Options and Choices in the Disposition of Excess Weapon Plutonium

1995 ◽  
Vol 412 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. L. Garwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Similar Amount ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Hard Evidence

AbstractMore than 50 tons of weapon-related plutonium (WPu) is expected to become excess andavailable for disposition by the year 2003 in Russia and a similar amount in the United States.Per two reports from the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the NationalAcademy of Sciences (1994 1 and 1995 2), the hazard of theft and incorporation into nuclearweapons impels us to guard this Pu carefully and as soon as possible to transform it into a formless accessible for use in nuclear weapons. To this end, CISAC adopted the “Spent FuelStandard” for the disposed WPu, which, if met, renders the WPu no greater hazard per kg thanthe much larger amount of reactor Pu in the form of spent fuel, since CISAC finds that separatedRPu can be used for nuclear weapons with little additional difficulty beyond that posed byseparated WPu. Many disposition routes can be eliminated on the basis of cost or other metric.The two principal survivors (of about equal cost and difficulty for the United States) are thepartial burning of WPu as MOX and the direct vitrification of WPu (as oxide) with high-level‘defense wastes’. Both these approaches should be pursued urgently, with experiments toqualify the processes, until one is selected on the basis of hard evidence. Either approach wouldcost about $1 B, within a factor two, to dispose of 50 tons of excess WPu. The CISAC analysiswill be presented, with comments on utility of RPu in weapons, on the DOE PlutoniumDisposition Study, and on ‘explosive criticality’ in the repository.

scholarly journals Russia's Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Anya Loukianova Fink ◽  
Olga Oliker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Strategic Stability

At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to deter Washington from a possible attack on Russia or coercive threats against it. Some elites in Russia would like to preserve existing arms control arrangements or negotiate new ones to mitigate a weakening infrastructure of strategic stability. At the same time, however, they seem skeptical that the United States is willing to compromise or deal with Russia as an equal. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control appears to be too complex a proposition for the time being.

Theater Missile Defenses: Possible Chinese Reactions; U.S. Implications and Options. By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-154 S, 23 February 1994. 4pp.] - Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implications and Options for the United State By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-422 S, 25 March 1994. 22pp.] - China in World Affairs – U.S. Policy Choice By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-265 S, 31 January 1995. 19pp.] - China After Deng Xiaoping – Implications for the United States. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-465 S, 7 April 1995. 27pp.] - China Policy: Managing U.S.–PRC–Taiwan Relations after President Lee′s visit to the U.S. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-727 S, 19 June 1995. 5pp.]

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 643-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxane D. V. Slsmanidis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
China Policy ◽  
United State ◽  
Congressional Research ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Research Service

Stopping the Bomb

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Selective Approach ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S

This book examines the historical development and effectiveness of US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Drawing on hundreds of declassified documents, the first part of the book shows how the anticipation of nuclear domino effects in the 1960s and 1970s led the United States to strengthen its nonproliferation policy, moving from a selective approach—which was relatively permissive toward allies acquiring nuclear weapons—and toward a more universal policy that opposed proliferation across the board. Most notably, Washington spearheaded the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and adopted sanctions legislation in the late 1970s that credibly threatened to cut off support to countries seeking nuclear weapons. The second part of the book analyzes how effective these policies have been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Statistical analysis suggests that a credible threat of sanctions has deterred countries dependent on the United States from even starting nuclear weapons programs over the last several decades. Meanwhile, in-depth case studies of French, Taiwanese, Pakistani, and Iranian nuclear activities illustrate the conditions under which sanctions succeed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs. The findings hold important implications for international security and nonproliferation policy.

The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects

1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 788-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. L. M. Burns
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
United Nations General ◽  
General Assembly Resolution ◽  
United Nations General Assembly

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.

Nuclear Arms Control in US Foreign Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Protest Movements ◽  
New States ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.

scholarly journals US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OPEN SKIES TREATY: CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-88
Author(s):  
I. V. Maksymenko ◽  
V. V. Matuyzo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Decision To Leave ◽  
Constructive Dialogue ◽  
International Stability ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The U.S

The arms control regime consists of several documents, and the United States of America and the Russian Federation as the State-Parties ensured the implementation and effectiveness of them mostly. However, the growing conflict between these States due to Russia's numerous violations of international law and obligations under international agreements has also harmed arms control. The withdrawal of both states from strategically important documents, which were tools for maintaining transparency and mutual control, is a result of the decline in trust and the lack of a constructive dialogue between Washington and Moscow. The Open Skies Treaty is one of these documents. The article examines the United States' reasons for the withdrawal from the Treaty and reveals the consequences of such a decision by the administration of President Trump. It is noted that the agreement, the idea of ​​which belonged to the United States, was signed immediately after the end of the Cold War and was to help build trust and openness in the new environment. It is noted that the Treaty ensures international stability through the ability of each party to openly collect information on the armed forces, activities, and operations of another party through coordinated flights of reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the member states. However, problems are gradually accumulating due to Russia's actions to restrict flight zones in violation of the provisions of the Open Sky Treaty, which has become especially acute since 2014. That made the United States think about the meaning of participating in an agreement where one of the parties violates its provisions. The authors outline the consequences of the U.S. decision to leave the agreement; in particular, the focus is on the reactions of the U.S. European partners and Ukraine. They also examined applications and countermeasures by Russia that has also announced its withdrawal from the agreement. Reflecting on the prospects for international security and arms control, the preconditions for the potential return of the United States and Russia to the Open Sky Treaty are outlined.

Separated Plutonium: Threats and Prospects

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison M. Macfarlane
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Mixed Oxide ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mox Fuel ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Weapons Grade Plutonium ◽  
Total Stock

Abstract Nuclear weapons reductions have resulted in 34 metric tons of declared excess weapons-grade plutonium in both the United States and Russia. To deal with this material both countries recently signed an agreement to disposition 68 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Stocks of separated plutonium have been growing in the European, Russian, and Japanese nuclear energy complexes due to the failure of the breeder reactor, the high cost of using the material as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and political opposition to use of the material. The total stock of separated civilian reactor-grade plutonium is 200 metric tons. Not only does separated plutonium pose a threat to international security, but also over the long run it poses a hazard to the environment. Therefore, it is necessary to select a disposition method that is both proliferation resistant and will perform well over the millennia in a repository.

Mulled US nuclear posture shift would lack credibility

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Barack Obama ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Nuclear Arsenal ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
And Shifts

Subject Potential US adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons policy. Significance The administration of US President Barack Obama is reportedly considering the adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons posture in his final months in office. A no first use policy would involve the United States declaring that it would only use its nuclear arsenal in response to a nuclear attack, never as a preliminary move in escalating tensions. This shift would be a significant departure from Washington's earlier posture, which maintained ambiguity as to whether nuclear weapons would be used in a hypothetical conventional attack on the United States or its allies. Impacts Arsenal upgrades and shifts in doctrine favouring tactical nuclear weapons would counteract the benefits of a restrained declaratory policy. Technological breakthroughs with hypersonic missiles are likely to undermine existing legal and diplomatic arms control arrangements. Obama may take up the pursuit of nuclear arms reductions with an ex-president's public profile. Eastern NATO allies will react strongly against any hint that their security does not fall under the US nuclear umbrella.

The Anarchical Society and the Control of Global Violence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Ayson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
International Society ◽  
International Security ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Violent Conflict ◽  
Security Challenge

In The Anarchical Society Bull treats violent conflict as a feature of international politics that cannot be abolished, but must be managed. With appropriate rules, which are often informal, managed violence can approximate an institution of international society. Bull’s treatment of violence reflects his earlier study of strategy and arms control, displayed in his classic The Control of the Arms Race. His arguments about the control of global violence still have purchase in a world where the superpower nuclear arms competition is no longer the central international security challenge. As America’s difficult experience in the Middle East indicates, states need to observe rules of restraint on violence even when dealing with violent non-state actors. Today’s Asia, strained by the competition between China and the United States, can only have peace and prosperity if there are rules which restrain violence. An accidental and unmanaged equilibrium of power will not do.

Pakistan army unlikely to see internal Islamist coup

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Western Media

Subject Risk of an Islamist coup with the Pakistan military. Significance Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, Western media and policymakers have been concerned about an Islamist coup within the Pakistan military. Given the army's exclusive control over nuclear weapons, an internal rebellion by radical sections of the officer corps could jeopardise regional and international security. A destabilised or divided military could give terrorist groups such as al-Qaida the opportunity to steal or acquire nuclear weapons technology. Such fears are exaggerated but not baseless. Impacts The military's relationship with Islamist militants will continue to be shaped by strategic calculations, rather than religious ideologies. This will undercut moderate political parties in Pakistan and the security of Afghanistan and India. Pakistan's defence ties with China and the United States would be imperilled by an Islamist shift in Pakistan's military.

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