scholarly journals To the Issue of Creation and Functioning of the U.S. Department of State (18th-19th Centuries)

Author(s):  
Tetiana Klynina ◽  

The article focuses on the question of the creation of the U.S. Department of State and its functions. We surveyed historiography (works by Mihalkanin E., Plischke E., West R.,Glad B. and so on). For over 200 years, the Department of State has conducted American diplomacy through war and peace, amidst the competing currents of isolationism and internationalism that have shaped American foreign policy and its commitment to liberty and democracy. The Department of State was established as the Department of Foreign Affairs by the act of July 27, 1789 and became the first Federal agency to be created under the new Constitution. In September 1789, additional legislation changed the name of the agency to the Department of State and assigned to it a variety of duties. There are 5 main periods of existence of the U.S. Department of State: the emerging State Department (1789-1860), the Department comes of age (1861-1895), managing the foreign affairs of a great power (1900-1940), the Department of state and the U.S. as a Superpower (1945-1960), the Department of State’s role in the U.S. Foreign Affairs Community (1961-2000). Special attention is paid to the positions of the Secretary of State who is in charge of defining and implementing U.S. foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson, Henry Kissinger, John Quincy Adams, William Jennings Bryan, Henry Clay, James Madison, George C. Marshall, George Schultz, and Daniel Webster are just a few of the Secretaries who played the greatest role in the providing of the USA’ foreign affairs. Then author gives the illustration of the secretary relations with the President, Cabinet and Congress.

Worldview ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 43-45
Author(s):  
O. Edmund Clubb

In view of the succession of failures that have marked U.S. policy in Indochina a clear assessment of responsibility would seem to be in order. The Congress is, to be sure, talking about the need to reassert itself on questions of war and peace. But, strangely enough, there has been no inclination to isolate and condemn specific bureaucratic or political figures in connection with the Indochina debacle. The instrumentalities of our foreign policy were not always so sacrosanct.As World War II ended, the Department of State came under heavy political attack for alleged errors and deviations. Shortly after resigning his position as Ambassador to China in November, 1945, Major General Patrick J. Hurley charged that "The weakness of the American foreign policy together with the Communist conspiracy within the State Department are responsible for the evils that are abroad in the world today."


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse

AbstractIn July 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo launched a Commission on Unalienable Rights, charged with a reexamination of the scope and nature of human rights–based claims. From his statements, it seems that Pompeo hopes the commission will substantiate—by appeal to the U.S. Declaration of Independence and to natural law theory—three key conservative ideas: (1) that there is too much human rights proliferation, and once we get things right, social and economic rights as well as gender emancipation and reproductive rights will no longer register as human rights; (2) that religious liberties should be strengthened under the human rights umbrella; and (3) that the unalienable rights that should guide American foreign policy neither need nor benefit from any international oversight. I aim to show that despite Pompeo's framing, the Declaration of Independence, per se, is of no help with any of this, whereas evoking natural law is only helpful in ways that reveal its own limitations as a foundation for both human rights and foreign policy in our interconnected age.


Author(s):  
Oğuz Alperen Turhan

The article studies the evolution of liberal world order within the framework of conventional directions of the U.S.’ foreign policy. The purpose of this work is to reveal the peculiarities of development of the U.S.’ foreign policy in terms of liberal world order. For this purpose, the U.S.’ foreign policy is considered through the prism of Walter Russel Mead’s “four schools of American foreign policy”. The author analyzes the development and transformation of liberalism in the context of using economic coercion in the U.S.’ foreign policy. The article also considers the topical problems of development of the liberal world order faced by the realist and liberal paradigms. Representatives of both groups realize the failure of the liberal world order, but offer different strategies of defining the U.S.’ foreign policy course. Representatives of the liberal paradigm believe that the liberal world order entered a phase of self-destruction because of accelerated integration of unequal states in a single system. Realists, in their turn, claim that transformations in the structure of the global system determine the functionality of the liberal world order. Specifically, the revisionist position of Russia and China is a reaction to the imposed principles, and serves as a basis for the transition to the multipolar system. Thus, conflicts of interest between the parties cause the use of measures of coercion.


Author(s):  
B. Bahriev

The article deals with the features of public diplomacy resource’ application in US foreign policy in Central Asia. The author claims that American public diplomacy which has been actively working in the region since the collapse of the USSR appears to be an important instrument of achievement of not only regional, but also global objectives of the USA. Despite a certain de-emphasis on the Central Asian direction in the American foreign policy at the present stage, the rising Russian public diplomacy activity and increasing Chinese influence in the region forces Americans to look for public diplomacy response in order to secure their positions in this important, from geopolitical viewpoint and energy resource perspective, region. The aforementioned tendencies shape a competitive regional environment for implementation of public diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Przemysław Potocki

The article is based on an analysis of certain aspects of how the public opinion of selected nations in years 2001–2016 perceived the American foreign policy and the images of two Presidents of the United States (George W. Bush, Barack Obama). In order to achieve these research goals some polling indicators were constructed. They are linked with empirical assessments related to the foreign policy of the U.S. and the political activity of two Presidents of the United States of America which are constructed by nations in three segments of the world system. Results of the analysis confirmed the research hypotheses. The position of a given nation in the structure of the world system influenced the dynamics of perception and the directions of empirical assessments (positive/negative) of that nation’s public opinion about the USA.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
V. Vasil'ev

The article investigates approaches taken by major political parties and civil society in the FRG toward the Transatlantic partnership. It reveals the tendencies of the prospective promotion of Berlin’s cooperation with Washington; the article also gives a forecast of further interaction between the EU and the USA, indicates the direction of discourse regarding the future Russia–Germany relations model in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in reference to the increased transatlantic solidarity. Disputes in German socio-political circles on the issue of the FRG’s policy toward the U.S. are emerging all the time, but they have to be considered within a concrete historical and political context. Being of primary significance for all German chancellors, the Trans-Atlantic factor has been shaping itself in a controversial way as to the nation’s public opinion. This has been confirmed by many opinion polls, including the survey on the signing of the EU–U.S. Agreement on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Chancellor A. Merkel is playing an important role: she is either ascribed full compliancy with Washington, or is being tentatively shown as a consistent government figure in advancing and upholding of Germany's and the EU's interests. A. Merkel has implemented her peace-seeking drive in undoing the Ukrainian tangle by setting up the “Normandy format” involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine while having cleared it through with the U.S. President B. Obama well in advance. Despite the increasing criticism of Washington’s policy among some part of Germans, for the majority of German voters, the USA remains a country of implementable hopes, the only power in the world possessing a high education level and the most advanced technologies. Americans, for their part, are confident of the important role that Berlin plays in world politics, particularly in what concerns the maintenance of unity within the EU. Berlin aims at further constructive interaction with the USA in the frame of NATO as well as within other Trans-Atlantic formats. Notwithstanding the steady tendency toward increasing of the Washington policy’s critical perception degree in German society, officially Berlin continues as Washington’s true ally, partner and friend. There is every reason to believe that after the 2017 Bundestag elections, the new (the former) Chancellor will have to face a modernized Trans-Atlantic partnership philosophy, with a paradigm also devised in the spirit of the bloc discipline and commitments to allies. The main concern for Berlin is not to lose its sovereign right of decision-making, including the one that deals with problems of European security and relations with Moscow. Regrettably, Germany is not putting forward any innovative ideas on aligning a new architecture of European security with Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, German scholars and experts are trying to work out a tentative algorithm of a gradual return to the West’s full-fledged dialogue with Russia, which, unfortunately, is qualified as an opponent by many politicians. Predictably, the Crimea issue will remain a long-lasting political irritant in relations between Russia and Germany. Although not every aspect of Berlin’s activation in its foreign policy finds support of the German public, and the outburst of anti-American feeling is obvious, experts believe that the government of the FRG is “merely taking stock of these phenomena and ignores them”. Evident is the gap between the government's line and the feeling of the German parties’ basis – the public. It is noteworthy that the FRG has not yet adopted the Law on Holding General Federal Referendums on key issues of the domestic and foreign policy. There is every indication to assume that the real causes of abandoning the nationwide referendums are the reluctance of the German ruling bureaucracy and even its apprehensions of the negative voting returns on sensitive problems, – such as basic documents and decisions of the EU, the export of German arms, relations with the U.S., etc. The harmony between Berlin’s "Realpolitik" and German public opinion is not yet discernible within the system of Trans-Atlantic axes.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 52-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory F. Domber

This article evaluates the U.S. role in the revolutions of 1989, specifically the claim that the U.S. government was a catalyst, accelerating the pace of change in Eastern Europe. Drawing from memoirs, declassified U.S. cables, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports, and underground literature from the Polish opposition, the article shows that the policy of George H. W. Bush's administration was not a “catalyst” and did not even “grease the skids” to remove Communist governments from power during the first ten months of 1989. Rather, the United States pursued a much more cautious policy that actively sought to impede the pace of change. The evidence indicates that U.S. policy was much more fixated on promoting stability in Eastern Europe, preferring evolutionary change to revolutionary transformation. The article concludes by placing these findings in the context of the emerging scholarship on the revolutions of 1989 and the Bush administration's foreign policy


2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 1885-1902 ◽  
Author(s):  
BINOY KAMPMARK

AbstractThis article examines the origins of American neo-conservatism by assessing the contributions of one of its less known inspirations, James Burnham. In charting Burnham's political philosophies and various contemporary reactions to them, this article examines his legacy as it relates to the movement, specifically in his approach to foreign affairs and institutions. It argues that he was more a pioneer than is often acknowledged. In so doing this article also corrects misunderstandings that have arisen in critiques of neo-conservatism, suggesting that Burnham's oeuvre may offer more instructive guidance than some of his contemporaries in understanding the neo-conservative revolution in American foreign policy.


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