scholarly journals On the Pareto Optimality in the Context of Lipschitzian Optimization

Informatica ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Mockus
2011 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Mockus ◽  
Justas Stašionis

A well-known example of global optimization that provides solutions within fixed error limits is optimization of functions with a known Lipschitz constant. In many real-life problems this constant is unknown. To address that, we propose a novel method called Pareto Lipschitzian Optimization (PLO) that provides solutions within fixed error limits for functions with unknown Lipschitzconstants.In the proposed approach, a set of all unknown Lipschitz constants is regarded as multiple criteria using the concept of Pareto Optimality (PO).


Author(s):  
Guohe Li ◽  
Yong Li ◽  
Yifeng Zheng ◽  
Ying Li ◽  
Yunfeng Hong ◽  
...  

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 934-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Zeckhauser

The market is a decentralized system that can bring about efficient economic decisions. This paper examines whether social choice mechanisms can duplicate this success in the political arena. The famed Arrow result tells us centralized systems cannot achieve efficient, nondictatorial outcomes unless they rely on cardinal preferences. With decentralization, efficiency comes to require something more: the truthful revelation of preferences. Schemes that elicit honest preferences are derived here. By their very structure they are shown to lead to inefficient outcomes. This negative result leads to the question whether the validity of the initial analogy continues. Market-based standards of performance may be innappropriate for investigations of political phenomena.


1973 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
George E. Peterson
Keyword(s):  

1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay K. Mathur
Keyword(s):  

1973 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 356-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Leitmann ◽  
W. Schmitendorf

We consider the optimal control problem with vector-valued criterion (including cooperative games) and seek Pareto-optimal (noninferior) solutions. Scalarization results, together with modified sufficiency theorems from optimal control theory, are used to deduce sufficient conditions for Pareto-optimality. The utilization of these conditions is illustrated by various examples.


Author(s):  
Antonio F. Gómez-Skarmeta ◽  
Fernando Jiménez ◽  
Jesús Ibáñez

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-712
Author(s):  
Mikhail Vilgelm ◽  
Sergio Rueda Linares ◽  
Wolfgang Kellerer

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