Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Justice: Possibility of Legal Aesthetics by Integrating Physiology of Art with Legal Philosophy

O artigo procura identificar o papel de Tobias Barreto no desenvolvimento de uma filosofia jurídica originalmente brasileira, em meados do século XIX. Barreto, como mostram os estudos que serviram de base para o presente estudo, pode ser apontado como um dos maiores responsáveis pelo despertar filosófico de uma sociedade periférica, ainda muito ligada às ideias dos antigos tempos imperial e colonial.

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Understanding the Functions of Jurisdictional Law

10.1093/oso/9780198795674.003.0006 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Dan Jerker B. Svantesson

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Legal Theory ◽

Legal Philosophy ◽

Law Reform ◽

The Internet ◽

Private International Law ◽

Public International Law ◽

Important Concept ◽

Definition Of

This chapter takes us into the domain of legal theory and legal philosophy as it places the questions of Internet jurisdiction in a broader theoretical, and indeed philosophical, context. Indeed, it goes as far as to (1) present a definition of what is law, (2) discuss what are the law’s tools, and (3) to describe the roles of law. In addition, it provides distinctions important for how we understand the role of jurisdictional rules both in private international law and in public international law as traditionally defined. Furthermore, it adds law reform tools by introducing and discussing the concept of ‘market sovereignty’ based on ‘market destroying measures’––an important concept for solving the Internet jurisdiction puzzle.

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Legal Concepts as Mental Representations

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique ◽

10.1007/s11196-021-09853-7 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Marek Jakubiec

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Mental Representations ◽

Legal Philosophy ◽

Current Debate ◽

Cognitive Tools ◽

Cognitive Sciences ◽

Cognitive Aspect ◽

Fundamental Level ◽

Legal Concepts ◽

Mental Constructs

AbstractAlthough much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.

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