La «practical reason» nel pensiero di Finnis alla luce di Grisez

Persona y Derecho ◽

10.15581/011.82.011 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 293-312

Author(s):

Tommaso Scandroglio

Keyword(s):

Practical Reason ◽

First Principle ◽

Basic Goods ◽

John Finnis

il presente contributo indaga il concetto di practical reason elaborato da John Finnis nell’interpretazione offerta da Germain Grisez, interpretazione esplicitamente accolta da Finnis. La ragione pratica è l’attore principale di una complessa interazione di molteplici elementi che produrranno la norma morale particolare. Questi elementi, tutti privi di connotati di moralità, sono le inclinationes naturales, i basic goods e le requirements of practical reasonableness. La natura della ragione pratica viene indicata dal primo principio della ragione pratica [first principle of practical reason], principio che ha carattere descrittivo/ indicativo e non prescrittivo.

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Same-sex marriage: a defense based on foundations of natural law

Revista Direito GV ◽

10.1590/2317-6172201839 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 14 (3) ◽

pp. 1044-1066

Author(s):

Pablo Antonio Lago

Keyword(s):

Practical Reason ◽

Natural Law ◽

Human Sexuality ◽

First Principle ◽

Gay Couples ◽

Lesbian And Gay ◽

Natural Law Theory ◽

Traditional Marriage ◽

John Finnis ◽

The One

Abstract Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditional marriage of a man and a woman. That makes sense when we notice Catholic Church's position about matrimony or even academic marriage conceptions as the one claimed by John Finnis. But would be possible to defend the so called “marriage equality” in natural law grounds? This paper aims to answer this question affirmatively. Departing from a critical analysis of Finnis’ natural law theory and his marriage conception, I argue that a better matrimony conception needs to be grounded on a wide vision of human sexuality, which encompasses lesbian and gay couples. Instead of procreation (which is one of the marriage points in Finnis’ conception), human experience shows that sex is not limited to breeding - it is a way people can achieve pleasure and high levels of intimacy, regardless their sexual orientation. I conclude that this way of conceptualizing human sexuality is “far more evident” than the one suggested by Finnis and is also consistent with Germain Grisez's interpretation of Aquinas’ first principle of practical reason - with which Finnis himself agrees.

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Law as Practical Reason

The Cambridge Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s0008197300109730 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 48 (3) ◽

pp. 436-471 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

M. J. Detmold

Keyword(s):

Practical Reason ◽

Practical Reasoning ◽

Legal Reasoning ◽

The State ◽

Strong Sense ◽

A Priority ◽

The Law ◽

John Finnis ◽

Vast Range

Law is practical. Legal reasoning is practical reasoning. We could make nothing of a judge who having listened to counsel's arguments and reflected about the law governing his case thought that the state of knowledge that he had achieved was the natural termination of his enterprise and submitted his conclusions to the editors of Halsbury's Laws of England rather than performed the action of giving judgment. The parties would be outraged, and rightly. And if the judge continued to do such a thing he would be dismissed. Legal reasoning is practical in the sense that its natural conclusion is an action (in the judge's case the action of giving judgment) rather than a state of knowledge. This is taking “practical” in a strong sense. By this definition thought is practical whose natural conclusion is an action (or decision against action): its strongest contrast is with theoretical thought whose natural conclusion is knowledge. But it also contrasts with hypothetical thought about action (say, my thinking it would be good to play cricket again). I do not call this practical because it does not conclude in an action or decision against action (others do; for example John Finnis in Fundamentals of Ethics; my reasons for differing in this matter will emerge). A judge's practical reasoning towards the action of giving judgment has priority for our understanding of law over that vast range of practically idle things that lawyers do, from the construction of digests like Halsbury to casual reflection about the rule in Shelley's case (of course there is one sort of doing involved in both these, but not legal doing). It is important here to be clear about this priority. It is a priority of practicality, not a priority of judges or lawyers.

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PERSONS PURSUING GOODS

Legal Theory ◽

10.1017/s1352325208070110 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 13 (3-4) ◽

pp. 285-313 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Steven D. Smith

Keyword(s):

Practical Reason ◽

Natural Law ◽

Natural Rights ◽

Legal Authority ◽

Basic Goods ◽

Natural Law Theory ◽

Law And Morality ◽

Basic Good ◽

Theory Of Law

John Finnis's powerfully and deservedly influential modern classic, Natural Law and Natural Rights, expounds a theory of law and morality that is based on a picture of “persons” using practical reason to pursue certain “basic goods.” While devoting much attention to practical reason and to the goods, however, Finnis says little about the nature of personhood. This relative inattention to what “persons” are creates a risk—one that Finnis himself notices—of assuming or importing an inadequate anthropology. This essay suggests that the “new natural law” developed by Finnis suffers in places from the inadvertent adoption of (or, more likely, acquiescence in) a flawed anthropology—an anthropology under the thrall of modern individualistic commitments. To explain this suspicion, this article discusses three difficulties (or so they seem to me) in his natural law theory: difficulties in accounting for the basic good of friendship, for obligations we owe to others, and for legal authority. These difficulties may seem disconnected, but this article suggests that they may all reflect an inadequate anthropology—one that Finnis does not exactly embrace (in fact, I suspect that he would reject it) but that is pervasive today and that in places may affect his theorizing.

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