Offensive versus Defensive Realism

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-40
Author(s):  
Dmitry Grafov

This article approaches Russia’s strategy of countering the United States indirectly by way of intermediate states. It is concerned with the reasons why Russia decided to engage in the Syrian conflict in 2015 and, from this perspective, the real goals of Russia’s policy in the region. These questions cannot be considered without taking account of how they are linked with the all-out confrontation between Russia and the West in Ukraine. The Syrian conflict merely represents an external platform for Russia in countering the United States. Russia is testing her own power to force the United States out of Syria and seeks any opportunity to demonstrate American vulnerability. There is a triangle of interests for the key regional actors—Turkey, Iran, and Russia—that oppose US interests. The rising confrontation with Washington in Syria triggered Moscow to seek ways of using other potential rivals of the United States, given that there are numerous areas of tension and conflict with Washington beyond the Middle East. The author’s analysis of the actors’ behavior is based on the “security dilemma” and the “balance of power” approaches. There are well-known disputes between “defensive” and “offensive” realism in the theory of international politics concerning which of these approaches is more reliable and reasonable when considering costs and results, as well as the risk of tensions spiraling out of control (“security spiral”). The aim of this research is to make a comparison between America’s offensive strategy with Russia’s defensive approach and evaluate the efficiency of both policies. Following a particular scholarly approach, this article presumes that Moscow acquires power via the indirect, “low-cost strategies,” using any opportunity available to counterbalance US power via other countries. It is concluded that offensive or defensive behavior depends on the situation and available resources. The United States has sufficient resources to implement an offensive strategy, and Washington may raise the stakes in confrontation. Russia’s defense approach of a “buck-passing” strategy is more efficient, but Moscow suffers from a lack of resources and chooses indirect countering, using any means necessary to counterbalance US power in Syria and beyond.

Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.


Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.


Author(s):  
Brian Schmidt

This chapter examines some of the competing theories that have been advanced to explain U.S. foreign policy. In trying to explain the foreign policy of the United States, a number of competing theories have been developed by International Relations scholars. Some theories focus on the role of the international system in shaping American foreign policy while others argue that various domestic factors are the driving force. The chapter first considers some of the obstacles to constructing a theory of foreign policy before discussing some of the competing theories of American foreign policy, including defensive realism, offensive realism, liberalism, Marxism, neoclassical realism, and constructivism. The chapter proceeds by reviewing the theoretical debate over the origins of the Cold War and the debate over the most appropriate grand strategy that the United States should follow in the post-Cold War era.


Subject PROSPECTS 2018: Global economy Significance Global GDP growth is likely to edge higher in 2018 as trade, investment and employment expand. However, monetary policy is gradually tightening, fiscal expansion is limited and there is little chance of a repeat of the surprise boost from trade seen in 2017 or a recovery in productivity. Inflation may remain obdurately low in the United States, Japan and the euro-area but not sufficiently to deter the US Federal Reserve (Fed) and the ECB from gently reeling in their bond-buying programmes. Modestly higher commodity prices should support economic recovery in resource producers. Impacts The timing of elections in the United States, Canada and Mexico may prolong the NAFTA trade talks into 2019 or beyond. China will battle any US attempts to constrain its innovation and access to technology, which it sees as key to its rebalancing. Technological progress and more open markets exacerbate the unpredictability of jobs and wages, but policy will increasingly address this. Automation means the job intensive low-cost industrial growth engine is now less effective; developing countries must consider new models. A better balance of power between multinationals, international organisations and governments will be key to global tax cooperation.


Author(s):  
Dominik Karczmarzyk

Following the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, the United States and Russian Federation became involved in the peace process aimed at stabilizing the internal situation. In the initial phase of this process, Russia introduced political plans to resolve the dispute, while successively blocking UNSC projects calling for the resignation of Bashar al-Assad. As a consequence of the changes that took place in Russia’s foreign policy after the annexation of Crimea, it began conducting military activities aimed at ousting opposition forces from Syria and preventing the West from making any possible intervention. Due to the lack of a decisive response from the United States, within a few years the Syrian regime’s offensive, militarily supported by Russia, reduced the opposition forces supported by the US to the defense. As a result of Russi’s intense involvement in the process of resolving the Syrian conflict, this country has once again started to play a key role in the international arena. The conflict in Syria has highlighted the Russian government’s aspirations to rebuild its state as a superpower.


Worldview ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 19 (9) ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. Edmund Clubb

The fall of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to the forces of communism in the spring of 1975 heralded a distinct shift in the balance of power in the West Pacific. The United States had lost its footholds in the Indochinese Peninsula, was being forced to evacuate military bases in Thailand, and faced a demand for the negotiation of new arrangements to govern the use of naval and air bases in the Philippines. There was a rise in Asian nationalisms, and a corresponding growth of local trends toward neutralism with respect to American “security” projects.The domino effect of those developments had been less pronounced than some of the American “worstcase” analysts had speculated a quarter-century before; the setback was nevertheless of a magnitude that seemed to call for a massive revision of our grand strategy for Asia. In fact, certain basic American strategic concepts were projected unchanged into the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204
Author(s):  
D. B. Grafov

Qatar lobbied its interests in the US in order to ease tensions with the Gulf c tries which declared a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, demanded to break off all ties with Iran and to close the Turkish military base on its territory. The article analyses the lobbying campaign against the blockade. It uses the facts and data disclosed by the consulting and lobbying firms according to “The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938” and “The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”. Three main conclusions are drawn: 1) The US is not interested in settlement of dispute through the support of one party. The White House prefers the “divide and rule” strategy. 2) There is little chance of successful lobbying in the US for any state that cooperates with Iran. 3) The balance-of-power approach in analysing of the development of Qatari-Saudi crisis shows that attempt of the both parties to “buck-pass” by one superpower is uneffisient. The reason is that both Qatar and Saudi coalition act like US's clients. Although Qatar is not as powerful as its rivals, but it uses the “defensive realism” strategy, that allows it to disrupt aggressive efforts and increase the costs of the Saudi coalition.


Author(s):  
Vladimir PECHATNOV

The concluding results of the anti-Hitler coalition meeting in Yalta have long been criticized in the United States by the antagonists of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy. In recent decades, they have raised renewed criticism in Central and Eastern Europe and across the West. Though, the decisions of Yalta Conference were fully determined by the balance of power and the real military situation on the war theatre by spring 1945. Each of the Allies pursued their own interests, but they appeared able to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise of these interests for the sake of final victory over common enemy. The Yalta Conference manifested the last upsurge of the Allied cooperation and in no way it served a prologue to the Cold War as it is now being asserted.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
Vincentia Vahistha Hirrya Jyalita

China’s rise through rapid development especially in the economic sector have prompted debates on whether it seeks to overtake the United States (U.S.) and strive for domination. However, China insists that it has no such intentions since it benefits from the current system and wishes to pursue peaceful development. This paper will analyze why China is not seeking to displace the U.S. and alter the international order despite claims from offensive realism that states are revisionist as they pursue domination to guarantee its survival under anarchy. This paper argues that defensive realism can better explain the case and that China is a status quo state unlike claims from offensive realism. The writer conducted the study with defensive realism’s perspective and utilized indicators from Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He to determine whether China is a status quo state. The results show that defensive realism can fill the gap left by offensive realism and that China is indeed a status quo state. Kebangkitan China yang ditandai dengan perkembangan pesat, terutama dalam bidang ekonomi, telah memicu perdebatan tentang apakah China berusaha untuk mengambil alih kekuasaan Amerika Serikat (A.S.) dan mendominasi tatanan global. Namun, China bersikeras dalam mengklaim bahwa tidak ada niat seperti itu karena mendapatkan keuntungan dari sistem saat ini dan lebih ingin mengejar pembangunan secara damai. Artikel ini akan menganalisis mengapa China tidak berusaha untuk menggantikan A.S. maupun mengubah tatanan global, meskipun ada klaim dari offensive realism bahwa setiap negara adalah revisionist karena mereka memperluas kekuasaannya untuk menjamin kelangsungan hidupnya di bawah sistem dunia yang anarki. Dalam artikel ini, penulis berpendapat bahwa defensive realism dapat menjelaskan kasus ini dengan lebih baik dan China adalah negara status quo tidak seperti klaim dari offensive realism. Penulis melakukan studi dengan perspektif defensive realism dan menggunakan indikator dari Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, dan Kai He untuk menentukan apakah China merupakan negara status quo. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa defensive realism dapat mengisi kekosongan yang ditinggalkan oleh offensive realism dan bahwa China memang negara status quo.


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