scholarly journals Subconcept as a Tool for the Reconstruction of the Mental Entity Water in I. Bunin’s Prose

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Marija Birney
Keyword(s):  
Vivarium ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.M. De Rijk

AbstractBasically, a historian's conception of history is to be judged by the status he assigns to historical fact. We on our part have defined fact as the mental entity to which direct reference is made by a descriptive statement accepted as true (1.2-1.4). Next, we have tried to throw further light on this conception, not least by enlisting the aid of linguistics (1.5-1.7). History-as distinct from what others have termed 'history in an objective sense'-has been defined as 'histoire connaissance', whose central concerns it is to render insightful what we have called the vis-à-vis (XYZ), sometimes indicated by the, to me repellent, term 'histoire réalité' (2.2). Further reflection on what ultimately constitutes fact has led us to adopt, in line with others, an extension of Kuhn's paradigm concept:


1994 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mira Ariel

Levinson (1985, 1987a & b, 1991) and Ariel (1985a & b, 1987, 1988a & b, 1990a, 1991) have each proposed to anchor discourse and sentential anaphora within a more general theory of communication. Levinson chose a general, extra-linguistic pragmatic theory. He uses Grice's Quantity maxim to account for the distribution of zeros, reflexives, pronouns and lexical NPs, claiming that coreferent readings are preferred, unless a disjoint reading is implicated (by the revised Gricean maxims he offers). I have proposed a specifically linguistic, cognitive theory, whereby speakers guide addressees' retrievals of mental representations corresponding to all definite NPs (coreferent as well as disjoint) by signalling to them the degree of Accessibility associated with the intended mental entity in their memory. An examination of actual data reveals that Levinson's predictions regarding definite NP interpretations are often not borne out. In addition, his proposals cannot account for many anaphoric patterns actually found in natural discourse. Accessibility theory, it is argued, can account for both types of problematic data.


2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annabelle Dufourcq

The common opposition between the imaginary and the real prevents us from genuinely understanding either one. Indeed, the imaginary embodies a certain intuitive presence of the thing and not an empty signitive intention. Moreover it is able to compete with perception and even to offer an increased presence, a sur-real display, of the things, as shown by Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of art in Eye and Mind. As a result, we have to overcome the conception according to which the imaginary field is a mere figment of my imagination, a mental entity that I could still possess in the very absence of its object. On the other hand, the presence of reality is never complete or solid: “The transcendence of the far-off encroaches upon my present and brings a hint of unreality even into the experiences with which I believe myself to coincide.” Therefore, first, the imaginary (initially regarded as a peculiar field constituted by specific phenomena such as artworks, fantasies, pictures, dreams, and so forth) has to be redefined as a special hovering modality of the presence of the beings themselves. Second and furthermore: is not the imaginary always intertwined with perception? Merleau-Ponty advocates the puzzling thesis that there is an “imaginary texture of the real.” What is the meaning of this assertion? To what extent will it be able to blur the classical categories without arousing confusion? Can we avoid reducing reality to illusion? Lastly, consistently followed, this reflection leads as far as to discover, in the imaginary mode of being, an ontological model (the ontological model?), the canon enabling Merleau-Ponty to think Being, an “Oneiric Being.” Thus we will venture the apparently paradoxical contention that the imaginary is the fundamental dimension of the real. The notion of “fundament” becomes indeed problematic and receives an ironical connotation, however this is precisely what is at stake in a non-positivist ontology. Existence “lies” in a ghost-like, sketchy and unsubstantial (absence of) ground, in a restlessly creative being that is open to creative interpretations. And there it finds the principle of the ever-recurring crisis that both tears it apart and makes it rich in future promise.


Author(s):  
В.И. КАРАСИК

В статье рассматриваются лингвокультурные характеристики этической категории «ответственность» в русском языковом сознании. Охарактеризованы понятийные, образно-ситуативные и ценностные признаки этого концепта. Показана специфика уточнения ответственности в философско-этическом и юридическом аспектах (негативная и позитивная ответственность), выделены признаки безответственности как отрицательного коррелята ответственности. The paper deals with linguistic and cultural features of ethical category «responsibility» as reflected in Russian linguistic consciousness. This concept is analyzed in notional, perceptive, situational and evaluative aspects. It is specified in philosophic and legal discourse as negative and positive responsibility. As a regulative mental entity it has its antipode – irresponsibility, which has a variety of lexical nominations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-301
Author(s):  
L. L. Fedorova

In this paper, we propose a sketch of the functional classification of the sign as the main object of semiotics. The well-known structural classifications of the sign as a carrier of meaning and information were based on its use in communication, while the cognitive value of the sign as a means of cognition was emphasized. As a mental entity, developing in the process of cognition, from the idea of Possibility to revealing Regularity, the sign was represented by Ch. Pierce, who defined its basic, cognitive, function. In linguistics the role of the sign in communication was especially emphasized, systems of communicative functions of the language sign were proposed by K. Bühler and R. Jacobson. However, the specific tasks that different signs perform are not only related to the aspect of meaning, but also to their significance. Signs that regulate social interaction, as well as signs of art, highlight the value side of their content. R. Barthes believed that the function of a thing can be determined on the basis of its structure – in decomposing it into component parts and then in recomposing it; this way you can understand how the whole works. If you use this method, you can distinguish between different functional character types. In the process of semiosis semantic relations between the two sides of the sign (signans vs signatum) can be different, which allows us to distinguish three main functional types of signs: identifiers, regulators and models. A sign-identifier is usually closely connected with its object, it seems to be “talking about itself”; a sign-regulator has the character of an indication or imperative, it “tells you”, indicating the path to its object; a sign-model recreates the image of an object in another space – it “tells about something”. Modeling signs represent the most complex level of sign organization and semiotic problems. Modeling can use iconic techniques, including the principle of harmonic similarity (or syntactic coding, according to U. Eco), or use the principle of functional similarity. Modifications are possible for any type of signs. The functional types of signs are in a sense correlated with the functions of language in the model of K. Bühler. The proposed classification could systematize ideas about the functions of the sign and the essence of semiosis, in which, according to Ch. Morris, “something functions as a sign”. Functional typology of signs can serve as a methodological basis for a particular semiotic analysis in different areas of semiotics and linguistics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 155-184

The article discusses Raymond Ruyer’s philosophy of neofinalism, which offers an original reading of the theory of final cause consistent with the data of the natural sciences. In contrast to the classical version of causa finalis, neofinalism accentuates not the object in its finished form, but rather the goal-oriented process of searching for the forms of its realization. Final cause opens out as unsubjected consciousness that is realized as qualitative evaluation which influences the object’s behavior. Ruyer calls this primary consciousness an “absolute survey” or external contour of consciousness. Its secondary version is an internal contour or the consciousness of intentional objects. The finalist process is realized through a mechanical consequence, and the result of finalism is a being, while the result of the mechanics is an aggregate. Mechanics and finality converge at the meta-level in the operations of trans-spatial and trans-subjective forms that assemble the structural solutions for local processes. Consciousness ceases to be “conscious about something” and on the contrary, becomes “something” itself, a thing that in precritical philosophy would have called a “mental entity.” Ruyer’s works exerted great influence on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy and fit into the ongoing tradition of exegesis of the multiple and complex nature of reality alongside the oeuvre of Gabriel Tarde, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson and Gilbert Simondon. Ruyer proposed and developed such terms in Deleuze’s vocabulary as molar and molecular, assemblage, virtuality, transversality, trans-individuality and trans-spatiality. The article provides an outline of Ruyer’s writings and gives an account of his main work Neofinalism together with commentaries and comparisons with the views of Plato, Bergson, Simondon, Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Daniel Dennett and Antonio Damasio.


1973 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 193-207
Author(s):  
Les Holborow

Wittgenstein refers to psychophysical parallelism in this apparently prejudiced way in paragraph 611 of Zettel, in the course of a rather remarkable passage. It begins at 605 with the claim that ‘One of the most dangerous ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with our heads or in our heads’. Subsequent sections develop this remark in a way that demonstrates Wittgenstein's rejection of the view that thinking is any sort of process in the head, whether a physiological process or a matter of the operations of ‘a nebulous mental entity’. Indeed he appears to consider that these ontologically opposed alternatives have a common source, in that they both derive from the mistaken view that there must be a mediating process between psychological phenomena such as my present remembering and my experience of the remembered event (cf. Z, 610). If we find no suitable mediating physiological process, we are easily led to assume that there must be a process of a rather different sort, and hence we are led to believe in a ‘nebulous mental entity’. But this whole line of thought in fact depends on a ‘primitive interpretation of our concepts’, an interpretation which we uncritically made at the stage at which we assumed that there must be a process of some sort mediating between the phenomena. We are reminded of Wittgenstein's earlier remarks in Philosophical Investigations, I, 308:


1973 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 193-207
Author(s):  
Les Holborow

Wittgenstein refers to psychophysical parallelism in this apparently prejudiced way in paragraph 611 of Zettel, in the course of a rather remarkable passage. It begins at 605 with the claim that ‘One of the most dangerous ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with our heads or in our heads’. Subsequent sections develop this remark in a way that demonstrates Wittgenstein's rejection of the view that thinking is any sort of process in the head, whether a physiological process or a matter of the operations of ‘a nebulous mental entity’. Indeed he appears to consider that these ontologically opposed alternatives have a common source, in that they both derive from the mistaken view that there must be a mediating process between psychological phenomena such as my present remembering and my experience of the remembered event (cf. Z, 610). If we find no suitable mediating physiological process, we are easily led to assume that there must be a process of a rather different sort, and hence we are led to believe in a ‘nebulous mental entity’. But this whole line of thought in fact depends on a ‘primitive interpretation of our concepts’, an interpretation which we uncritically made at the stage at which we assumed that there must be a process of some sort mediating between the phenomena. We are reminded of Wittgenstein's earlier remarks in Philosophical Investigations, I, 308:


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