scholarly journals The Interpretive-Sensory Access Theory of Self-Knowledge: Simplicity and Coherence with Surrounding Theories

Problemos ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 96 ◽  
pp. 148-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulius Rimkevičius

The interpretive-sensory access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mind by turning one’s capacity to know other minds onto oneself. Previously, researchers mostly debated whether the theory receives the most support from the results of empirical research. They have given much less attention to the question whether the theory is the simplest of the available alternatives. I argue that the question of simplicity should be considered in light of the well-established theories surrounding the ISA theory. I claim that the ISA theory then proves to be the simplest. I reply to objections to this claim related to recent developments in this area of research: the emergence of a unified transparency theory of self-knowledge and the relative establishment of the predictive processing theory.

Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 150-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulius Rimkevičius

The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory’s advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory’s introduction. I review the most important developments during this time period regarding the two criteria: whether the theory’s six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory’s predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (7) ◽  
pp. 806
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

Psychomotor experience can be based on what people predict they will experience, rather than on sensory inputs. It has been argued that disconnects between human experience and sensory inputs can be addressed better through further development of predictive processing theory. In this paper, the scope of predictive processing theory is extended through three developments. First, by going beyond previous studies that have encompassed embodied cognition but have not addressed some fundamental aspects of psychomotor functioning. Second, by proposing a scientific basis for explaining predictive processing that spans objective neuroscience and subjective experience. Third, by providing an explanation of predictive processing that can be incorporated into the planning and operation of systems involving robots and other new technologies. This is necessary because such systems are becoming increasingly common and move us farther away from the hunter-gatherer lifestyles within which our psychomotor functioning evolved. For example, beliefs that workplace robots are threatening can generate anxiety, while wearing hardware, such as augmented reality headsets and exoskeletons, can impede the natural functioning of psychomotor systems. The primary contribution of the paper is the introduction of a new formulation of hierarchical predictive processing that is focused on psychomotor functioning.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Kiepe ◽  
Nils Kraus ◽  
Guido Hesselmann

Self-generated auditory input is perceived less loudly than the same sounds generated externally. The existence of this phenomenon, called Sensory Attenuation (SA), has been studied for decades and is often explained by motor-based forward models. Recent developments in the research of SA, however, challenge these models. We review the current state of knowledge regarding theoretical implications about the significance of Sensory Attenuation and its role in human behavior and functioning. Focusing on behavioral and electrophysiological results in the auditory domain, we provide an overview of the characteristics and limitations of existing SA paradigms and highlight the problem of isolating SA from other predictive mechanisms. Finally, we explore different hypotheses attempting to explain heterogeneous empirical findings, and the impact of the Predictive Coding Framework in this research area.


Author(s):  
Thomas Metzinger

This chapter explores points of contact between philosophy of mind and scientific approaches to spontaneous thought. While offering a series of conceptual instruments that might prove helpful for researchers on the empirical research frontier, it begins by asking what the explanandum for theories of mind-wandering is, how one can conceptually individuate single occurrences of this specific target phenomenon, and how one might arrive at a more fine-grained taxonomy. The second half of this contribution sketches some positive proposals as to how one might understand mind-wandering on a conceptual level, namely, as a loss of mental autonomy resulting in involuntary mental behavior, as a highly specific epistemic deficit relating to self-knowledge, and as a discontinuous phenomenological process in which one’s conscious “unit of identification” is switched.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qin Xie

Corpus linguistics has transformed the landscape of empirical research on languages in recent decades. The proliferation of corpus technology has enabled researchers worldwide to conduct research in their own geographical locations with few hindrances. It has become increasingly commonplace for researchers to compile their own corpora for specific research questions or to conduct research on the basis of corpora constructed by other researchers. Moreover, corpus linguistics has become accessible to language teachers, providing ideas, instructions and new opportunities to apply corpus techniques, corpus-based materials and activities in their classrooms (e.g., Bennett 2010; Reppen 2010; Scheffler 2011).


2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (141) ◽  
pp. 723-743
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beren Millidge

Fixational eye movements are ubiquitous and have a large impact on visual perception. Although their physical characteristics and, to some extent, neural underpinnings are well documented, their function, with the exception of preventing visual fading, remains poorly understood. In this paper, we propose that the visual system might utilize the relatively large number of similar slightly jittered images produced by fixational eye movements to help learn robust and spatially invariant representations as a form of neural data augmentation. Additionally, we form a link between effects such as retinal stabilization and predictive processing theory, and argue that they may be best explained under such a paradigm.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Davey Smith

Mendelian randomization is a promising approach to help improve causal inference in observational studies, with widespread potential applications, including to prioritization of pharmacotherapeutic targets for evaluation in RCTs. From its initial proposal the limitations of Mendelian randomization approaches have been widely recognised and discussed, and recently Pickrell has reiterated these1. However this critique did not acknowledge recent developments in both methodological and empirical research, nor did it recognise many future opportunities for application of the Mendelian randomization approach. These issues are briefly reviewed here.


Author(s):  
David M. Williams

Why is it so hard to choose the fruit salad instead of the chocolate cake? Why do we dread our daily workout? And why do some of us find it so difficult to quit smoking, quit drinking too much, or stop using drugs? This chapter argues that these unhealthy behaviors are largely a function of hedonic motivation: an automatically triggered motivational state that manifests in a felt desire to perform behaviors that have previously brought immediate pleasure, or dread of performing behaviors that have previously brought immediate displeasure. The concept of hedonic motivation is based on recent developments in the fields of affective neuroscience (i.e., incentive salience theory) and psychology (i.e., dual-processing theory) and is positioned herein as the central mechanism of the ancient and intuitive theory of psychological hedonism. Greater attention to hedonic motivation is critical for understanding behaviors that account for a significant proportion of worldwide death and disease.


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