scholarly journals LIETUVOS FILOSOFINIŲ DISCIPLINŲ APŽVALGOS IR JŲ NARATYVINĖS STRATEGIJOS

Problemos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 75-93
Author(s):  
Aldis Gedutis

Straipsnio tikslas – taikant filosofinio žinojimo sociologijos prieigą ištirti strategijas, kurias Lietuvos filosofai naudoja apžvelgdami savo disciplinų tapsmo ir raidos istorijas. Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos keturios apžvalgos, skirtos Lietuvos filosofų įdirbiui šiose srityse: Lietuvos filosofijos istorijos tyrinėjimai (1993), filosofinė antikotyra (1995), fenomenologija (2008), analitinė kalbos ir mokslo filosofija (2010). Pagrindiniai klausimai: kaip aprašoma ir pateikiama konkrečios filosofinės krypties raida? Kokį vaidmenį apžvalgoje atlieka nuorodos į išorinį kontekstą? Kokia istorija dominuoja apžvalgoje – vidinė ar išorinė? Kuriems filosofams ir jų tekstams skiriama daugiausia dėmesio? Kokia apžvalgose pateikiamų tekstų dinamika?Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Lietuvos filosofija, filosofinio žinojimo sociologija, filosofijos istorija, vidinė ir išorinė istorija.The Reviews of Lithuanian Philosophical Disciplines and Their Narrative StrategiesAldis Gedutis SummaryThe article applies the approach of sociology of philosophical knowledge in order to analyze the strategies Lithuanian philosophers use reviewing development of their disciplines. Four reviews on different fields of Lithuanian philosophy are analyzed: History of Lithuanian Philosophy (1993), Philosophical Studies of Antiquity (1995), Phenomenology (2008), Analytic Philosophy of Language and Science (2010). The major questions are to be answered: How development of certain philosophical field is described and presented? What role the references to external and extra-philosophical context play? What historical approach is predominant – internal or external? What philosophers and texts are presented as most influential? What is dynamics of the philosophical texts presented in reviews?Keywords: Lithuanian philosophy, sociology of philosophical knowledge, history of philosophy, internal and external history.

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-177
Author(s):  
Martin Pickavé

In this short contribution I argue that the history of philosophy has much to gain from an engagement with the questions and conceptual tools of contemporary (analytic) philosophy. In particular I argue against the view that the historian of philosophy’s engagement with contemporary philosophy necessarily leads to anachronism. Whatever the risks of failure, they seem to be outweighed by the potential for insight. Advocates of a “purely” historical approach to the history of philosophy defend their approach by pointing to the idea that the history of philosophy can and should be studied on its own terms and independently of our current philosophical interests. I try to show that this is an illusion.


Author(s):  
Eduardo Mendieta

Karl-Otto Apel (b. 1922–d. 2017) was one of the most original, influential, and renowned German philosophers of the post–World War II generation. He is credited with what is known as the linguistification of Kantian transcendental philosophy, in general, and the linguistic transformation of philosophy in Germany, in particular. His name is closely associated with that of Jürgen Habermas, his junior colleague, whom he met as a graduate student in Bonn in the 1950s, and with whom he maintained a lengthy philosophical collaboration. He received his doctorate in 1950 with a dissertation titled Dasein und Erkennen: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Interpretation der Philosophie Martin Heideggers (translated as: “Dasein and knowledge: An epistemological interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy”). However, as early as the 1950s, Apel had become increasingly critical of the relativistic and historicist consequences of his phenomenological and hermeneutical work. In 1962, he presented his Habilitation at the University of Mainz, which was published in 1963 as Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico (translated as: “The idea of language in the traditions of humanism from Dante to Vico”). This book is a pioneering reconstruction of the Italian philosophy of language and how it laid the foundations for the different currents of the philosophy of language that would branch out in the modern philosophies of language. In 1965, Apel published “Die Entfaltung der ‘sprachanalytischen’ Philosophie und das Problem der ‘Geisteswissenchaften,’” which was translated into English as Analytic Philosophy of Language and the “Geisteswissenschaften” in 1967. This was the first work of Apel to be translated into English, but it is also emblematic of Apel’s pioneering engagement with “analytic” philosophy. In 1973, at the urging of Habermas, Apel published Transformation der Philosophie (Transformation of philosophy) in two volumes. A selection, mostly from the second volume, appeared in 1983 under the title Towards a Transformation of Philosophy. In this work Apel introduced the idea that would become the hallmark of his thinking: The Apriori of the Community of Communication, by which he meant that the conditions of possibility of all knowledge and interaction are already given in every natural language that belongs to a community of speakers, who are per force already entangled in normative relations, that can never be circumvented or negated lest one commit a performative self-contradiction. In 1975, Apel published Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce: Eine Einführung in den amerikanischen Pragmatismus (The intellectual path of Charles S. Peirce: An introduction to American pragmatism), which is made up of the lengthy introduction he had written for his two-volume German selection and translation of Peirce’s writings. His next most important book was Diskurs und Verantwortung: Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral (translated as: “Discourse and responsibility: The problem of the transition to a postconventional morality”), from 1988, a collection of essays in which Apel develops his own version of discourse ethics. Apel’s last three books are collections of essays: Auseinandersetzungen in Erprobung des transzendentalpragmatischen Ansatzes (1998) [Confrontations: Testing the transcendental-pragmatic proposal) (It should be noted that Auseinandersetzungen, one of Apel’s favorite words, could also be translated as “coming to terms” with a particular thinker. This is an important volume as in three extensive essays Apel discusses his differences with and departures from Habermas’s version of universal pragamatics.); Paradigmen der Ersten Philosophie: Zur reflexiven–transzendentalpragmatischen Rekonstruktion der Philosophiegeschichte (2011) (translated as: “Paradigms of first philosophy: Toward a reflexive-transcendental-pragmatic reconstruction of the history of philosophy”), and Transzendentale Reflexion und Geschichte (2017) (translated as: Transcendental reflection and history”).


Author(s):  
Roderick M. Chisholm ◽  
Peter Simons

Brentano was a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna. He made significant contributions to almost every branch of philosophy, notably psychology and philosophy of mind, ontology, ethics and the philosophy of language. He also published several books on the history of philosophy, especially Aristotle, and contended that philosophy proceeds in cycles of advance and decline. He is best known for reintroducing the scholastic concept of intentionality into philosophy and proclaiming it as the characteristic mark of the mental. His teachings, especially those on what he called descriptive psychology, influenced the phenomenological movement in the twentieth century, but because of his concern for precise statement and his sensitivity to the dangers of the undisciplined use of philosophical language, his work also bears affinities to analytic philosophy. His anti-speculative conception of philosophy as a rigorous discipline was furthered by his many brilliant students. Late in life Brentano’s philosophy radically changed: he advocated a sparse ontology of physical and mental things (reism), coupled with a linguistic fictionalism stating that all language purportedly referring to non-things can be replaced by language referring only to things.


Author(s):  
Ilkka Niiniluoto

Jaakko Hintikka was a Finnish philosopher who developed important new methods and systems in mathematical and philosophical logic. Over a distinguished career in universities in Finland and the USA, he was one of the most cited analytic philosophers and published prolifically in mathematical and philosophical logic, philosophy of language, formal epistemology, philosophy of science and history of philosophy. Hintikka was a pioneer of possible-worlds semantics, epistemic logic, inductive logic, game-theoretical semantics, the interrogative approach to inquiry and independence-friendly logic. He was an expert on Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Peirce and Wittgenstein. He also influenced philosophy as a successful teacher and the long-time editor of the journal Synthese.


Author(s):  
Daniel W. Graham

A leading figure in the study of ancient Greek philosophy, Vlastos was a pioneer in the application to ancient philosophers of the techniques of analytic philosophy. Concentrating on figures of early Greek philosophy, he made major contributions to the understanding of the Presocratics, Socrates and Plato. He saw the Presocratics as applying ethical concepts to nature which ultimately rendered nature intelligible. He distinguished between the early dialogues of Plato, which represent the philosophy of Plato’s master Socrates – a philosophy the early Plato shared – and the middle dialogues in which Plato develops a transcendental metaphysics and rationalist epistemology to ground Socratic ethical concepts. Vlastos’s work played a major role in bringing the history of philosophy into the mainstream of philosophical research.


2021 ◽  
pp. 44-54
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter evaluates the historical history of philosophy. Given the very strong philosophical assumptions underlying the early philosophical histories of philosophy, and given in particular the fact that they tended to be written from the point of view of some kind of idealism, it is not surprising that they should have met with some resistance, in particular outside philosophy. Thus, one finds Albert Schwegler criticizing Hegel’s method of treating the history of philosophy, rejecting any kind of philosophical history of philosophy as history. He insists that the systematical study of the history of philosophy is the task of a historian and has to be pursued in precisely the way one studies any other kind of history or history in general. Zeller therefore advocates a purely historical approach to the history of philosophy, a historian’s history of philosophy, and his own monumental work on the history of Greek philosophy is inspired by this conception, just as it, in turn, inspires a lot of work, at least on ancient philosophy of the same kind. The chapter then presents a systematical consideration of the historical history of philosophy.


Author(s):  
Christof Rapp

Is it reasonable to expect that the occupation with history of philosophy contributes to our contemporary philosophical debate? The scholarship on ancient philosophy seems to be a paradigm case for the discussion of this kind of question. In the 1950s and 1960s, philosophers and scholars such as John L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, G.E.L. Owen, John Ackrill and Gregory Vlastos initiated a new style of scholarship that was influenced by analytic philosophy. This analytic style of ancient philosophy scholarship encouraged philosophers to take arguments presented by Plato or Aristotle more seriously and to import ancient ideas into contemporary debates. It was objected that analytic scholars tend to be thematically narrow and to neglect the historical context. By sketching the development of the first two generations of analytic scholarship this chapter tries to show that analytic scholarship need not be anachronistic and that the gain of this method outweighs possible excesses.


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