scholarly journals Theory of regional stability as a public good: Examples from Southern Africa

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fungisai Nota
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Cost Comparison ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Regional Stability ◽  
Crisis Prevention ◽  
Cost Allocations ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
First Mover

The article examines the interaction of countries in the same region when making efforts to achieve stability. The leader in regional initiatives that foster stability is likely to be the most vulnerable member of the region because in the event of regional instability, the leader member will experience the most detrimental effects. The analysis identifies a key factor - cost comparison - that determines counter-regional instability cost allocations. It is shown that market failures associated with crisis prevention and solving regional instability may be jointly reduced by a vulnerable member. Nevertheless, the subgame perfect equilibrium will still be suboptimal due to leaders who do not internalize the full externalities. Because of the high costs associated with a leader member, she is likely to be the first mover in the game of providing stability, the regional public good, giving its neighbors the opportunity to free-ride.

DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE

2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 83-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG OECHSSLER ◽  
KARL H. SCHLAG
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Learning Dynamics ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Almost All ◽  
First Mover

Bagwell (1995) considered a simple Stackelberg-type game in which one player benefits from the other's ability to observe his move, assuming they play the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. He showed that introducing noise in the observability of the move eliminates that equilibrium, and thus the advantage. Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) objected that the noisy game also has a mixed strategy equilibrium close to the pure strategy one Bagwell had eliminated. However, we analyse the noisy game with a wide variety of evolutionary and learning dynamics, and find that almost all admit the no-first-mover-advantage equilibrium as a possible outcome, and often they select it uniquely.

Step-by-Step: The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium

2020 ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Manfred J. Holler ◽  
Barbara Klose-Ullmann
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium

The Road Ahead

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgia Levenson Keohane
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Road ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Market Solutions

This book is neither the last nor the definitive word on innovative finance. Instead, it is meant to introduce the subject as a way to consider our individual and collective roles in financing the public good and in developing market solutions to market failures. The omissions are many, but they are fertile ground for the next generation of innovative finance solutions. This is particularly true as we think about the two major areas of investment required for our future prosperity: education and infrastructure....

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940011
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Canonical Extension ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
The Given

To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.

Upgrading of wastewater treatment plants for nutrient removal under optimal use of existing structures

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (9) ◽  
pp. 1437-1443 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Winkler ◽  
M. Gasser ◽  
W. Schättle ◽  
D. Kremmel ◽  
P. Kletzmayr ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Wastewater Treatment ◽  
Nutrient Removal ◽  
Wastewater Treatment Plants ◽  
Cost Comparison ◽  
Anaerobic Sludge ◽  
Existing Structures ◽  
Low Area ◽  
Removal Capacity ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Operation Results

Upgrading of wastewater treatment plants under maximum use of existing structures is often an important requirement, but also useful due to a number of aspects. Because of a change in legal effluent requirements, a number of plants in Austria, typically aged 20+ years, were required to be extended. The two stage activated sludge HYBRID®-process often provides an interesting design alternative for such plant upgrades, especially in case an anaerobic sludge treatment stage already exists. It provides high nutrient removal capacity at low area demand. The latter is especially important in cases where no or very limited extension area is available making it the key factor to preserve a site for future use. Based on two full stage case studies the adaptation of the plant layout, first operation results and a synthetic cost comparison to a conventional (single stage) plant extension are given.

Field Centipedes

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1619-1635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta ◽  
Oscar Volij
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Previous Evidence ◽  
Chess Players

In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that 69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)

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