scholarly journals The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-281
Author(s):  
Jens Leth Hougaard ◽  
Frank Jensen ◽  
Aleksandrs Smilgins
Keyword(s):  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel

Spatio-temporal interactions between Northeast Atlantic Mackerel and its fishery - Simulating different futures

Marine Policy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 133 ◽  
pp. 104740
Author(s):  
Sandra Rybicki ◽  
Katell G. Hamon ◽  
Sarah Simons ◽  
Axel Temming
Keyword(s):  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
Temporal Interactions

Game theory and fish wars: The case of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery

2015 ◽  
Vol 172 ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jensen ◽  
Hans Frost ◽  
Thomas Thøgersen ◽  
Peder Andersen ◽  
Jesper Levring Andersen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel

scholarly journals Sharing the Northeast Atlantic mackerel

2012 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rögnvaldur Hannesson
Keyword(s):  
Time Horizon ◽  
The Other ◽  
Faroe Islands ◽  
Fishing Mortality ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Cooperative Solution ◽  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Density Dependent ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel ◽  
Scomber Scombrus

Abstract The sharing of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) stock is analysed as a game between four parties: the European Union, Norway, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland. Consideration is given to how the outcome depends on the nature of the stock's migrations. Two types of migrations are considered: (i) density-dependent, where the mackerel migrates into the Icelandic economic zone only if it exceeds 3.5 million t, and (ii) stochastic migrations, where the said migrations are stochastic. It is determined that the Faroe Islands would never accept a cooperative solution wherein they can only fish with the globally optimal fishing mortality within their own zone. This is also true for Iceland when the migrations into her zone are stochastic, but not if they are density-dependent. In the latter case, the other players have incentives to retaliate to Icelandic overfishing by fishing harder, which greatly reduces the number of years when mackerel are available in the Icelandic zone. It is assumed that the objective is maximization of the catch volume over a time-horizon of 50 years.

Quantifying the influence of geography and environment on the northeast Atlantic mackerel spawning distribution

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Brunel ◽  
Cindy J. G. van Damme ◽  
Melvin Samson ◽  
Mark Dickey-Collas
Keyword(s):  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel

scholarly journals Development of a stock–recruit model for simulating stock dynamics for uncertain situations: the example of Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus)

2011 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 848-859 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. John Simmonds ◽  
Andrew Campbell ◽  
Dankert Skagen ◽  
Beatriz A. Roel ◽  
Ciaran Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Stock Assessment ◽  
Management Plan ◽  
Maximum Sustainable Yield ◽  
Fish Stock ◽  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel ◽  
Scomber Scombrus ◽  
Stock Biomass ◽  
Spawning Stock ◽  
Functional Forms

Abstract Simmonds, E. J., Campbell, A., Skagen, D., Roel, B. A., and Kelly, C. 2011. Development of a stock–recruit model for simulating stock dynamics for uncertain situations: the example of Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus). – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 68: 848–859. The assumption of a relationship between recruitment and a spawning stock is the cornerstone of the precautionary approach and may constrain the use of a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) target for fisheries management, because the failure to include such a relationship suggests that providing a measure of stock protection is unnecessary. The implications of fitting different functional forms and stochastic distributions to stock-and-recruit data are investigated. The importance of these considerations is shown by taking a practical example from management: the management plan for Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus), a fish stock with an average annual catch of 600 000 t. The historical range of spawning-stock biomass is narrow, and historical data from a stock assessment explain only a small proportion of the recruitment variability. We investigate how best to reflect the uncertainty in the stock–recruit relationship. Selecting a single model based on simple statistical criteria can have major consequences for advice and is problematic. Selecting a distribution of models with derived probabilities gives a more complete perception of uncertainty in dynamics. Differences in functional form, distribution of deviations, and variability of coefficients are allowed. The approach appropriately incorporates uncertainty in the stock–recruit relationship for FMSY estimation.

scholarly journals Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (02) ◽  
pp. 1850001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evangelos Toumasatos ◽  
Stein Ivar Steinshamn
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Net Present Value ◽  
Growth Function ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Northeast Atlantic ◽  
Atlantic Mackerel ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Management Regime ◽  
Player Game ◽  
The Uk

The partition function approach is applied to study coalition formation in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery in the presence of externalities. Atlantic mackerel is mainly exploited by the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Two games are considered. First, a four-player game where the UK is still a member of the EU. Second, a five-player game where the UK is no longer a member of the union. Each game is modeled in two stages. In the first stage, players form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. In the second stage, given the coalition structure that has been formed, each coalition chooses the economic strategy that maximizes its own net present value of the fishery, given the behavior of the other coalitions. The game is solved using backward induction to obtain the set of Nash equilibria coalition structures in pure strategies, if any. We find that the current management regime is among the stable coalition structures in all eight scenarios of the four-player game but in only one case of the five-player game. In addition, stability in the five-player game is sensitive to the growth function applied and the magnitude of the stock elasticity parameter.

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