Credit Bureau Licensing and Supervision

10.1596/34760 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 66-71
Author(s):  
Davron Butaboev ◽  

The article analyzes the practice of organizing and developing the activities of microcredit organizations, the practice of microcrediting small businesses, the formation of the legal frameworkfor the activities of microcredit organizations in the practice of the European Union.Keywords: microcredit, microfinance, microloan, pawnshop, credit union, credit bureau


Author(s):  
Akwesi Assensoh-Kodua

Credit defaulting in the financial sector is a worldwide delinquency that has become a nightmare for this sector. The search for a solution to root out this problem remains a big challenge for academics, the financial sectors, and the governments. For instance, per the American Bankers Association's (ABC) Consumer Credit Delinquency Bulletin, unserviced bank cards plunged two basis points to 2.96% of all accounts between July-August 2019. This value remained below the 15-year average of 3.68%. (Per ABC, delinquency is a late payment that is 30 days or more overdue.) Though these terrifying statistics sounds like good news, the Trans Union's Industry Insights Report found that the unserviced credit card rate reached 1.81% in the third quarter of 2019, rising from 1.71% for the third quarter of 2018. These figures from the credit bureau are based on accounts that are 90 days or more overdue.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Boluwaji A. Akinnuwesi ◽  
Faith Michael E. Uzoka ◽  
Micheal Tokunbo Adenibuyan ◽  
Badmus D. Adeyinka

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 102S
Author(s):  
Mary Ellen Vitek ◽  
Mary Biondic ◽  
Kenneth Bukowski ◽  
Jack Goldberg ◽  
William G. Henderson

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 294-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronel Elul ◽  
Piero Gottardi

In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defaults. We study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. We analyze its effects on borrowers' incentives and credit access, and identify conditions under which it is welfare improving. Our model's predictions are consistent with the evidence on the impact of these credit bureau regulations on borrowers' and lenders' behavior as well as on credit provision. We also show that “forgetting” must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention. (JEL D14, D82, G33, K35, L26)


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