The Importance of Criticality in the Safety Analysis of the Spent-Fuel Waste Container

1992 ◽  
Vol 294 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Culbreth ◽  
Paige Zielinski
Keyword(s):  
Thermal Effects ◽  
Federal Regulations ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Waste Container ◽  
Neutron Multiplication ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
High Level ◽  
Internal Configuration ◽  
Selection Of

ABSTRACTThe storage of high-level spent reactor fuel in a proposed national geologic repository will require the construction of containers to be placed in boreholes drilled into the host rock. Federal regulations require that the fuel be maintained subcritical under normal or accident conditions. This is determined through the calculation of a neutron multiplication factor, keff, that must remain below 0.95. Criticality will play an important role in the container design, the internal configuration of the fuel, and the selection of neutron poisons. An analysis of keff should be a normal step in the conceptualization of new waste container designs. Unlike thermal effects in a proposed repository, criticality will remain a problem long after the 10,000 year lifetime of the facility.

Centralization of Canada’s Spent Nuclear Fuel

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Site Selection ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Candu Reactors ◽  
High Level

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.

Application of Leakage Rates Measured on Scaled Cask or Component Models to the Package Containment Safety Assessment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Rolle ◽  
Viktor Ballheimer ◽  
Tino Neumeyer ◽  
Frank Wille
Keyword(s):  
Test Results ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Thermal Tests ◽  
Containment System ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
High Level ◽  
Elastomeric Seals ◽  
Component Models ◽  
And Storage

The containment systems of transport and storage casks for spent fuel and high level radioactive waste usually include bolted lids with metallic or elastomeric seals. The mechanical and thermal loadings associated with the routine, normal and accident conditions of transport can have a significant effect on the leak tightness of such containment system. Scaled cask models are often used for providing the required mechanical and thermal tests series. Leak tests have been conducted on those models. It is also common practice to use scaled component tests to investigate the influence of deformations or displacements of the lids and the seals on the standard leakage rate as well as to study the temperature and time depending alteration of the seals. In this paper questions of the transferability of scaled test results to the full size design of the containment system will be discussed.

A Comparison of the Performance of Nuclear Waste Glasses by Modeling

1987 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Grambow ◽  
D. M. Strachan
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Waste ◽  
Nuclear Reactors ◽  
Liquid Waste ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
High Level Liquid Waste ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Waste Forms ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Soluble Solid ◽  
High Level

The reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear reactors and processing of fuels for defense purposes have generated large volumes of high-level liquid waste that need to be immobilized prior to final storage. For immobilization, the wastes must be converted to a less soluble solid, and, although other waste forms exist, glass currently appears to be the choice for the transuranic-containing portion of the reprocessed waste. Once produced, this glass will be sent in canisters to a geologic repository located some 200 to 500 m below the surface of the earth.

The Effect of Fuel Burnup and Dispersed Water Intrusion on the Criticality of Spent High-Level Nuclear Fuel in a Geologic Repository

1993 ◽  
Vol 333 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Culbreth ◽  
Paige R. Zielinski
Keyword(s):  
Fuel Burnup ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Chain Reaction ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Mixture Ratio ◽  
Waste Package ◽  
Radiological Data ◽  
A Chain ◽  
High Level

ABSTRACTStudies of the spent fuel waste package have been conducted through the use of a Monte-Carlo neutron simulation program to determine the ability of the fuel to sustain a chain reaction. These studies have included fuel burnup and the effect of water mists on criticality. Results were compared with previous studies.In many criticality studies of spent fuel waste packages, fresh fuel with an enrichment as high as 4.5% is used as the conservative (worst) case. The actual spent fuel has a certain amount of “burnup” that decreases the concentration of fissile uranium and increases the amount of radionuclides present. The LWR Radiological Data Base from OCRWM has been used to determine the relative radionuclide ratios and KENO 5.a was used to calculate values of the effective multiplication factor, keff.1Spent fuel is not capable of sustaining a chain reaction unless a suitable moderator, such as water, is present. A completely flooded container has been treated as the worst case for criticality. Results of a previous report that demonstrated that keff actually peaked at a water-to-mixture ratio of 13% were analyzed for validity. In the present study, these results did not occur in the SCP waste package container.

Spent Fuel Storage in the Post-Yucca Mountain Paradigm

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl Easton ◽  
Christopher Bajwa ◽  
Zhian Li ◽  
Matthew Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Dose Rates ◽  
Fuel Storage ◽  
High Burnup ◽  
High Level ◽  
Time Frames

The current uncertainty surrounding the licensing and eventual opening of a long term geologic repository for the nation’s civilian and defense spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW) has shifted the window for the length of time spent fuel could be stored to periods of time significantly longer than the current licensing period of 40 years for dry storage. An alternative approach may be needed to the licensing of high-burnup fuel for storage and transportation based on the assumption that spent fuel cladding may not always remain intact. The approach would permit spent fuel to be retrieved on a canister basis and could lessen the need for repackaging of spent fuel. This approach is being presented as a possible engineering solution to address the uncertainties and lack of data availability for cladding properties for high burnup fuel and extended storage time frames. The proposed approach does not involve relaxing current safety standards for criticality safety, containment, or permissible external dose rates.

scholarly journals Preliminary modelling of radionuclide migration in the argillaceous sediments of the Sumer Formation (Northwestern Bulgaria)

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-18
Author(s):  
Dimitar Antonov ◽  
Madlena Tsvetkova ◽  
Doncho Karastanev
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Waste Disposal ◽  
High Level Waste ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Radionuclide Migration ◽  
Geological Disposal ◽  
Disposal Facility ◽  
Deep Geological Disposal ◽  
High Level ◽  
Host Rocks ◽  
Selection Of

In Bulgaria, from the preliminary analyses performed for site selection of deep geological disposal of high-level waste (HLW) and spent fuel (SF), it was concluded that the most promising host rocks are the argillaceous sediments of the Sumer Formation (Lower Cretaceous), situated in the Western Fore-Balkan Mts. The present paper aims to compare the transport of three major radionuclides from a hypothetical radioactive waste disposal facility, which incorporates an engineering barrier of bentonite into the argillaceous (marl) medium. The simulations were performed by using HYDRUS-1D computer programme. The results are used for a preliminary estimation of argillaceous sediments as a host rock for geological disposal of HLW.

Investigations of the Possible Separation Distance Between Spent Fuel/High-Level Waste and a Low/Intermediate-Level Waste Repositories due to Gas and Heat Generation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Senger ◽  
J. Ewing
Keyword(s):  
Heat Generation ◽  
Thermal Effects ◽  
Intermediate Level ◽  
High Level Waste ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Gas Generation ◽  
Pressure Buildup ◽  
Thermally Induced ◽  
High Level ◽  
Hlw Repository

This study is part of a generic investigation for the assessment of the required minimum distance between a Spent Fuel/High-Level Waste/ Intermediate-Level Waste (SF/HWL/ILW) repository and a Low/ Intermediate-Level Waste (L/ILW) repository. For this, a large-scale numerical model was constructed to investigate the two-phase flow behavior for such a repository configuration in a low-permeability claystone formation. The modeling focused on the pressurization mechanisms associated with (a) resaturation of backfilled underground facilities, (b) thermal effects caused by heat generation from the SF/HLW canisters, and (c) gas generation from corrosion and degradation of different wastes in the L/ILW and ILW caverns and in the SF/HLW emplacement tunnels. The model accounts for gas generation from corrosion and degradation of both L/ILW and ILW wastes indicating decreasing rates with time, and from corrosion of the SF/HLW canisters characterized by a constant rate. Heat generation from radioactive decay of radionuclides of MOX/UO2 wastes is described by an exponential decay with time. The preceding operational phases of the different repository components were simulated representing the transient initial conditions for the post-closure phase. The simulated pressure buildup in the L/ILW repository shows a near linear increase between 10 and 4,000 years when the peak pressure of 6.5 MPa is reached for a repository at about 370 m bg. This is followed by a similar decline, recovering to near hydrostatic pressures after 1 million years. The SF/HLW repository (repository level 600 m bg) indicates a pressure rise between 100 and 1,000 years affected by the early thermal effects, followed by a steep increase between 3,000 and 100,000 years when the pressures level off to a maximum of 6.5 MPa after 160,000 years (corresponding to a steel corrosion rate of 1 μm/year). This is the time when all the metal is corroded and the gas generation stops resulting in a sudden decline, and the pressures level off to about 4.5 MPa in the SF/HLW emplacement tunnel after 1 million years. The numerical modeling demonstrates that the main pressurization mechanism is from gas generation in the different repository components. The pressure histories show a distinct separation of the pressure peaks between the L/ILW repository and the SF/HLW/ILW repository. Moreover, the thermal phenomena affect the pressures in the SF/HLW repository at early time only (prior to about 2,000 years). The thermal expansion of the pore water in the nearfield around the SF/HLW tunnels does produce a relatively steep pressure buildup after 100 years, but it dissipates rapidly prior to the main pressure buildup caused by the gas generation and gas accumulation in the SF/HLW repository. The thermally induced pressure buildup is restricted to the vicinity of the SF/HLW emplacement tunnels (decameter range) and thus, significant interference of the thermally induced pressure perturbation around the SF/HLW/ILW repository with the early gas pressure buildup in the L/ILW repository can be excluded.

Some Materials Concerns in Nuclear Waste Management

MRS Bulletin ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-45
Author(s):  
Regina L. Hunter
Keyword(s):  
Power Plants ◽  
The United States ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
High Level Waste ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Waste Container ◽  
High Level ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that deep geologic disposal is appropriate for three types of radioactive waste generated in the United States: spent fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic waste. Spent fuel is nuclear fuel that has been discharged from a reactor after irradiation. High-level waste (HLW) is the highly radioactive material that remains after the reprocessing of spent fuel to recover uranium or plutonium. Transuranic (TRU) waste is any waste material contaminated with more than 100 nCi/g of elements having atomic numbers greater than 92 and half-lives longer than 20 years. Spent fuel and HLW can result from either commercial or governmental activities, although no commercially generated spent fuel has been reprocessed since 1972. TRU waste results primarily from the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons, not from nuclear power plants.The physical characteristics of TRU waste differ substantially from those of spent fuel and HLW. This imposes different requirements on materials associated with containment and isolation, so TRU waste will be discussed separately from spent fuel and HLW Because all three are judged to be particularly dangerous to human beings and the environment, the EPA standard requires a demonstration of adequate 10,000-year performance of geologic repositories for these radioactive wastes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for implementing the standard by designing, siting, and building the repositories.This article briefly describes TRU waste, HLW, and spent fuel and the two repositories currently planned by DOE. It con cludes by offering some observations on materials compatibility among waste, container materials, and host rock.

Gap and Grain-Boundary Inventories of Cs, Tc, and Sr in Spent LWR Fuel

1991 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Gray ◽  
D. M. Strachan ◽  
C. N. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Grain Boundary ◽  
Grain Boundaries ◽  
Surface Area ◽  
Dissolution Behavior ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Metallic Particles ◽  
Waste Container ◽  
Fission Gas Release

ABSTRACTSoluble radionuclides concentrated within the gap and grain-boundary regions of spent fuel could dissolve relatively rapidly were the waste container to fail and the fuel to be contacted by water in a geologic repository. To provide an estimate of the quantities of radionuclides that may be rapidly released, fractional inventories of Cs, Tc, and Sr concentrated within the fuel/cladding gap region have been measured for U.S. LWR spent fuels with fission gas release (FGR) values ranging from 0.25% to 18%. Separate measurements of the grain-boundary inventories of Cs, Tc, and Sr have been made for the same fuels. The Cs gap inventories were generally found to be about one fourth of the FGR values. The Cs grain-boundary inventories were generally less than 1% of the total Cs inventories and were not strongly correlated with FGR. Both the gap and grain-boundary inventories of Tc and Sr were near the detection limits of the methods used, less than 0.2% of the total inventories of these elements. However, some of the Tc may reside at the grain boundaries in the form of relatively insoluble metallic particles and not be detected by these experiments. Data obtained by comparing the dissolution behavior of fuel fragments with that of fuel grains were used to estimate the dissolution rate of Cs from the grain boundaries of one of the fuels. Surface-area normalized dissolution rates determined for fuel fragments in these same tests exceeded those determined for grains. A likely explanation is that the estimated fragment surface area did not take into account the “effective” grain-boundary surfaces.

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