SMME attitudes towards financial bootstrapping: A perspective from a developing economy

The present study investigates diffusion and adoption of corruption and factors that influence the rate of adoption of corruption in Ghana. In the current study, the diffusion and adoption of corruption and the factors that influence the speed with which corruption spreads in society is examined within Ghana as a developing economy. Data from public sector workers in Ghana are used to conduct the study. Our findings based on the results from One Sample T-Test suggest that corruption is perceived to be high in Ghana and diffusion and adoption of corruption has witnessed appreciative increases. Social and institutional factors seem to have a larger influence on the rate of corruption adoption than other factors. These findings indicate the need for theoretical underpinning in policy formulation to face corruption by incorporating the relationship between the social values and institutional failure, as represented by the rate of corruption adoption in developing economies.

Download Full-text

Financial Bootstrapping as the Steppingstones to S...

10.2514/6.iac-05-d3.1.10 ◽

2005 ◽

Author(s):

Declan J. O’Donnell

Keyword(s):

Financial Bootstrapping

Download Full-text

On Capital Allocation And The Real Cost Of Labour (Notes & Comments)

The Pakistan Development Review ◽

10.30541/v10i4pp.491-499 ◽

1970 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 491-499

Author(s):

F. E. Banks

Keyword(s):

Agricultural Sector ◽

Wage Differential ◽

Industrial Sector ◽

Capital Allocation ◽

Marginal Product ◽

Developing Economy ◽

Real Cost ◽

The Difference ◽

Industrial Wage ◽

Two Sectors

This note is an extension of several contributions to the problem of re¬source allocation in a developing economy. In separate papers, I.M.D. Little and F. Seton* have introduced a model in which labour in a developing economy cannot be shifted from the subsistence to the industrial sector at zero opportunity cost, even though this labour displays zero marginal product in its 'traditional' occupations; and in what follows this problem will be attacked via a diagramma¬tic analysis. A short appendix will treat a side issue of the topic. As Little presented the model, there was an initial amount of capital K to be divided between two sectors, the I (industrial) sector, and the C (subsistence, traditional, or agricultural) sector. In the C-sector, there is excess labour or dis¬guised unemployment, in the sense of Professor W. A. Lewis2, in that the marginal product of labour in this sector is taken as equal to zero. As it happens, however, this labour cannot be moved to the I-Sector without an increase in production in the C-sector. The reason for this is because as labour is transferred to the industrial sector, consumption per head increases in the C-sector, thus decreasing the surplus available for workers being transferred to the I-sector. The transfer can only be carried out if a surplus equal to the difference between the industrial wage in C-goods and the amount of C-goods 'released' by the C-sector is forth¬coming, and for this an increased production of C-goods (via the input of capital into the C-sector) must take place. A similar situation would exist if transferring workers required a wage differential; or if C-goods had to be exported to obtain certain types of capital goods for the labour being reallocated, and/or housing, training, etc.

Download Full-text