scholarly journals Political, socio-demographic and economic aspects of state instability as a factor of external influence in Ukraine: a sociological perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (6-7) ◽  
pp. 26-38
Author(s):  
Eduard Gugnin

The article describes the descriptive characteristics of demographic and economic factors of state weakening in their multicausal interactions, which is based on the analysis of empirical indicators of state instability of the demographic and economic sphere, proposed by the Peace Foundation and partial logical extrapolation of these indicators to the social reality of Ukraine. As a result of research the following conclusions are formulated. The analysis of the factors of weakening of the state power in Ukraine allows to carry out their conditional hierarchy which will be defined by features of a social-institutional and social-group profile of the Ukrainian society. It is stated that the weakening of state power over the past 5 years can be considered both as the root cause and as a consequence of external influence. At the same time, it was emphasized that the external influence on the functioning of state institutions, the economy, and the mass media took place at the start of Ukrainian independence. It is noted that at the level of a formal constitutional act Ukraine was declared an independent and sovereign state, in social practices one could observe an unspoken (shadow) restriction of sovereignty by the presence of infiltrated groups of influence of other states (including Russia, USA, EU countries) in parliament, bodies executive power in general and special services in particular. It is noted that their very presence, on the one hand, was a consequence of the instability of the borders of identity of the political space of Ukraine, its power and information depressurization, on the other hand - the weakness of cultural filters, which was expressed in cult attitude to actors of foreign origin.It is emphasized that these actors of external influence did not (and could not) have an interest in strengthening Ukrainian statehood, and therefore created a regime of ignorance and silence to solve a number of current problems and crises, from cultural to environmental. It is noted that at the same time, it is impossible to remove some responsibility for maintaining such a regime from ordinary citizens, who, as bearers of Soviet political culture, are accustomed to building relations with the state in the usual paternalistic format. It was stated that the consequences of covert external influence and its ignorance and tacit indulgence by the population were protest movements, which grew into the Orange Revolution of 2005 and the Revolution of Dignity of 2014.Attention is focused on the fact that the "coefficient of usefulness" of these events for Ukrainian society (except for the ruling elites) remains quite insignificant. Permanent fragmentation of state power and its delegitimization continue, crisis phenomena in the economy become more complicated and intensified, environmental problems are postponed, however, they steadily affect the creation of discontent groups. It is summarized that all this highlights the need for sociological reflection and implementation of management strategies to overcome the crisis, part of which is a multi-causal study of external influence on Ukraine, which has been the subject of analysis in this article and future publications.

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Eduard Gugnin

The article constructs a descriptive and analytical description of the connection between corruption, delegitimization and loss of state sovereignty over society as background factors for increasing external influence and the destruction of political and spatial cohesion. As a result of the study, a conclusion was formulated, according to which the complete or partial loss of legitimacy coincides with the spread of corruption, which entails the devaluation of value and regulatory systems of social behavior. It is emphasized that corrupt practices contribute to the destruction of morals, law, ideology, have a devastating effect on government structures, procedures for its institutionalization, prevent the nomination of elites and leaders to command positions in the state apparatus, negatively affect the power and centralizing capabilities of the state. legitimate physical violence. It is noted that the loss of legitimacy is preceded by the loss of dialogue between government and society, the habitualization of corruption and its transformation into an endemic component of social life.It was stated that corruption increases the level of public permeability for external actors who take advantage of the situation of blurring the boundaries of political space and encourage citizens to spontaneous protests, which should shake the procedural principles of law and order, to achieve open conflicts between government and self-organized communities. what are the conditions for dialogue. External actors can seek to actively discredit the ruling elites by simultaneously unscrewing instability and escalating waves of destructive criticism aimed at disavowing all kinds of legitimacy: ideological, ethnic, structural, personalistic (charismatic), and others.It is noted that the final destruction of the state is the loss of a monopoly on public violence within the procedures established by law. Actors of external influence can resort to various acts of violence in order to encourage the ruling elites to increase security with the use of special Praetorian groups (paramilitary formations).It is summarized that the emergence of paramilitary formations is an indicator of the fragility of the state and its inability to control its own power structures, as evidenced by the violation of paramilitary formations of the usual official hierarchies and privatization of legitimate violence by alternative centers of power. Finally, it is emphasized that the destructive accompaniment of the latter is the growth of shadow arms markets, criminalization of the behavior of ordinary citizens who cease to see the state as an authorized defender of sovereignty and security and cease to trust legitimate law enforcement agencies, and these processes precede their colonial expansion. frozen conflicts with accompanying negative consequences for the state.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
JAGJEET LALLY

Abstract Across monsoon Asia, salt is of such vital necessity that controlling its production or supply has historically been connected to the establishment and expression of political authority. On the one hand, rulers maintained the allegiance of their subjects by ensuring their access to salt of suitable price and sufficient quantity. On the other hand, denying rebels their salt was a strategy of conquest and pacification, while the necessity of salt meant it could reliably be taxed to raise state finances. This article first sets out this connection of salt and sovereignty, then examining it in the context of colonial Burma, a province of British India from its annexation until its ‘divorce’ in 1935 (effected in 1937), and thus subject to the Government of India's salt monopoly. Focusing on salt brings into view two aspects of the state (while also permitting analysis of ‘Upper Burma’, which remains rather marginal in the scholarly literature). First, the everyday state and quotidian practices constitutive of its sovereignty, which was negotiated and contested where indigenes were able to exploit the chinks in the state's administrative capacity and its knowledge deficits. Second, in turn, the lumpy topography of state power. The state not only failed to restrict salt production to the extent it desired (with the intention that indigenes would rely on imported salt, whose supply was easier to control and thus tax), but conceded to a highly complex fiscal administration, the variegations in which reflected the uneven distribution in state power – thicker in the delta and thinnest in the uplands.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl F. Bahm

In much of the already vast and expanding literature on nationalism there is an understandable emphasis on its political dimensions. It is generally seen as the ideological mobilization of an essentially cultural national identity—which may or may not be considered pre-existing—for the purposes of attaining sovereign state power, or in some other way influencing and affecting state power, for example attaining greater rights or autonomy within the state. Where there are no such demands directed at the state, such an understanding implies that either we are not dealing with a nation, or we are dealing with one that is still unconscious of its nationhood or that is satisfied without any political expression of that nationhood. None of these cases, in any event, would normally be considered examples of nationalism, since nationalism by definition must demand, indeed is the demand for such state expression or recognition of nationality. As John Breuilly puts it: nationalism is “above and beyond all else, about politics, and … politics is about power.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 254-258
Author(s):  
Yudo Adiananto ◽  
Abdul Rachmad Budiono ◽  
Tunggul Anshari SN ◽  
Iwan Permadi

The prosecutor's position as a government agency that carries out state power in the field of prosecution has resulted in its own legal problems.  The Attorney General's Office, on the one hand, is part of a government agency (executive) and is carrying out a prosecution (judicial) function. There is a conflict of norms in the regulation between Article 2 paragraph (1) of Law No.  30 of 2004 concerning the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia with Article 38 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) letter b of Law No. 48 of 209 concerning Judicial Power. The Prosecutor's Office in carrying out its authority independently and independently in the field of prosecution is difficult to be separated from the influence of the power of the authorities, because the Prosecutor's position is under the executive power.


2009 ◽  
pp. 168-178
Author(s):  
Yaroslav V. Stockiy

In recent years, the study of this problem has received considerable attention in both Ukrainian and Polish historiography, which is connected, on the one hand, with the deportation of Ukrainians from Poland and Poles from Ukraine, and, on the other, with the loss of confessional presence, including property. , these two denominations in Western Ukraine in 1944-1946. Both the first and the second are related to the policy of the State power of the Stalin regime. The echo of these events reminded itself in the late 1980s - in the first half of the 1990s - of the apogee years of interfaith confrontation in Ukraine and still echoes today, activating these 60-year-old events. Therefore, given the Ukrainian and Polish historiography of the study, it is appropriate to cover this issue in more detail. This is the relevance of our article. In this context, the author used sources already available in our time in the archives of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions, which have not yet been fully explored by researchers. This made it possible to reproduce the confessional transformations of the Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Catholic Church in a broader and more detailed way and to show the impact on this process of state power, which was the purpose of the study.


Vojno delo ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-20
Author(s):  
Ilija Kajtez

In the paper the author would like to explain why the concept of the social power is relevant for the state power, and why it is more appropriate for the military to talk about the armed force. Although he is acutely aware of the intertwining, reciprocity and closeness of the state power and the organization of the military, as well as the concepts of power and force, the author would like to emphasize their differences. It is not possible to talk about the power without the help and reliance on the armed force, and there is no armed force that does not view its meaning, task and goal in the state power. The military power can be independent only in short periods, but it immediately returns to the state power or the very military establishes the state power because it needs a source of legitimacy. What is the first and main rule is that we cannot talk anywhere about true power unless the one in power controls the armed force in his community, tribe, family, class, politics, state and society. It is simply impossible to imagine, let alone really happen, that the one who rules a community or society is not the supreme commander of the armed forces, as well. The main idea is to consider what are the inviolable spheres of the society in which politics should dominate, and where the best field of action of the armed forces is and how and in what way their relations, which are close, but often tense, are regulated.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Irma Riyani

This paper discusses how the Indonesian Sunni Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid and the Iranian Shiite Muslim leader Ayatollah Khomeini responded to the debate about the relationship between Islam and the state. Their responses impacted on the struggle of Indonesian and Iranian Muslims in considering the ideological basis of Indonesian and Iranian states. On the one hand, Wahid with his educational and social background and Indonesian political context rejected the concept of an Islamic state. He did not agree with the formalization of Islamic sharia. To implement his idea, he promoted the idea of Pribumisasi Islam. For Wahid, islamization was not arabization. Khomeini, on the other hand, believed that Islam is a religion that has complete laws and way of life including social rules. According to Khomeini, to effectively implement these rules, Muslims need to have executive power. In Khomeini’s view, when the Quran calls for Muslims to obey Allah, the messenger, and ulil amri, this means that Allah instructs Muslims to create an Islamic state. To realise his views, Khomeini proposed the doctrine of Velayat-e al Faqeeh. Thus, different religious-political contexts of these two leaders contributed to their different responses to the relationship between Islam and the state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-45
Author(s):  
Ahmad Ali Nurdin ◽  
Ahmad Tholabi Kharlie

This paper discusses how the Indonesian Sunni Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid and the Iranian Shiite Muslim leader Ayatollah Khomeini responded to the debate about the relationship between Islam and the state. Their responses impacted on the struggle of Indonesian and Iranian Muslims in considering the ideological basis of Indonesian and Iranian states. On the one hand, Wahid with his educational and social background and Indonesian political context rejected the concept of an Islamic state. He did not agree with the formalization of Islamic sharia. To implement his idea, he promoted the idea of Pribumisasi Islam. For Wahid, islamization was not arabization. Khomeini, on the other hand, believed that Islam is a religion that has complete laws and way of life including social rules. According to Khomeini, to effectively implement these rules, Muslims need to have executive power. In Khomeini’s view, when the Quran calls for Muslims to obey Allah, the messenger, and ulil amri, this means that Allah instructs Muslims to create an Islamic state. To realise his views, Khomeini proposed the doctrine of Velayat-e al Faqeeh. Thus, different religious-political contexts of these two leaders contributed to their different responses to the relationship between Islam and the state.


Author(s):  
Володимир Шатіло

The purpose of this work is to define the concept of functions of the state power constitutional mechanism through the study of doctrinal positions of function in various branches of social sciences. Methodology for the functions’ study of the state power constitutional mechanism consists of the methods of cognition, discovered and developed by philosophy, history, sociology, theory of law and state, specialized legal sciences and approved by legal practice. Thus, the role of the historical method in the analysis of the functions of the constitutional mechanism of state power, in addition to explaining the nature of origin and development, is to ensure a systematic study of the evolution of this category. The semantic method was used to clarify the meaning of the term “function”, its scientific and practical meaning, the possibility of using it in constitutional law to refer to such legal categories as “constitutional mechanism of state power”. The comparative method was applied to reveal the general in such terms as “functions”, “goals” and “tasks”. The results of the study show that the function is a kind of “a pattern”, “a standard”, “an ideal model” of the system’s work, in particular, of the constitutional mechanism of state power, and therefore, it must be, on the one hand, differentiated from the goals and tasks that face the system, and on the other hand – from the real, actual activity of its institutions (competences). When determining the functions of the constitutional mechanism of state power, it must be assumed that, firstly, the functions are the directions of influence of a certain socially significant phenomenon or circumstance on certain legal relations, and secondly, the functions are the activity of certain subjects of the constitutional mechanism of state power within the limits of the powers specified in the Constitution and laws; thirdly, functions reflect the essence of the phenomenon, its purpose and patterns of development. The theory of functions of the constitutional mechanism of state power should proceed from the social purpose of the state, its tasks and goals, the legislation of Ukraine, as well as the experience of practical activity of the state apparatus and the achievement of scientific opinion in the field of constitutional law and a number of theoretical and applied legal sciences. Actually the system of functions of the state determines the need to study the functions of the constitutional mechanism of state power, but if the functions of the state are the directions of influence on public relations, then the functions of the constitutional mechanism of state power are the directions of the state functions within the competence of individual institutions that make up the structure of the constitutional mechanism of the state power. On the basis of this research, the author comes to the conclusion that the functions of the constitutional mechanism of state power should be defined as the directions of activity of the subjects of the constitutional mechanism of state power within the competence defined in the Constitution and laws aimed at achieving the goals and tasks of the state.


2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-151
Author(s):  
Dewale Adewale Yagboyaju

It is common to interpret African politics in tribal or ethnic terms. In the case of Nigeria, the dominant political behaviour can be defined, on the one hand, in terms of “incessant pressures on the state and the consequent fragmentation or prebendalizing of state-power” (Joseph, 1991:5). On the other hand, such practices can also be related to “a certain articulation of the factors of class and ethnicity” (ibid). For a better understanding of the essentials of Nigerian politics and its dynamics, it is necessary to develop a clearer perspective on the relationship between the two social categories mentioned above and their effects on such issues as political corruption and poverty.


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