scholarly journals Automated Search for Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice Theory: Ranking Sets of Objects

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 143-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Geist ◽  
U. Endriss

We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important applications in social choice theory and decision making under uncertainty, is how to extend an agent's preferences over a number of objects to a preference relation over nonempty sets of such objects. Certain combinations of seemingly natural principles for this kind of preference extension can result in logical inconsistencies, which has led to a number of important impossibility theorems. We first prove a general result that shows that for a wide range of such principles, characterised by their syntactic form when expressed in a many-sorted first-order logic, any impossibility exhibited at a fixed (small) domain size will necessarily extend to the general case. We then show how to formulate candidates for impossibility theorems at a fixed domain size in propositional logic, which in turn enables us to automatically search for (general) impossibility theorems using a SAT solver. When applied to a space of 20 principles for preference extension familiar from the literature, this method yields a total of 84 impossibility theorems, including both known and nontrivial new results.

2004 ◽  
Vol 44 (160) ◽  
pp. 131-146
Author(s):  
Branislav Boricic ◽  
Snezana Konjikusic

Theories of fuzzy sets and rough sets, as alternatives to the usual set theory founded on the two valued classical logic, present an appropriate context for developing the basic notions of the logic of preference and consequently, of the social choice theory. In this paper we present an introductory survey of two non-classical concepts of set: fuzzy set and rough set, as originally introduced by L. A. Zadeh and Z. Pawlak respectively, and then we prove that a preference relation defined by means of rough sets has the same basic properties as the classical or the fuzzy one. Moreover, we prove that The Liberal Paradox, as originally formulated by A. Sen, holds in the framework of theory of rough sets as well.


Author(s):  
Iain McLean

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.


1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters’ preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document