and we demonstrate here that the data are useful in Danish earthquake research.

scholarly journals ZÁZNAMY SEVEROKOREJSKÝCH JADERNÝCH EXPLOZÍ NA SEISMICKÉ STANICI VRAC

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Havíř
Keyword(s):  
Monitoring System ◽  
Seismic Station ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
International Monitoring System ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
International Monitoring ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Natural Earthquakes ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

Seismic station VRAC operated by IPE (Institute of Physics of the Earth) is part of the International Monitoring System CTBTO (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization). This monitoring system is built for verifi cation of the compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Station VRAC provided important registration of the nuclear explosions. Last explosions were carried out on the territory Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), latest North Korean nuclear test was conducted this year (12. 2. 2013). Station VRAC recorded signal of all North Korean nuclear explosions. Registrations by stations of International Monitoring System, including station VRAC, significantly contributed to improving of the discrimination techniques, mainly to improving the discrimination between natural earthquakes and explosions based on the analyses of Ms and mb magnitudes.

Yield estimation using regional mb(Pn)

1990 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 656-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eileen S. Vergino ◽  
Richard W. Mensing
Keyword(s):  
Large Population ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Yield Estimation ◽  
Nevada Test Site ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Threshold Test ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Yield Threshold ◽  
Test Ban

Abstract Seismic yield estimation at regional distances will become increasingly important in monitoring a Low-Yield Threshold Test Ban (LYTTB). In order to investigate seismic yield estimation using regional data, we have examined regional mb(Pn) values for a large population of Nevada Test Site (NTS) underground nuclear explosions that occurred in widely varying geologic media with a range of yields from less than 1 kt to 300 kt. Magnitude-yield relationships were developed using data from a set of pre-1985 events (calibration set). To obtain an independent estimate of the uncertainty in estimating yields of events at NTS using mb(Pn) alone, the calibrated relationships were applied to a set of post-1984 events (prediction set). We found that the average uncertainty in the yield estimate, based on a weighted combination of the yield estimates from the four Livermore NTS Network (LNN) seismic stations, is about 1.8 (at the 2σ level). If data are available from all four LNN stations, the uncertainty is about 1.7 (at the 2σ level). By including a term for the gas-filled porosity of the rock near the working point in the magnitude-yield relationship, we were able to develop a single relationship valid for events both above and below the water table, as well as those in alluvium and tuff. We have found, however, systematic differences in the relationships for events in Yucca Flat, Pahute Mesa, and Rainier Mesa.

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