scholarly journals Loss Aversion and its Reference Point in the Housing Market

2011 ◽  
Vol 69 (null) ◽  
pp. 141-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
김준형 ◽  
Lewis Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Housing Market ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point

Loss Aversion in the Housing Market: A New Paradigm

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaohui Li ◽  
Michael Joseph Seiler ◽  
Hua Sun
Keyword(s):  
Housing Market ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
New Paradigm

scholarly journals Reconciling Loss Aversion and Gain Seeking in Judged Emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 096372142199204
Author(s):  
Barbara A. Mellers ◽  
Siyuan Yin ◽  
Jonathan Z. Berman
Keyword(s):  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Negative Change ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Status ◽  
Positive Feelings ◽  
Negative Feelings

Is the pain of a loss greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain? Studies that compare positive feelings about a gain with negative feelings about a comparable loss have found mixed answers to this question. The pain of a loss can be greater than, less than, or equal to the pleasure of a comparable gain. We offer a new approach to test hedonic loss aversion. This method uses emotional reactions to the reference point, a positive change, and a negative change. When we manipulated the reference point (i.e., pleasurable and painful), two distinct patterns emerged. Pain surpassed pleasure (loss aversion) when the reference point was positive, and pleasure exceeded pain (gain seeking) when the reference point was negative. A reference-dependent version of prospect theory accounts for the results. If the carriers of utility are changes from a reference point—not necessarily the status quo—both loss aversion and gain seeking are predicted. Loss aversion and gain seeking can be reconciled if you take the starting point into account.

OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO UNDER STATE-DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850013 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROLE BERNARD ◽  
STEVEN VANDUFFEL ◽  
JIANG YE
Keyword(s):  
Portfolio Choice ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Optimal Portfolio ◽  
Characterization Result ◽  
Terminal Wealth ◽  
Utility Maximizer ◽  
State Dependent

We derive the optimal portfolio for an expected utility maximizer whose utility does not only depend on terminal wealth but also on some random benchmark (state-dependent utility). We then apply this result to obtain the optimal portfolio of a loss-averse investor with a random reference point (extending a result of Berkelaar et al. (2004) Optimal portfolio choice under loss aversion, The Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (4), 973–987). Clearly, the optimal portfolio has some joint distribution with the benchmark and we show that it is the cheapest possible in having this distribution. This characterization result allows us to infer the state-dependent utility function that explains the demand for a given (joint) distribution.

Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Endowment Effect ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Foreign Policy Analysis ◽  
Point Selection

Prospect theory is one of the most influential behavioral theories in the international relations (IR) field, particularly among scholars of security studies, political psychology, and foreign policy analysis. Developed by Israeli psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, prospect theory provides key insights into decision making under conditions of risk and uncertainty. For example, most individuals are risk averse to secure gains, but risk acceptant to avoid losses (loss aversion). In addition, most people value items they already posses more than they value items they want to acquire (endowment effect), and tend to be risk averse if they perceive themselves to be facing gains relative to their reference point (risk propensity). Prospect theory has generated an enormous volume of scholarship in IR, which can be divided into two “generations”. The first generation (1990–1999) sought to establish prospect theory’s plausibility in the “real world” by testing hypotheses derived from it against subjective expected-utility theory or rational choice models of foreign policy decision making. The second generation (2000–present) began to incorporate concepts associated with prospect theory and related experimental literature on group risk taking into existing mid-level theories of IR and foreign policy behavior. Two substantive areas covered by scholars during this period are coercive diplomacy and great power intervention in the periphery as they relate to loss aversion. Both generations of prospect theory literature suffer from conceptual and methodological difficulties, mainly around the issues of reference point selection, framing, and preference reversal outside laboratory settings.

scholarly journals Expectations, loss aversion and retirement decisions in the context of the 2009 crisis in Europe

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-44
Author(s):  
Nicolas Sirven ◽  
Thomas Barnay
Keyword(s):  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Older Workers ◽  
Standard Of Living ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Job Retention ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Retirement Decisions ◽  
Form Model ◽  
Reduced Form Model

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to estimate a reduced form model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences to explain job retention of older workers in Europe in the context of the 2009 economic crisis. Design/methodology/approach Using individual micro-economic longitudinal data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe between 2006 and 2011, the authors derive a measure of “good, bad or no surprise” from workers’ anticipated evolution of their standard of living five years from 2006 (reference point) and from a comparison of their capacity to make ends meet between 2006 and 2011. Findings The authors find that the probability to remain on the labour market in 2011 is significantly higher for individuals who experienced a lower than expected standard of living. The effect of a “bad surprise” on job retention is larger than the effect of a “good surprise” once netted out from the effects of expectations at baseline, change in consumption utility, and the usual life-cycle determinants on job retention of older workers. Originality/value The authors interpret this result as an evidence of loss aversion in the case the reference point is based on individuals’ expectations. The authors also find that loss aversion is more common among men, risk-averse individuals and those with a higher perceived life expectancy.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (24) ◽  
pp. 3154
Author(s):  
Wentao Yi ◽  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan ◽  
Yuzhong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient

This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆m ≥ πm) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆r ≥ πr) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members’ loss aversion levels.

scholarly journals Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan
Keyword(s):  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
High Share

Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we investigate the effect of loss aversion and initial reference points on subgame perfect equilibrium. Firstly, a subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed. And its uniqueness is shown. Furthermore, we analyze this equilibrium with respect to initial reference points, loss aversion coefficients, and discount factor. It is shown that one benefits from his opponent’s loss aversion coefficient and his own initial reference point and is hurt by loss aversion coefficient of himself and the opponent’s initial reference point. Moreover, it is found that, for a player who has a higher level of loss aversion than the other, although this player has a higher initial reference point than the opponent, this player can(not) obtain a high share of the pie if the level of loss aversion of this player is sufficiently low (high). Finally, a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining is established, where player’s bargaining power is negatively related to his own loss aversion and the initial reference point of the other and positively related to loss aversion of the opponent and his own initial reference point.

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