scholarly journals The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (079) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kandrac ◽  
◽  
Bernd Schlusche ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kandrac ◽  
Bernd Schlusche

Abstract We exploit an exogenous reduction in bank supervision and examination to demonstrate a causal effect of supervisory oversight on financial institutions’ risk taking. The additional risk took the form of risky lending, faster asset growth, and a greater reliance on low-quality capital. This response to less oversight boosted banks’ odds of failure. Lastly, we show that the reduction in oversight capacity led to more costly failures because there were longer delays in closing insolvent institutions, and because more bad assets were passed to the government insurance fund.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. e0249045
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Kowalik ◽  
Piotr Lewandowski

We study the gender differences in aversion to COVID-19 exposure using a natural experiment of the 2020 US Open. It was the first major tennis tournament after the season had been paused for six months, held with the same rules and prize money for men and women. We analyze the gender gap in the propensity to voluntarily withdraw because of COVID-19 concerns among players who were eligible and fit to play. We find that female players were significantly more likely than male players to have withdrawn from the 2020 US Open. While players from countries characterized by relatively high levels of trust and patience and relatively low levels of risk-taking were more likely to have withdrawn than their counterparts from other countries, female players exhibited significantly higher levels of aversion to pandemic exposure than male players even after cross-country differences in preferences are accounted for. About 15% of the probability of withdrawing that is explained by our model can be attributed to gender.


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