Wisconsin works'? | ScienceGate

The spread of workfare to Israel and elsewhere in the world is typically attributed to the power of a globalized neoliberal orthodoxy. This chapter demonstrates how, on the contrary, the introduction of new employment and social policies in Israel bearing the Wisconsin moniker was an attempt to resolve intra-state conflict regarding the goals and instruments of state intervention in the labor market. These conflicts were resolved through by importing new policy ideas. Via translation, it was possible to assemble a change coalition and advance domestic institutional change. Nevertheless, due to the persistence of intra-state conflicts over the goals and instruments of social and labor policies, workfare was implemented alongside existing institutions to create a new institutional layer. Layering was instrumental in overcoming opposition to the program, but also made it vulnerable to politicization. This politicization brought about the interruption of the program five years after its inception.

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Evaluating Performance-Based Contracting in Welfare-to-Work Programs: Selection and Earnings Gain Effects in Wisconsin Works

Korean Journal of Policy Studies ◽

10.52372/kjps31102 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 31 (1) ◽

pp. 31-61

Author(s):

Choi You Seok

Keyword(s):

Service Provision ◽

Financial Incentives ◽

Service Providers ◽

Welfare To Work ◽

Performance Contracting ◽

Individual Level ◽

Gain Rate ◽

Positive Effect ◽

Administrative Datasets ◽

Wisconsin Works

The Wisconsin Works (W-2) program, the TANF program in Wisconsin, has introduced performance contracting to align W-2 service providers??? objectives with the state???s goals by establishing financial and administrative incentives. Using individual-level administrative datasets from 1998 to 2005, this study examines whether the introduction and revision of the earnings gain rate standard improved the economic performance of W-2 participants. Results reveal that under exacerbating economic conditions and weakening financial incentives, the adoption of the earnings gain standard had a positive effect on maintaining the earing gain of W-2 participants. However, W-2 agencies responded to the changes in the earnings gain rate standard by controlling the movement of W-2 participants in and out of the program and selecting those who were more likely to be employed. This study discusses a better contract design to improve the effectiveness of the welfare service provision.

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