scholarly journals Man is an object and a subject of social and humanitarian sciences

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (86) ◽  
pp. 130-134
Author(s):  
O.V. Ohirko

Philosophical, anthropological and Christian views on a person as a reasonable, free, religious and social person are considered. Theocentric and anthropocentric views are analyzed. Man is three worlds: physical, cognitive, and affective. Man differs from other creatures by having reason and will and natural inclinations. Man is embodied in the spirit and the spiritualized body, and its human spirit is expressed in bodily form. The body and soul of man are not two realities that are separated from one another. The body is a living matter, merged with the soul. The body, having the ability to feed, move, rest, multiply, falls under the laws of matter, that is, in particular, under the law of death. The human soul animates the body, reveals the spiritual ability to think abstractly, to create ideas, assessments, reasoning, make decisions freely. She does not suffer corporal death and can not decompose. In order for a person to live according to his nature, the mind must freely and sincerely seek the truth, and the will must always desire the truth offered as reason by the mind. A person is a person who has his own mind, will and feeling. In view of its dignity, the human person is the center of public life. Man as an image and likeness of God, is able to know, to love the Creator, and to serve Him. Man as a person is a goal in itself and in no case is not only an instrumental instrument. The purpose of human life is to love people and God, to be kind, to know, to speak and to testify the truth.

Author(s):  
Isabella Image

This chapter presents Hilary’s understanding of the Fall. Hilary uses the ‘historical’ Genesis narrative and apparently rejects Origen’s teaching of the Fall of souls into bodies. His most interesting discussion of the Fall (InMt 10.23–4) sees the scriptural narrative as an allegory for the components of the human person. At the Fall, the human is changed and now comprises body, soul, will, disobedience (infidelitas), and sin; however, Christ’s coming gives the body and soul dominance over the other three elements. This intriguing analogy demonstrates that for Hilary the first sin, disobedience, is also its own punishment (an idea later found in Augustine). The importance of infidelitas in Hilary’s works is demonstrated, as is the role of the will at the Fall.


Etyka ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Szawarski

Human life is a process. It is the process of becoming and ceasing to be a human being and it is a process of becoming and ceasing to be a human person. I accept the distinction between being a human being and being a human person and distinguish further – future, present, and past human persons. The main problem of the paper is when do we become past persons? Having distinguished and presented four distinctive modi of human dying (hospital death, hospice death, nursing home death, and death at home) I concentrate on the problem of good death and ask what are the goods of the dying person. The goods are: life, the good of the mind, the good of the body, the good of the communal life, and (paradoxically) the good of death. The decision who is a terminal patient is a moral one and implies two different strategies with regard to life: the affirmation of life, and the affirmation of death strategy. The first one, based on the concept of respect for human life, ignores the value of human dignity. The second one assumes that we should respect not only human biological life, but the whole human person, and we cannot respect the whole person if we do not respect her freedom of choice and her right to self-respect. Care for the artificially sustained but absolutely personless human life, is not a proper terminal care but rather is post-terminal care, and as such requires other, special justification.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-154
Author(s):  
Vasily P. Goran

The paper offers an analysis of the argument of priest P. Bourdin in his actual discussion with the philosopher R. Descartes, initiated by the response of this priest to the philosophical treatise “Meditations on the first philosophy...”. The paper also provides a historical and philosophical assessment of their positions. Particular attention is paid to the fact that Bourdin very persistently tried to clarify the conceptual basis on which Descartes rests his decision to consider the mind of a person incorporeal. In addition, Descartes considered the mind isolated from the body and independent of it so completely as to recognize it continuing to exist even after the death of the body. Since, according to Bourdin, Descartes’ efforts did not have a convincing positive result, the priest rejected this concept of the philosopher and the isolation of the mind from the body, and the immortality of the mind. This position of the church hierarch cannot but be recognized as materialistic. As a result, the paradox of the situation is established. On the question of the relationship between a person’s body and soul, the church hierarch essentially upholds a materialistic position, and one of the largest natural scientists of that time has a religiously idealistic idea of the immortality of the human soul.


2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem Jacobus Cardinal Eijk

Is medicine losing its way? This question may seem to imply a serious warning, one needing a further explanation. What I mean to say by the title of this paper is that we can detect an undeniable shift in medicine in the last forty to fifty years. Medicine used to focus on what we call “health care” in a classical sense, that is, the treatment of people suffering from diseases, injuries or handicaps, or the alleviation of pain and other symptoms. In addition to this, in the last half century, it has begun to offer more and more treatments aiming to perfect the qualities of people who are otherwise healthy. Summary Due to the rapid progress of research in the biomedical field, medicine is already and will ever more be able not only to cure diseases, but also to improve the characteristics of healthy human persons. This seems to be justifiable from the point of view of the contemporary view of man. This considers the mind as the actual human person and the body as an object of which he may dispose as he likes. However, serious and convincing objections exist against this view, because it does not do justice to the fact that we experience ourselves as a unity. Aristotelian-Thomist anthropology explains man as a substantial unity of a spiritual and a material dimension, of body and soul, which implies that the body is an essential dimension of man, participates in his intrinsic dignity and is never to be instrumentalized in order to improve the characteristics of healthy people. Medicine should apply all new medical techniques availed, but remain true health care.


Author(s):  
Rosario Sánchez Muñiz

Según Cardona, el constitutivo real de la persona es el actus essendi, que la hace subsistir. El alma humana participa al cuerpo su propio acto de ser, elevándolo al nivel personal. Cuerpo y alma se enriquecen mutuamente. Cardona fundamenta la unidad entitativa de la persona humana en su acto personal de ser; y la operativa, en la máxima expresión de ese ser: el amor, acto supremo de libertad, que debe informar cualquier otra acción u operación. La persona (humana) es descrita como “alguien delante de Dios y para siempre”. La despersonalización del mundo contemporáneo deriva, en última instancia, de la pérdida teorético-práctica de la relación del hombre a Dios, que manifiesta en el orden predicamental la directa creación de cada varón o mujer.According to Cardona, the real constituent of the human person is the actus essendi, which makes it subsist. The human soul communicates its own act of being to the body, thus elevating it to the level of the person. Body and soul enrich each other. Cardona bases the entitative unity of the human person on its personal act of being; and the operative one on the maximum expression of said being: love, the supreme act of liberty, which should inform any other action or operation. The (human) person is described as “someone who stands before God forever.” Depersonalisation in the contemporary world originates in the theoretical and practical loss of the relation of man with God, which predicamentally shows the direct creation of each man and woman by God.


Author(s):  
Isabella Image

This chapter discusses Hilary’s dichotomous body–soul anthropology. Although past scholars have tried to categorize Hilary as ‘Platonic’ or ‘Stoic’, these categories do not fully summarize fourth-century thought, not least because two-way as well as three-way expressions of the human person are also found in Scripture. The influence of Origen is demonstrated with particular reference to the commentary on Ps. 118.73, informed by parallels in Ambrose and the Palestinian Catena. As a result, it is possible to ascribe differences between Hilary’s commentaries to the fact that one is more reliant on Origen than the other. Nevertheless, Hilary’s position always seems to be that the body and soul should be at harmony until the body takes on the spiritual nature of the soul.


Author(s):  
Martin Eisner

This article investigates the significance of the manuscripts of Virgil and other classical poets that Dante might have read. Calling attention to the presence of musical notation (neumes) in copies that share the particular Virgilian readings Dante quotes, this essay explores the resonance of one of those passages (Aeneas’ dream of Hector) in Dante’s poem. It shows how Dante uses this Virgilian episode to craft his encounter with Manfred where he considers the relationship of body and soul that constitutes one of the major differences between classical and Christian thought, as Augustine frequently noted. Just as Christian anthropology maintains that the body constitutes an essential element of the human person, this essay argues that the materiality of the texts Dante read constitutes a crucial source for understanding how Dante interpreted these texts.


2019 ◽  
pp. 192-209
Author(s):  
Дионисий Шленов

В XI в. монах Студийского монастыря прп. Никита Стифат в аскетико-богословском корпусе своих сочинений неоднократно пользовался выражениями «главные добродетели» и «главные страсти». В статье делается попытка раскрыть смысл выражения«главные добродетели», систематизировать представления автора о четырех главных добродетелях, известных ему от античной традиции через посредство христианских авторов, продолжавших и далее свободно пользоваться этим выражением. Общий контекст позволяет выявить своеобразие автора, который сравнивает «четыре главные добродетели» с четырехчастностью человеческой души как великого мира по сравнению с внешним, малым, миром, состоявшим, согласно античным представлениям, из четырех первоэлементов. Особо рассматривается еще более детализированное сравнение четырех добродетелей с четырьмя способностями высшей части души - разума. Наряду с этим, автор сопоставляет пять чувств тела и пять разумных сил души. Для прп. Никиты четыре главные добродетели являются основополагающими, что не исключает особого внимания автора к ряду других ключевых добродетелей, таких как смирение и любовь. Учение о четырех главных добродетелях отсутствует в корпусе сочинений учителя прп. Никиты - прп. Симеона Нового Богослова, что сильнее подчеркивает более«школьный» и компилятивный характер наследия Стифата. Учение Стифата рассматривается в контексте античной и византийской литературы. In the XI century a monk of the Studite monastery St. Nicetas Stethatus in the ascetic-theological corpus of his writings repeatedly used the expressions “main virtues” and “main passions”. The article attempts to uncover the meaning of the expression “main virtues”, to systematize the author’s ideas about the four main virtues, known to him from the ancient tradition through Christian authors, who continued to use this expression freely. The general context makes it possible to reveal the originality of the author, who compares the “four main virtues” with the fourfold part of the human soul as a great world compared to the external, small, world, which, according to ancient concepts, consisted of four primary elements. Particularly, an even more detailed comparison of the four virtues with the four abilities of the higher part of the soul, the mind, is considered. Along with this, the A. compares the five senses of the body and the five rational powers of the soul. For St. Nicetas the four main virtues are fundamental, which does not exclude the A.’s special attention to a number of other key virtues, such as humility and love. The doctrine of the four main virtues is missing from the corpus of St. Nicetas/St. Simeon the New Theologian, which more strongly emphasizes the more “school-like” and compilative nature of St. Stethatus’ heritage. The doctrines of Stethatus are considered in the context of ancient Byzantine literature.


2019 ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Frances Young

This chapter demonstrates how arguments about creation and resurrection in the second century ensured that by the fourth century even those Christian thinkers with the most leanings toward Neoplatonism would espouse the view that the union of soul with body was constitutive of human being as a creature among creatures, and so a necessary aspect of the reconstitution of the human person at the resurrection. Soul-body dualism is often treated as the default anthropological position in antiquity, but the fourth-century anthropological treatise of Nemesius of Emesa shows that, despite huge debts to the legacies of philosophy, creation and resurrection, though barely mentioned, in fact shape his conclusion that the body-soul union is fundamental to what a human being is; the same is true, for example, of the Cappadocian Gregories and Augustine.


Health ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 141-173
Author(s):  
Guido Giglioni

In the Renaissance medicine was still based largely on the works of Galen, but increasingly the Galenic medical paradigm was tested and modified. This was in part the result of new findings in anatomy, in part the result of new reflection on the nature and sources of health. The humanists pointed to cultural and physical factors to account for the flourishing of the human person, though figures such as Cardano continued to work with the Galenic idea of the six non-naturals. Ficino, Francis Bacon, and others proposed that one could preserve health through a “medicine of the mind” that would be grounded partly in an understanding of the states of the body, in part on the mind’s influence on the body. Consideration was also given to defining just what it means to live a flourishing life.


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