scholarly journals Davidson, Reasons, and Causes: A Plea for a Little Bit More Empathy

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karsten R. Stueber
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Recent Theory ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Anomalous Monism

In this essay, I will suggest ways of improving on Davidson’s conception of the explanatory autonomy of folk psychological explanations. For that purpose, I will appeal to insights from the recent theory of mind debate emphasizing the centrality of various forms of empathy for our understanding of another person’s mindedness. While I will argue that we need to abandon Davidson’s position of anomalous monism, I will also show that my account is fully compatible with Davidson’s non-reductive and interpretationist account of meaning and mental content. Indeed, my account does more justice to the empathic capacities underlying our interpretive capacities, which Davidson himself has to acknowledge in thinking about the constitutive features of thought and meaning. More specifically, I will propose a new way of philosophically safeguarding the causal-explanatory autonomy of our ordinary action explanations by showing how our empathic capacities are involved in epistemically delineating the domain of rational agency.

scholarly journals Estimating the Use of Higher-Order Theory of Mind Using Computational Agents

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harmen de Weerd ◽  
Denny Diepgrond ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Bayesian Model ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Competitive Game ◽  
Matching Pennies ◽  
Reactive Strategy ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Recursive Thinking

Abstract When people make decisions in a social context, they often make use of theory of mind, by reasoning about unobservable mental content of others. For example, the behavior of a pedestrian who wants to cross the street depends on whether or not he believes that the driver of an oncoming car has seen him or not. People can also reason about the theory of mind abilities of others, leading to recursive thinking of the sort ‘I think that you think that I think…’. Previous research suggests that this ability may be especially effective in simple competitive settings. In this paper, we use a combination of computational agents and Bayesian model selection to determine to what extent people make use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning in a particular competitive game known as matching pennies. We find that while many children and adults appear to make use of theory of mind, participants are also often classified as using a simpler reactive strategy based only on the actions of the directly preceding round. This may indicate that human reasoners do not primarily use their theory of mind abilities to compete with others.

Illusions of Consciousness

Dialogue ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-776
Author(s):  
Stewart Nicolson
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
The Third ◽  
To Come ◽  
Intentional Systems

Daniel Dennett's theory of mind divides into two parts: a theory of mental content, which is provided by his intentional systems theory, and a theory of consciousness, the latest presentation of which is brought together in an exciting recent work, Consciousness Explained. This book, combined with his 1987 The Intentional Stance, constitutes the third execution of Dennett's overall program, the first two being Content and Consciousness (1969) and Brainstorms (1978). Consciousness Explained is a veritable treasure of fascinating ideas, fresh perspectives and striking illustrations, many of which are sure to be much discussed by philosophers in years to come.

The bottleneck may be the solution, not the problem

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnon Lotem ◽  
Oren Kolodny ◽  
Joseph Y. Halpern ◽  
Luca Onnis ◽  
Shimon Edelman
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Recent Theory ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Selection Pressures ◽  
Biological Trait ◽  
Memory Bottleneck

AbstractAs a highly consequential biological trait, a memory “bottleneck” cannot escape selection pressures. It must therefore co-evolve with other cognitive mechanisms rather than act as an independent constraint. Recent theory and an implemented model of language acquisition suggest that a limit on working memory may evolve to help learning. Furthermore, it need not hamper the use of language for communication.

Mind wandering as data augmentation: How mental travel supports abstraction

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myrthe Faber
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Data Augmentation ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Important Addition

Abstract Gilead et al. state that abstraction supports mental travel, and that mental travel critically relies on abstraction. I propose an important addition to this theoretical framework, namely that mental travel might also support abstraction. Specifically, I argue that spontaneous mental travel (mind wandering), much like data augmentation in machine learning, provides variability in mental content and context necessary for abstraction.

Cognitive gadgets: A provocative but flawed manifesto

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Del Giudice
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Twin Studies ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Evolutionary Approach ◽  
Genetic Inheritance ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
Cherry Picking ◽  
Dichotomous Thinking

Abstract The argument against innatism at the heart of Cognitive Gadgets is provocative but premature, and is vitiated by dichotomous thinking, interpretive double standards, and evidence cherry-picking. I illustrate my criticism by addressing the heritability of imitation and mindreading, the relevance of twin studies, and the meaning of cross-cultural differences in theory of mind development. Reaching an integrative understanding of genetic inheritance, plasticity, and learning is a formidable task that demands a more nuanced evolutionary approach.

Are Deficits in Social Cognition Linked to Autobiographical Memory in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease?

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 257-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes H. Scheidemann ◽  
Franz Petermann ◽  
Marc Schipper
Keyword(s):  
Alzheimer’S Disease ◽  
Alzheimer's Disease ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Autobiographical Memory ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Neuropsychological Test ◽  
Clinical Group ◽  
Neuropsychological Test Battery ◽  
Fluency Task

Abstract. We investigated theory of mind (ToM) deficits in Alzheimer‘s disease (AD) and its possible connection to autobiographical memory (ABM). Patients and matched controls were evaluated and compared using a video-based ToM test, an autobiographical fluency task, and a neuropsychological test battery. We found that ToM deficits were positively associated with semantic ABM in the clinical group, whereas a positive relationship appeared between ToM and episodic ABM in controls. We hypothesize that this reflects the course of the disease as well as that semantic ABM is used for ToM processing, being still accessible in AD. Furthermore, we assume that it is also less efficient, which in turn leads to a specific deficit profile of social cognition.

Skalierung von “Theory of Mind“-Aufgaben

2006 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Kristen ◽  
Claudia Thoermer ◽  
Tanja Hofer ◽  
Gisa Aschersleben ◽  
Beate Sodian
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Fand Sich

Zusammenfassung. Die von Wellman und Liu (2004) für den englischsprachigen Raum entwickelte “Theory of Mind“-Skala wurde in einer Übersetzung ( Hofer & Aschersleben, 2004 ) an einer Stichprobe von 107 3- bis 5-jährigen Kindern validiert. Sowohl die Annahme einer einheitlichen konzeptuellen Progression als auch die Skalenpassung konnten repliziert werden. Abweichend von Wellman und Liu (2004) fand sich ein Effekt der Aufgabenfolge mit einer besseren Skalenpassung und insgesamt besserer Performanz bei nach Schwierigkeit ansteigender Präsentation. Insgesamt sprechen die Befunde dafür, dass die deutsche Version der “Theory of Mind“-Skala die Entwicklung der begrifflichen Erschließung des mentalen Bereichs im Vorschulalter adäquat abbildet und eine zuverlässige Methode darstellt, den individuellen Stand der “Theory of Mind“-Entwicklung zu messen.

Bleibt die Spezifität der Beziehung zwischen Theory of mind und inhibitorischer Kontrolle über die Lebensspanne bestehen?

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athanasios Chasiotis ◽  
Florian Kießling
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Sozioökonomischer Status

Zusammenfassung. Eine Reihe neuerer Untersuchungen zur Beziehung zwischen der Entwicklung der kindlichen “theory of mind“ (TOM) und inhibitorischer Fähigkeiten weisen auf einen engen Zusammenhang beider Konstrukte hin, der selbst nach Kontrolle signifikanter Einflussvariablen wie verbale Intelligenz, Geburtsrang und sozioökonomischer Status bestehen bleibt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird an zwei Stichproben explorativ untersucht, ob sich dieser für das Kindesalter bekannte Zusammenhang auch im Erwachsenenalter zeigt. Zur Erfassung der TOM im Erwachsenenalter wurden Geschichten verwendet, die das mentalistische Verständnis komplexer sozialer Situationen erfordern. Als Maß für die inhibitorischen Fähigkeiten im Erwachsenenalter wurde die Leistung im für Erwachsene modifizierten Selbstregulations- und Konzentrationstest (SRKT-K, Kuhl und Kraska, 1992 ) erhoben. Während die aus der Kindheit bekannten Kontextvariablen im Erwachsenenalter über beide Stichproben hinweg keine konsistente Rolle spielten, ließ sich der bereits im Kindesalter spezifische Zusammenhang zwischen mentalistischer Kompetenz und inhibitorischen Fähigkeiten auch im Erwachsenenalter nachweisen.

Lifespan Theory of Mind

2018 ◽  
Vol 226 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind
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