scholarly journals What Rule of Law for the European Union? – Tracing the Approaches of the EU Institutions

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-32
Author(s):  
Justyna Maliszewska-Nienartowicz ◽  
◽  
Marcin Kleinowski ◽  
Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019251212090832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Closa

Several European Union (EU) governments have infringed the obligation to respect ‘rule of law’ as demanded by the European Union Treaty but, despite its supranational features, the EU has done little to sanction those violations. Why? The European Union’s institutional features paradoxically permit (and even encourage) logics that might be inhibiting its sanctioning capacity. Thus, a partisanship logic informs the European Parliament and this protects errant states. Then, the Commission, rather than acting assertively, anticipates the Council’s stance and adapts also its actions to anticipate a ‘compliance dilemma’ (i.e. compliance depends ultimately on the good will and cooperation of domestic authorities). The Commission prefers to channel its sanctioning activity via other softer instruments (e.g. infringement procedures). Finally, a distaste for increasing EU competence, ideological sympathy for illiberal governments, or fears of spillovers from sanctioning activity inform the action of governments within the Council. Those three institutional logics combine to explain the unexpectedly low sanctioning record for breaches of EU values.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1959-1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dawson ◽  
Elise Muir

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is a political and economic union founded on a respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, referred to hereafter as EU fundamental values. The central place of this commitment in the EU Treaties suggests a founding assumption: That the EU is a Union of states who themselves see human rights and the rule of law as irrevocable parts of their political and legal order. Reminiscent of the entry of Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government in 2000, the events of 2012 have done much to shake that assumption; questioning both how interwoven the rule of law tradition is across the present-day EU, and the role the EU ought to play in policing potential violations of fundamental rights carried out via the constitutional frameworks of its Member States. Much attention in this field, much like the focus of this paper, has been placed on events in one state in particular: Hungary.


Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
M. Zekić

Should we join the European Union or not? The European Union is not some imaginative goal to be pursued. It requires and offers concrete solutions. At the same time, it seeks out and establishes values and obligations to be fulfilled and inserted in a concrete political life. These obligations and values are universal and it is up to each state to assess whether the acceptance and realization of those interests and values is in its own interest. It should be borne in mind that the legal state and the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, a market economy with developed social policy, fight against corruption and terrorism and many other values that the European Union stands for are essential to every democratic society and exactly these values are a goal that every human being strives for. Eurasian integration is also in favor of these values, but instead of ultimatum and conditioning, they offer a more flexible negotiation method.It is indisputable, at the moment, that in the region of the Western Balkans, the Republic of Serbia is at the back line of the European integration process. It has entered these processes as the last interested state, but in addition it constantly faces major internal problems and insufficient understanding, as well as new conditions that are constantly being set for its accession. If we add the fact that the decrease of the interest of citizens to join the European Union is currently being noticed, it is clear why the question of who to approach is becoming actualized. One of the goals of the reforms undertaken in the accession process is the harmonization of internal regulations with Communitarian Law. In doing so, it should be borne in mind that total harmonization is almost impossible.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Adnan Mahmutovic ◽  
Helza Nova Lita

This paper discusses the distinctiveness of the European Union with focus on the Rule of Law and its importance for the EU integration process. Rule of Law is a notion that is very frequently used, but at the same time quite controversial as it is not so easy always to reach generally accepted meaning. Therefore, this paper provides a analysis of the EU Rule of Law  as multidimensional legal principle gravitating between values and principles. The paper acknowledges that a concept of the EU rule of law can be the subject of diverse interpretations and implementation. High-ranking government officials of a two EU member states, Poland and Hungary, have argued recently that a concept of the EU rule of law lacks well-defined rules and remains the subject of much debate. Therefore, the paper provides for better understanding of the concept itself within the specific supranational legal environment. Also, the paper argues that the future of the EU and its integrations depends largely on the respect of the rule of law that remains to be a core and the element of unity within Europe’s legal space. The relationship between the principles and values upon which the EU is founded remain close and interrelated. The EU Rule of law with all its distinctiveness can be concluded with certainty that it reflects a specific character and nature of the EU legal system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 3-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent PECH ◽  
Kim Lane SCHEPPELE

AbstractHow should the European Union cope with Member States that no longer respect the basic values of the Union? This article reviews the responses of the major European Union institutions to Poland and Hungary as their governments removed checks on their power, eliminated the independence of judiciaries and failed to honour their European commitments. As the article demonstrates, the responses of EU institutions have so far been ineffective in bringing these Member States back into line with European values. We examine the various proposals that have been made to do better, concluding that there is promise in some legal strategies that are available now, but have yet to be tried.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Reyns

Admissibility of questions for preliminary ruling – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as Dorsch Consult criterion under Article 267 TFEU – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as element of the Rule of Law value under Article 19 TEU – Structural inadmissibility of questions for preliminary ruling as perverse consequence of the attempts to safeguard independence of the EU judiciary


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert

Suggested citation:  Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert, 'An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis' (2019) 2(2) NJEL 1. While commentators for the past years, have highlighted that there is no effective enforcement mechanism after accession for the values of the European Union which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Juncker Commission has announced in 2017 that it will be ‘bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things’ thus applying a more strategic approach to enforcement in terms of handling infringements. This Article thus analyses two cases brought by the Juncker Commission after 2017 and on their bases seeks to show that the infringement procedure, when applied strategically, is and remains an effective enforcement mechanism even for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU in the ‘rule of law crisis’. Thus, by way of analysis of the case C-619/18 Commission v Poland and its comparison with similar cases which have not been as effective, it is shown how the infringement procedure can prevent the enforcement of the most controversial provisions regarding the judiciary in Hungary and Poland and ensure the separation of powers, which is essential for the rule of law. Moreover, by comparison of the Commission’s request and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in C-235/17 Commission v Hungary it is shown how the Charter could become a significant legal instrument in the Commissions infringement policy towards Member States that are undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. This Article thereby aims to contribute to the discussion on how to effectively enforce the values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU through an existing enforcement mechanism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Xavier Groussot ◽  
Niels Kirst ◽  
Patrick Leisure

The Court ofJustice ofthe European Union’s (CJEU, Court) SEGRO judgment is more than just a recent addition to the debate on the so-called rule of law crisis in the European Union. As this case note shows, SEGRO touches on the most fundamental aspects of the European Union and its relation to the Member States. From an economic perspective, the Court in SEGRO’s treatment ofproperty rights and the ability ofeconomic actors to rely on their lawfully concluded contracts forms the undercurrent of economic investment in the Union. From a functional perspective, the case is perhaps indicative of a wider change in the role of the Court with respect to national courts’ margin of discretion. From a normative perspective, SEGRO gives rise to an important discussion on the difference between fundamental rights and economic freedoms in the EU since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as well as ‘constitutional homogeneity’ in the EU after Hungary’s legislative reforms. Finally, from an evolutionary perspective, SEGRO marks another iteration in perhaps a wider shift in the trajectory of the Court with respect to questions that menace the integrity of the functioning of the European Union. This case note first examines the background (I) and facts of the case (II). Then it analyses the Opinion of the Advocate General (III) and the findings of the Court (IV). It concludes with a discussion based not only on an analysis of the SEGRO case (V), but also going beyond the case by analysing the most recent jurisprudential developments concerning Hungary and the issue of the (non-respect) of the Rule of Law in the European Union(VI).


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Juha Raitio

The concept of the rule of law has lately become a topical and controversial issue. For example, the existence of effective judicial review is an inseparable part of the rule of law and some problems in this respect have been analysed. This article advocates for a thick concept of the rule of law. This refers to the idea that the rule of law has both material and formal content. The controversial part seems to be the question of material content and whether it obscures the essential meaning of the rule of law as a requirement of legality. However, the material aspect of the rule of law can be linked to the value-base of the European Union. For example, during its EU Presidency, Finland strongly emphasized the significance of the value base and the rule of law in Article 2 teu for the development of the EU. Democracy, the rule of law, and the actualisation of fundamental and human rights in particular are connected together, combined in a trinity where all the components form preconditions for the others. This stance is not a novelty in Finland, since Jyränki, for one, two decades ago already maintained that human rights protect the individual’s position and thus belong to the sphere of the material concept of the rule of law. I have employed the metaphor of a musical triangle. A triangle can only make a sound if all three of its corners are connected to each other, thereby connecting the sides of the triangle. Observance of the core values of the EU is a precondition for mutual trust between Member States, which in turn is necessary for a well-functioning European Union and good governance.


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