Two Major Recent Approaches to Kant's Second Analogy

Kant-Studien ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregg Osborne
Keyword(s):  
Second Analogy

scholarly journals Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism

Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-511
Author(s):  
Truls Wyller
Keyword(s):  
Human Subjects ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Spatial Objects ◽  
Temporal Duration ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Laws Of Motion ◽  
Second Analogy

Abstract I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).

Colloquium 5 The Birds and the Bees: Aristotle on the Biologcial Concept of ἀνάλογον

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-169
Author(s):  
Devin Henry
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Common Causes ◽  
Similar Location ◽  
Different Parts ◽  
Second Analogy

In this paper I examine Aristotle’s biological use of the concept of analogy. On the reading I defend, biological analogues are parts that realize the same capacity of soul or occupy a similar location in the animals whose parts they are but are not specific (“more-and-less”) modifications of the same underlying material substratum. The concept of analogy serves two principal functions in Aristotle’s biology. First, Aristotle uses analogy as a tool for classifying animals into separate natural kinds (Part 3). Second, analogy plays an explanatory role in which the same causal explanation is transferred to “φ and its analogue” (Part 4). Here the function of analogy is to group different parts into a single explanatory class unified on the basis of shared causes. One of the upshots of my interpretation is that, while analogical unity may allow us to posit a common explanation for φ and its analogue, it is not grounds for treating the class of animals that ­possess those parts as a natural kind. For Aristotle, natural kinds are groups whose shared similarities must result from common causes operating on a common material substratum.


scholarly journals The second analogy and the kantian answer to Hume: why “cause” has to be an a priori concept

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (34) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Andrea Faggion
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Second Analogy

The main goal of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience was to answer Humean objectionsconcerning the aprioricity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. This paper intendsto suggest an interpretation of the Kantian argument that, even though cannot show thatHume should be satisfied with the answer, makes clear Kant’s reasons for that anti-Humeangoal. In the first part of this paper, I intend to discuss summarily Hume’s objection againstthe possibility of a demonstration of the principle “every-event-some-cause” and his thesisconcerning its validity. In the second part, it is the turn of the Kantian answer to thesame question concerning the validity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”.

The Second Analogy

2007 ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
Arthur Melnick
Keyword(s):  
Second Analogy

The Second Analogy

2004 ◽  
pp. 163-178
Author(s):  
Georges Dicker
Keyword(s):  
Second Analogy

KANT’S SECOND ANALOGY OF EXPERIENCE

Kant-Studien ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 58 (1-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
W. A. Suchting
Keyword(s):  
Second Analogy

Kantian Prequel

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fraser MacBride
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Conceptual Realism ◽  
Second Analogy

This chapter argues that Kant in the Critique of Pure Reasons and his Prolegomena problematized the distinction between substance and attribute long before the advent of analytic philosophy. Kant did so because he realized that the distinction between the concepts of substance and attribute is problematic if the concept of causation is problematic, for the reasons Hume gave. Kant’s efforts, including his Metaphysical Deduction and Second Analogy, to transcendentally justify the employment of the category of substantia et accidens were ultimately a failure. This set the stage for Moore’s conceptual realism, an ontological scheme free of both substances and attributes.

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