New Impossible Differential Attack on SAFER Block Cipher Family

2015 ◽  
Vol E98.A (3) ◽  
pp. 843-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingyuan ZHAO ◽  
Meiqin WANG ◽  
Jiazhe CHEN ◽  
Yuliang ZHENG
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Differential Attack ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Impossible Differential Attack

scholarly journals Accurate Estimate of the Advantage of Impossible Differential Attacks

2017 ◽  
pp. 169-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Céline Blondeau
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Poisson Approximation ◽  
Accurate Estimate ◽  
Random Permutations ◽  
Differential Attack ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Impossible Differential Attack ◽  
Differential Attacks ◽  
Multivariate Hypergeometric Distribution

Impossible differential attacks, which are taking advantage of differentials that cannot occur, are powerful attacks for block cipher primitives. The power of such attacks is often measured in terms of the advantage — number of key-bits found during the key sieving phase — which determines the time complexity of the exhaustive key search phase. The statistical model used to compute this advantage has been introduced in the seminal work about the resistance of the DEAL cipher to impossible differential attacks. This model, which has not been modified since the end of the 1990s, is implicitly based on the Poisson approximation of the binomial distribution. In this paper, we investigate this commonly used model and experimentally illustrate that random permutations do not follow it. Based on this observation, we propose more accurate estimates of the advantage of an impossible differential attack. The experiments illustrate the accuracy of the estimate derived from the multivariate hypergeometric distribution. The maximal advantage –using the full codebook– of an impossible differential attack is also derived.

scholarly journals Different Types of Attacks on Block Ciphers

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 28-31
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Classical Method ◽  
System Of Nonlinear Equations ◽  
Algebraic Attack ◽  
Differential Attack ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Important Challenge ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Linear Differential ◽  
Truncated Differential

Cryptanalysis is a very important challenge that faces cryptographers. It has several types that should be well studied by cryptographers to be able to design cryptosystem more secure and able to resist any type of attacks. This paper introduces six types of attacks: Linear, Differential , Linear-Differential, Truncated differential Impossible differential attack and Algebraic attacks. In this paper, algebraic attack is used to formulate the substitution box(S-box) of a block cipher to system of nonlinear equations and solve this system by using a classical method called Grobner  Bases . By Solving these equations, we made algebraic attack on S-box.

Impossible Differential Attack on 30-Round SHACAL-2

2003 ◽  
pp. 97-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seokhie Hong ◽  
Jongsung Kim ◽  
Guil Kim ◽  
Jaechul Sung ◽  
Changhoon Lee ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Attack ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Impossible Differential Attack

scholarly journals Cryptanalysis of Reduced round SKINNY Block Cipher

2018 ◽  
pp. 124-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sadegh Sadeghi ◽  
Tahereh Mohammadi ◽  
Nasour Bagheri
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Integer Linear Programming ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Differential Attack ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Zero Correlation ◽  
Impossible Differential ◽  
Key Recovery Attack ◽  
Correlation Attacks ◽  
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

SKINNY is a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers designed to have the smallest hardware footprint. In this paper, we present zero-correlation linear approximations and the related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics for different versions of SKINNY .We utilize Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to search all zero-correlation linear distinguishers for all variants of SKINNY, where the longest distinguisher found reaches 10 rounds. Using a 9-round characteristic, we present 14 and 18-round zero correlation attacks on SKINNY-64-64 and SKINNY- 64-128, respectively. Also, for SKINNY-n-n and SKINNY-n-2n, we construct 13 and 15-round related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics, respectively. Utilizing these characteristics, we propose 23-round related-tweakey impossible differential cryptanalysis by applying the key recovery attack for SKINNY-n-2n and 19-round attack for SKINNY-n-n. To the best of our knowledge, the presented zero-correlation characteristics in this paper are the first attempt to investigate the security of SKINNY against this attack and the results on the related-tweakey impossible differential attack are the best reported ones.

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