scholarly journals Humanistic Marxism as Practical Philosophy in K. Kosík -Focusing on discussing the human and the world in Dialectics of the Concrete-

2018 ◽  
Vol null (44) ◽  
pp. 239-260
Author(s):  
권기환
Keyword(s):  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The World

scholarly journals Philosophy for children: an effective tool for developing independent thinking

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 86-94
Author(s):  
Nadezhda Ilyushenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
School Aged Children ◽  
Philosophical Language ◽  
New Directions ◽  
The World ◽  
Philosophical Texts ◽  
Additional Education ◽  
Independent Thinking ◽  
Linguistic Means

The content of the article is in the thematic field of practical philosophy, designated as “philosophy for children”. Within the framework of the article, the author considers specificity of the philosophical language. The main linguistic means are explicated and described, making it possible to expand the usual descriptions of the world, to achieve expression of non-trivial philosophical intuitions, to outline new directions of philosophical search. Particular attention is paid to such techniques as using metaphors, tautologies and a vicious circle in the definition in philosophical texts, as well as a step-by-step, gradual refinement of thought by introducing “operational concepts”. In conclusion, the author gives examples of tasks aimed at acquiring the language of philosophy by school-aged children (10–13 years old) as part of the program of additional education for children and adolescents “Green Sun” (team of authors: N. Ilyushenko, N. Kutuzova, D. Kutuzov, O. Davydik).

scholarly journals Kant – filosofiens Luther?

2017 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Anders Moe Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Human Subjectivity ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
The World ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Ultimate Nature

This paper discusses Kant’s philosophy as a possible heir to Lutheran thought. Comparing Kant’s philosophy to that of Descartes reveals some interesting common presuppositions and convictions between Luther and Kant . Their shared conviction about the illegitimacy of reasoning about the ultimate nature of God and the world is especially stressed, which in Kant leads to the idea of the finitude of reason, an idea that runs through both his theoretical and his practical philosophy. It remains an open question, however, whether Kant, though he repeatedly stresses the finitude of reason, escapes the tendency, socharacteristic of the enlightenment, to absolutize human subjectivity.

scholarly journals Axiology and Agathology

2020 ◽  
pp. 1370-1383
Author(s):  
Vladimir K. Shokhin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Continental Philosophy ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Human Needs ◽  
The World

From the very beginning, attention is given to the fact that, being introduced at the very beginning of the 20th century, the axiology term, meaning the doctrine of values, almost immediately led to a boom in the development of theories of values (mainly in continental philosophy), whereas the agathology term, meaning the doctrine of goods, which was introduced in 1770 and then rediscovered in 1823, came to almost complete oblivion. For its rehabilitation, one of the commonplaces of the philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries is reviewed, namely, the actual identification of goods and values, as a result of which the former of these concepts is absorbed by the latter. As for values, they are also usually viewed as common human needs, rather than deep and indivisible individual “inner possessions”. Therefore, it is proposed to distinguish between universal needs and personal valuables and to stratify the world of significant things into values, preferences, and goods. As a result, the latter of these varieties is interpreted as a sphere of practical mind (both in the Ancient and Kantian senses), teleologically loaded and with the potential to be included in a new, the fourth of the large programmes of theoretical ethics (able to compete well with consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics) and, at the same time, laid into the foundation of the cluster of philosophical disciplines, which is commonly termed as practical philosophy

Aristotle on Practical Truth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiana Olfert
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Common View ◽  
The Core ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of

Aristotle’s theories of truth, practical reasoning, and action are some of the most influential theories in the history of philosophy. It is surprising, then, that so little attention has been given to his notion of practical truth. In Aristotle on Practical Truth, C. M. M. Olfert gives the first book-length treatment of this notion and the role of truth in our practical lives overall. She offers a novel account of practical truth: it is the truth, in the technical Aristotelian sense of “truth,” about what is good simpliciter (haplôs) for a particular person in her particular situation. Olfert argues that, understood in this way, Aristotle’s notion of practical truth is an attractive idea that illuminates the core of his practical philosophy. But it is also an idea that challenges a common view that in practical reasoning, we aim at action or acting well as our primary goals, not at truth and knowledge. Contrary to this common view, Olfert shows that in dialogues such as Charmides, Protagoras, and Republic, Plato describes practical reasoning as being concerned equally with grasping the truth and with acting well. She argues that Aristotle develops this Platonic picture with the notion of practical truth and with a technical notion of rational action as fitting ourselves to the world. Using key texts from the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, as well as De Anima, Metaphysics, De Interpretatione, and Categories, Olfert demonstrates that practical truth deserves to be treated as a central and plausible Aristotelian idea.

The Star of Redemption as a System of Philosophy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Human Action ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
The World ◽  
Subject And Object

This chapter explains why Schelling and Rosenzweig hold that the representation of God by finite human beings is a topic of practical philosophy. Like Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and his Ages of the World fragments, Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption is motivated by an attempt to provide an explanation for the existence of the finite world, for the condition that brings about the relation between subject and object that characterizes all states of human consciousness. The system that Rosenzweig develops in the Star invites us to consider our commitments, the values that we ascribe to ourselves when we form maxims for action, as the means through which abstract concepts of the good are cognized. On Rosenzweig’s view, our commitments are the site of reason’s revelation; for this reason, God is both cognized and realized through human action in the world.

scholarly journals From Life to Existence: A Reconsideration of the Question of Intentionality in Michel Henry’s Ethics

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédéric Seyler
Keyword(s):  
Essential Role ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Point ◽  
The World ◽  
Human Reality ◽  
Michel Henry

Michel Henry has renewed our understanding of life as immanent affectivity: life cannot be reduced to what can be made visible; it is – as immanent and as affectivity – radically invisible. However, if life (la vie) is radically immanent, the living (le vivant) has nonetheless to relate to the world: it has to exist. But, since existence requires and includes intentional components, human reality – being both living and existing – implies that immanence and intentionality be related to one another, even though they are conceived at the same time as radically distinct modes of appearing in Henry’s phenomenology of life. Following this line of thought, we are faced with at least two questions: First, what reality does immanent appearing have for us as existing and intentional beings? And second, from an ethical point of view, what does Henry’s opposition of “barbarism” and “second birth” mean in terms of existence? As will be shown, it follows from the standpoint of radical phenomenology itself that immanent affectivity has reality for us only insofar as it finds its expression or translation in the realm of the intentionally visible and that, with regard to ethics, both “barbarism” and its overcoming in “second birth” are effective only insofar as they are mediated through representations. Henry’s critique of representation and intentionality needs therefore to be revised, especially in the field of practical philosophy, where the essential role played by intentionality has to be acknowledged even by radical phenomenology.

Reasons for the Method in Descartes’ Discours

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-27
Author(s):  
Patrick Brissey ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Inductive Argument ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Ontological Foundation ◽  
Definition Of

In the practical philosophy of the Discours de la Méthode, before the theoretical metaphysics of Part Four and the Meditationes, Descartes gives us an inductive argument that his method, the procedure and cognitive psychology, is veracious at its inception. His evidence, akin to his Scholastic predecessors, is God, a maximally perfect being, established an ontological foundation for knowledge such that reason and nature are isomorphic. Further, the method, he tells us, is a functional definition of human reason; that is, like other rationalists during this period, he holds the structure of reason maps onto the world. The evidence for this thesis is given in what I call the groundwork to Descartes’ philosophical system, essentially the first half of the Discours, where, through a series of examples in the preamble of Part Two, he, step-by-step, ascends from the perfection of artifacts through the imposition of reason (the Architect Example) to the perfection of a constituent’s use of her cognitive faculties (the Wise-Lawgiver Example), to God perfecting and ordering reality (the Divine Artificer Example). Finally, he descends, establishing the structure of human reason, which undergirds and entails the procedure of the method (the Laws of Sparta Example).

Aristotle on the Truth About Practical Ends

Apeiron ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiana Megan Meyvis Olfert
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

AbstractAristotle holds that rational agents can think true thoughts about their practical ends. Specifically, we can think true thoughts about whether our ends are good and able to be brought about in action. But what makes these thoughts true? What sort of thing is a practical end, such that it both is good, and also may be brought about in the future? These questions are difficult to answer. They are metaphysical questions about Aristotle’s practical philosophy: they ask what practical ends are, such that they can make true certain parts of our practical thinking. What is more, key claims in Aristotle’s account of rational agency seem to make it impossible for thoughts about our practical ends to ever, in fact, be true. Given the ways in which we think about our ends, there seems to be nothing in the world to which these thoughts truthfully correspond. In this paper, I identify and solve two puzzles for Aristotle’s claim that we can think true thoughts about our practical ends. These puzzles have not been discussed in recent literature, but they have potentially wide-reaching consequences for Aristotle’s account of rational agency and motivation. My solution offers a novel account of the metaphysics of practical ends, which explains how these ends can be truth-makers for our thoughts about them. I argue that we should understand practical ends on the model of first actualities, which are also second potentialities. The idea that some actualities are also potentialities is a complicated one, but as I hope to show, it yields a straightforward and illuminating conception of practical ends. It also adds a crucial metaphysical component to Aristotle’s account of rational agency, one which shows how this account is internally consistent.

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