scholarly journals DVILYPĖ FILOSOFINIO MODERNO SAVIGRINDA IN PECTORE – TVARUSIS HYPOKEIMENON IR ATOMON SĄJUNGOS TRAPUMAS

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 7-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Povilas Šaulauskas

Modernusis epistemologinis metanaratyvas randasi kaip universalusis žmogiškojo pažinimo savigrindos projektas. Retrospektyviąją šio projekto pagrindų rekonstrukciją įgalina dekartiškojo subjectum kaip epistemologinio ego siejimas ne tik, sekant Heideggeriu, su hypokeimenon, bet ir, reinterpretuojant Habermaso įžvalgas, su atomon kaip performatyviąja moderniosios individualumo sampratos versme. Epistemologinis ego kaip atomon apnuogina solipsistinę moderniosios pažinimo teorijos agneologinę priedermę, o epistemologinis ego kaip hypokeimenon išreiškia dekartiškojo subjectum performatyvumą. Toks agneologinis performatyvumas ir yra agneologinis antropocentrinės epistemologijos branduolys, atskleidžiantis ir sisteminantis darnią jame ex necessitate rei slypėjusių pažintinių galių visumą galimos pažinti būties ir metafilosofinių ego cogito steiginių izomorfijos horizonte. Tad klausimas „Kaip įmanomas pažintinių patikimumo pretenzijų įteisinimas reflektyviosios epistemologinio ego savipratos ištekliais?“ laikytinas visos moderniosios, par excellence agneologinės, filosofijos ašimi. Būtent tokia nuolat replikuojama epistemologinio ego metafilosofinė performacija ir yra tvariojo moderniosios Vakarų filosofijos trapumo – jos agneologinio gymio – laidas, raiška ir lemtis.Bifurcating Foundationalism of the Philosophical Modernity in pectore: Persistent Lability of the Hypokeimenon-Atomon JointureMarius Povilas Šaulauskas SummaryThe primary desiderata of the modern epistemological metanarrative eventually hinges on the reflexively founded certainty and universality of human knowledge. The retrospective reconstruction of the conceptual underpinnings of this modernity’s project dwells on the reinterpretation of Cartesian subjectum, posited as an epistemological ego, in terms of not only Heideggerian hypokeimenon, but also of Habermasian atomon, understood as a performative constituent of the modern nuclear individuality. While hypokeimenon pinpoints the irreducible performativity of the epistemological ego, its atomon determinant unveils the agneological and solipsistic nature of modern epistemology. It is the agneological performativity of the modern anthropocentrical epistemology that serves as an ultimate basis for the systematic disclosure of the unified epistemic potential of modern knowledge, unfolded along the isomorphic lines of the metaphilosophical presumptions of ego cogito and universal pretensions of empirical natural philosophy. Thus the question how to establish the certainty of reliable human knowledge on the ground of reflexive self-understanding of the epistemological ego stands as the ultimate basis of the par excellence agneological modern philosophy. The metaphilosophical performation of the epistemological ego is unremittingly replicated as a warrant, expression and fortune of the persistent lability of modern Western philosophy, its ineradicably agneological posture.

2021 ◽  
Vol 153 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-318
Author(s):  
Alexander Fidora ◽  
Nicola Polloni

This contribution engages with the problematic position of the mechanical arts within medieval systems of knowledge. Superseding the secondary position assigned to the mechanical arts in the Early Middle Ages, the solutions proposed by Hugh of St Victor and Gundissalinus were highly influential during the thirteenth century. While Hugh’s integration of the mechanical arts into his system of knowledge betrays their still ancillary position as regards consideration of the liberal arts, Gundissalinus’s theory proposes two main novelties. On the one hand, he sets the mechanical arts alongside alchemy and the arts of prognostication and magic. On the other, however, using the theory put forward by Avicenna, he subordinates these “natural sciences” to natural philosophy itself, thereby establishing a broader architecture of knowledge hierarchically ordered. Our contribution examines the implications of such developments and their reception afforded at Paris during the thirteenth century, emphasising the relevance that the solutions offered by Gundissalinus enjoyed in terms of the ensuing discussions concerning the structure of human knowledge.


Author(s):  
Nazih Muneer Hanania

However, the phrase is often confused with modern philosophy (which refers to an earlier period in Western philosophy), postmodern philosophy (which refers to continental philosophers' criticisms of modern philosophy), and with a non-technical use of the phrase referring to any recent philosophic work. The notable theory of this philosophy is existentialism, Marxism, dialectical materialism, common language philosophy etc.


Author(s):  
Nataliya Kanaeva

The article touches upon the problem of concept “Indian tradition of rationality”. The author recalls a genetic link of the concept with Western philosophy. She notices the complexity of its application to Indian material, gives some examples in which the use of Western concepts of “reason”, “methods of cognition”, etc., leads to a distortion of the text’s meaning, and when an application of the criteria of Western logic to analysis of Indian philosophical discourse gives the readers an impression of its absurdity. However, according to the author’s mind, the difficulties with the applying of Western concepts are not the sufficient grounds to abandon them. This conclusion follows from the presence of comparative studies by researchers belonging to both traditions (for example, B.K. Matilal, J. Mohanty, A. Chakrabarti, etc.), who compare successfully Western and Indian kinds of logico-epistemological type of rationality. The difficulties just bring up the questions about new instrumental concepts and methods of comparative studies more adequate to Indian culture. There are two possible directions for the studies of Indian tradition of rationality in connection with the revision of contents of the concepts in Western post- modern philosophy. In the first of them the concept of rationality can not to be used at all, then the phenomenology of practices of Indian discourse becomes the subject of research, i.e. the discourse images in different contexts (religious, philosophical, scientific), its explicit and implicit foundations and aims, which aren’t coincide with Western ones. In the second case Indian rationality can be analyzed in accordance with the criteria of transversal reason and transversal rationality.


Philosophy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonia LoLordo

In 21st century academic philosophy, “early modern philosophy” refers to the study of texts written in a specific time and place, and understood as works of philosophy in that context. The time is, roughly, the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century. This article is limited to philosophers who published or wrote most of their major works between 1600 and 1750, thus including Hume and Condillac but omitting near-contemporaries like Rousseau. The place is often described as Western Europe, but this is a bit misleading: with very few exceptions, the philosophers discussed here were from France, Holland, or what is now the United Kingdom. The traditional canon of Early Modern philosophers was very small: Locke, Berkeley, and Hume on one side of the English Channel; Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza on the other. In the last decades of the 20th century and first decades of the 21st century, the canon was expanded significantly. Two main factors drove the expansion of the canon. One was increased attention to works of what was then called natural philosophy, like Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. The other was increased attention to the work of women. This bibliography aims to capture some of this expansion, but still, hundreds of other works could have been included—and more will be as time goes on.


Author(s):  
Alex Silverman

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inherited, and were witness to, the decline of the metaphysics of substance, mode, and accident of the Aristotelian tradition. The causes of this decline can be gleaned from an investigation of various puzzles which arose during the period, and of the ways in which different philosophers reacted to these puzzles. One such puzzle concerns independence. A substance is meant to be something that exists independently – but what meets this standard, other than God? Another puzzle concerns identity. A substance is meant to be something which in some sense supports (etymologically, stands under) its modes or accidents – but how can we penetrate to the nature, or identity, of the substance itself? A third puzzle concerns unity. A substance is meant to be unified in a way that a heap of stones is not – but what qualifies as a genuine unity? The puzzles were initially raised by those, such as Descartes and Locke, who did not intend for them to radically modify our understanding of substance, mode, and accident. But radical changes followed shortly thereafter nonetheless. Spinoza maintained that God or Nature is the only substance, all other things being mere modes of God. Conway, Leibniz, and Berkeley argued that the world is fundamentally spiritual or mind-like. And eventually, Hume and Kant questioned whether the notions of substance, mode, and accident were, in some sense, unavoidably problematic. As an investigation of this debate reveals, theories of substance, mode, and accident were intertwined with many other enduring philosophical themes, including the nature of reality, the mind–body relation, and the limits of human knowledge.


Author(s):  
Ian Tipton

George Berkeley, who was born in Ireland and who eventually became Bishop of Cloyne, is best known for three works that he published while still very young: An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), and in particular for A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). In the Principles he argues for the striking claim that there is no external, material world; that houses, trees and the like are simply collections of ‘ideas’; and that it is God who produces ‘ideas’ or ‘sensations’ in our minds. The New Theory of Vision had gone some way towards preparing the ground for this claim (although that work has interest and value in its own right), and the Dialogues represent Berkeley’s second attempt to defend it. Other works were to follow, including De Motu (1721), Alciphron (1732) and Siris (1744), but the three early works established Berkeley as one of the major figures in the history of modern philosophy. The basic thesis was certainly striking, and from the start many were tempted to dismiss it outright as so outrageous that even Berkeley himself could not have taken it seriously. In fact, however, Berkeley was very serious, and certainly a very able philosopher. Writing at a time when rapid developments in science appeared to be offering the key to understanding the true nature of the material world and its operations, but when scepticism about the very existence of the material world was also on the philosophical agenda, Berkeley believed that ‘immaterialism’ offered the only hope of defeating scepticism and of understanding the status of scientific explanations. Nor would he accept that his denial of ‘matter’ was outrageous. Indeed, he held that, if properly understood, he would be seen as defending the views of ‘the vulgar’ or ‘the Mob’ against other philosophers, including Locke, whose views posed a threat to much that we would ordinarily take to be common sense. His metaphysics cannot be understood unless we see clearly how he could put this interpretation on it; and neither will we do it justice if we simply dismiss the role he gives to God as emerging from the piety of a future bishop. Religion was under threat; Berkeley can probably be judged prescient in seeing how attractive atheism could become, given the scientific revolution of which we are the heirs; and though it could hardly be claimed that his attempts to ward off the challenge were successful, they merit respectful attention. Whether, however, we see him as the proponent of a fascinating metaphysics about which we must make up our own minds, or as representing merely one stage in the philosophical debate that takes us from Descartes to Locke and then to Hume, Kant and beyond, we must recognize Berkeley as a powerful intellect who had an important contribution to make.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-307
Author(s):  
Christoph Sander

The investigation of magnetic phenomena played a crucial role for the emergence of an experimental approach to natural philosophy in the early modern period. William Gilbert’s De magnete, in particular, and Leonardo Garzoni’s Due trattati, are taken to herald this development. This article brings to light a contrasting approach to magnetism, by analyzing an extensive and hitherto unknown study on the magnet by the Vatican librarian Leone Allacci, and its relation to Giulio Cesare LaGalla’s Disputatio de sympathia et antipathia (1623). Allacci’s De magnete (1625) which survives in a single manuscript, offers a comprehensive literature review on early modern knowledge about the magnet in a variety of disciplines, including natural history, natural philosophy, navigational science, natural magic, and medicine. Allacci incorporates Greek Byzantine authors as well into his doxographical anthology, and he commends the Paracelsian ‘weapon salve,’ which was condemned by most Catholics at his time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-144
Author(s):  
V. N. Belov

The article analyzes the creativity of one of the most famous Russian neokantians Boris V. Yakovenko. Despite the fact that the work of Yakovenko becomes the subject of analysis of an increasing number of researchers both in Russia and abroad, it has not yet taken place in a systematic analysis. The article attempts to consider the philosophical creativity of the Russian philosopher systematically, revealing both the main directions of European thought that had the greatest influence on the position of Yakovenko and the main areas of philosophy to which the efforts of the national thinker were directed. These, according to the author, include the history of philosophy and the system of so-called transcendental pluralism. It is pointed out that the history of philosophy for Yakovenko is a single holistic process and therefore is the history of the development of philosophical ideas, and not the history of life and work of individual philosophers. According to Yakovenko, the general philosophical scheme of historical development looks like this: from Greek cosmism to German epistemology and the beginning ontological turn in modern philosophy. There is also the belief of B.V. Yakovenko that there is no national philosophy. In his opinion, philosophy, as well as science in General, can only be international. His second main thesis concerning the development of philosophy is that philosophy should be independent from other branches of human knowledge and knowledge. She must not be a servant of theology or science. The article also presents various stages of the Russian philosopher's development of his version of the concept of pluralistic philosophy. According to Yakovenko, only pluralistic philosophy is able to know the essence as the main object of philosophy.


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