A Survey of State Practices for Protecting Transportation Agencies Against Construction and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud Including Use of Contractor Suspension and Debarment Procedures

Pushback for public–private partnerships (P3s) comes in part from their purported favoritism toward large firms. However, no study has empirically verified this claim. This paper examined the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program to assess whether delivery methods play a role in the participation of minority- and women-owned firms in federally assisted transportation contracts. A sample of 134 contracts from the US Major Transportation Project Database served as the dataset to run linear regressions. Results revealed that P3 associates with higher DBE goals than design–bid–build (DBB). Plausible explanations include P3 being associated with a larger contract size, more public attention, more potential subcontracting opportunities with design included in the package, and intensified agency desire for greater diversity in DBE subcontracts. Moreover, the delivery method has an insignificant effect on DBE attainment. This paper also introduces the DBE envelope, a radar plot capable of graphically assessing DBE program implementation.

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Defining the Problem: Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program Impediments Identified by Survey of Program Administrators

Public Works Management & Policy ◽

10.1177/1087724x11398937 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 132-156 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Cynthia Orndoff ◽

Galen Papkov ◽

Michael Behney ◽

Joanne Lubart

Keyword(s):

Business Enterprise ◽

Program Administrators ◽

Disadvantaged Business Enterprise

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Do federal davis-bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations affect aggressive bidding? evidence from highway resurfacing procurement auctions

Journal of Public Procurement ◽

10.1108/jopp-15-03-2015-b002 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 15 (3) ◽

pp. 291-316 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Kevin C. Duncan

Keyword(s):

Fixed Effects ◽

Empirical Studies ◽

Procurement Auctions ◽

Business Enterprise ◽

State Highway ◽

Prevailing Wage ◽

Disadvantaged Business Enterprise ◽

State Projects

Previous empirical studies examine the effect of asymmetries across bidders on auction outcomes. This paper tests for asymmetries in behavior when bidders are confronted with different regulatory environments. Data from federal and state highway resurfacing projects in Colorado are used to determine if bids are more aggressive when contractors switch from federal projects, with Davis-Bacon prevailing wage and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise regulations, to less-regulated state projects. Results from fixed effects estimates of winning bids indicate that the level of aggressive bidding is not altered with a change in regulations, at least not with respect to the policies and types of projects examined here.

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