scholarly journals Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Smart ◽  
Robert Clowes ◽  
Richard Heersmink
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Web Science

scholarly journals Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Smart ◽  
Robert Clowes ◽  
Richard Heersmink
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Web Science

Socially Extended Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Collective Memory ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Societal Impact ◽  
Research Teams ◽  
The Core ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Web Science ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Core Idea

The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memory in old partners, problem-solving by juries, and the behaviors of hiring committees, scientific research teams, and intelligence agencies. This volume attempts to further our understanding of socially extended knowledge while also exploring its potential practical and societal impact by inviting perspectives not just from philosophy but from cognitive science, computer science, Web science, and cybernetics too. Contributions to the volume mostly fall within two broad categories: (i) foundational issues within socially extended epistemology (including elaborations on, defences and criticisms of core aspects of socially extended epistemology), and (ii) applications and new directions, where themes in socially extended epistemology are connected to these other areas of research. The volume is accordingly divided into two parts corresponding to these broad categories. The topics themselves are of great conceptual interest, and wider interdisciplinary perspectives suggest many connections with social concerns and policy-making.

Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous?

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kernohan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Essential Difference ◽  
Anomalous Monism

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.

scholarly journals Interview on Experimental Philosophy with Joshua Knobe

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-28
Author(s):  
Pendaran S. Roberts ◽  
Joshua Knobe ◽  
Pendaran Roberts ◽  
Joshua Knobe
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Yale University ◽  
Knobe Effect ◽  
Experimental Philosopher ◽  
Interdisciplinary Collaborations ◽  
Conversation Piece

This conversation piece contains an interview with Joshua Knobe. It provides a useful introduction to what experimental philosophy is and the interdisciplinary collaborations it encourages. Pendaran Roberts and Joshua Knobe collaboratively developed this conversation piece via email. Joshua Knobe is a renowned experimental philosopher, who works on a range of philosophical issues, including philosophy of mind, action and ethics. He is a professor in the Program in Cognitive Science and the Department of Philosophy at Yale University. He is most known for what is now called the ‘Knobe effect’.

Distributed Cognition in Medieval and Renaissance Studies

2019 ◽  
pp. 18-43
Author(s):  
Miranda Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
Art Music ◽  
The Body ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Research Context ◽  
Renaissance Studies

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to current research in medieval and Renaissance studies on topics related to distributed cognition and to consider how the various chapters in this volume represent, reflect and advance work in this area. The volume brings together 14 chapters by international specialists working in the period between the ninth and the seventeenth century in the fields of law, history, drama, literature, art, music, philosophy, science and medicine. The chapters revitalise our reading of medieval and Renaissance works by bringing to bear recent insights in cognitive science and philosophy of mind on the distributed nature of cognition. Together the chapters make evident the ways in which particular notions and practices of distributed cognition emerged from the particular range of sociocultural and technological contexts that existed during this period. This chapter attempts to put these contributions in their wider research context by examining how such topics have been approached by mainstream scholarship, earlier work in the cognitive sciences and by existing applications of distributed cognition theory. It draws out both more general features of distributed cognition and what was distinctive about medieval and Renaissance insights into (and superstitions about) the cognitive roles of the body and environment. Throughout this chapter, I reference the chapters in this volume that provide further information on topics covered or take forward the issues in question. In the concluding section, I turn to a fuller overview of the chapters themselves

On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

1998 ◽  
pp. 32-36
Author(s):  
Henrique de Morais Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
Irreducible Elements ◽  
Framework Model ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Ontological Problem

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously

Philosophy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter P. Slezak
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Historical Evidence

AbstractIn response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar's caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17thCentury. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.

scholarly journals The Evolution of Moral Cognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tony James Scott
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Inheritance Model ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Evolution Of Mind ◽  
Dual Inheritance

<p>Many modern approaches to the evolution of mind have claimed that the fundamental drivers of our cognitive capacities and cultures are genetically specified psychological adaptations, which evolved in response to evolutionary pressures deep within our lineage's history. Many of our cognitive capacities are innate. Recent approaches to moral cognition have similarly argued that moral cognition is innate. In this thesis, I argue that even though our capacity for moral cognising is an adaptation, it is a learned adaptation. Moral cognition is not innate. In arguing this thesis I will question many of the assumptions of traditional cognitive science and evolutionary approaches to the mind. By incorporating theory and evidence from cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, I apply the explanatory frameworks of embodied and extended cognition to the domain of morality: moral cognition is both embodied and extended cognition. This places particular importance on the role of our bodies and world in the fundamental structuring and scaffolding of the development and execution of moral cognition. Putting this in an evolutionary framework, I develop a dual inheritance model of the non-nativist evolution of moral cognition focusing on the roles of niche construction, biased learning and active learning in the transfer of moral phenotypes between generations. Morality is a learned adaptation that evolved through the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between genes and culture.</p>

scholarly journals The significance of encapsulation of visual perception for philosophy of mind and aesthetic analysis

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-92
Author(s):  
Vladimir Konecni
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Visual Perception ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Effects ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Opinion Article

This Opinion Article highlights three sets of important implications of the very recent work by C. Firestone and B. Scholl on the encapsulation of visual perception: (a) methodological implications, especially with regard to experimental areas of cognitive science, such as cognitive social psychology; (h) implications of interest to philosophers of mind, some of whose more extravagant recent claims have been based on the assumption of "top-down" cognitive effects on perception; and (c) implications that challenge some recent work in philosophical and psychological aesthetics regarding art expertise, as well as defend the logic of A. Danto's theorizing from attacks that are based on the assumption of "top-down- cognitive effects.

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