When Practice Fails to Reduce Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot: The Case of Cognitive Load

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (6) ◽  
pp. 555-570
Author(s):  
Balbir Singh ◽  
Jordan Axt ◽  
Sean M. Hudson ◽  
Christopher Lee Mellinger ◽  
Bernd Wittenbrink ◽  
...  

Practice improves performance on a first-person shooter task (FPST), increasing accuracy and decreasing racial bias. But rather than simply promoting cognitively efficient processing, we argue that the benefits of practice on a difficult, cognitively demanding task like the FPST rely, at least in part, on resource-intensive, cognitively effortful processing. If practice-based improvements require cognitive resources, then cognitive load should compromise the value of practice by depriving trained participants of the cognitive resources on which they depend. This experiment shows that inducing cognitive load eliminates the benefits of training, leading to an increase in racial bias, as predicted.

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debbie S. Ma ◽  
Joseph Blass ◽  
Joshua Correll ◽  
Bernd Wittenbrink ◽  
Matthew Tipping

2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica J. Sim ◽  
Joshua Correll ◽  
Melody S. Sadler

In three studies, we examined how training may attenuate (or exacerbate) racial bias in the decision to shoot. In Experiment 1, when novices read a newspaper article about Black criminals, they showed pronounced racial bias in a first-person-shooter task (FPST); when they read about White criminals, bias was eliminated. Experts (who practiced the FPST) and police officers were unaffected by the same stereotype-accessibility manipulation. However, when training itself (base rates of armed vs. unarmed targets in the FPST, Experiment 2a; or special unit officers who routinely deal with minority gang members, Experiment 2b) reinforced the association between Blacks and danger, training did not attenuate bias. When race is unrelated to the presence/absence of a weapon, training may eliminate bias as participants learn to focus on diagnostic object information (gun vs. no gun). But when training actually promotes the utility of racial cues, it may sustain the heuristic use of stereotypes.


Author(s):  
Bastien Trémolière ◽  
Marie-Ève Gagnon ◽  
Isabelle Blanchette

Abstract. Although the detrimental effect of emotion on reasoning has been evidenced many times, the cognitive mechanism underlying this effect remains unclear. In the present paper, we explore the cognitive load hypothesis as a potential explanation. In an experiment, participants solved syllogistic reasoning problems with either neutral or emotional contents. Participants were also presented with a secondary task, for which the difficult version requires the mobilization of cognitive resources to be correctly solved. Participants performed overall worse and took longer on emotional problems than on neutral problems. Performance on the secondary task, in the difficult version, was poorer when participants were reasoning about emotional, compared to neutral contents, consistent with the idea that processing emotion requires more cognitive resources. Taken together, the findings afford evidence that the deleterious effect of emotion on reasoning is mediated by cognitive load.


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