Peircean anti-psychologism and learning theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cary Campbell ◽  
Alin Olteanu ◽  
Sebastian Feil

Abstract Taking influence from Peirce’s phenomenological categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), a notion of what we call bottom-up modeling has become increasingly significant in research areas interested in learning, cognition, and development. Here, following a particular reading of Peircean semiotics (cf. Deacon, Terrence. 1997. The symbolic species: The co-evolution of language and the brain. London and New York: W. W. Norton; Sebeok, Thomas and Marcel Danesi. 2000. The forms of meaning: Modelling systems theory and semiotic analysis. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter), modeling, and thus also learning, has mostly been thought of as ascending from simple, basic sign types to complex ones (iconic – indexical – symbolic; Firstness – Secondness – Thirdness). This constitutes the basis of most currently accepted (neo-Peircean) semiotic modeling theories and entails the further acceptance of an unexamined a priori coherence between complexity of cognition and complexity of signification. Following recent readings of Peirce’s post-1900 semiotic, we will present, in abbreviated form, a discussion as to the limits of this theoretical approach for theories of learning that draws upon Peirce’s late semiotic philosophy, in particular his late work on iconicity and propositions. We also explore the corollary conceptions of semiotic resources and competences and affordances to develop an ecological perspective on learning that notably does not impose a linear developmental progression from simple to complex. In conclusion, we address some of the implications of this (post-Peircean) conceptualization for transdisciplinary research into learning.

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEREK BICKERTON

Donald Loritz, How the brain evolved language. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 227.Lyle Jenkins, Biolinguistics : exploring the biology of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii+264.In the course of reviewing recent books on the evolution of language and communication (Dunbar 1996, Hauser 1996, Deacon 1997) I have had occasion to note that relatively few writers on these topics know much about linguistics, and to wish that more of them did. I should have remembered the old adage that one shouldn't wish for things - one might get them.For more than a century, linguists honored the Linguistic Society of Paris's ban on all discussion of language evolution; other disciplines went ahead with it regardless. Now that the centrality of language evolution to any study of our species is becoming apparent, linguists are desperately trying to play catchup, and the two volumes reviewed here both appeared in the last couple of years. Both authors are linguists, albeit hyphenated ones. Donald Loritz teaches computational linguistics at Georgetown University; his doctorate was in psycholinguistics. Lyle Jenkins works in the Biolinguistics Institute in Cambridge, MA; however, his doctorate was in unhyphenated linguistics. It would be difficult to find two authors whose ideas were more diametrically opposed.


Author(s):  
Susan Bowsfield

A review of The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain, by Terrance Deacon, 1997. New York: W.W. Norton, 527pp. ISBN 0393317544. $29.95 USD. Hardcover.


Author(s):  
Donnchadh O’Conaill

AbstractOne of the most widely-discussed arguments against physcialism appeals to the conceivability of zombies, being which are physically or functionally identical to humans but which have no conscious experiences. Philip Goff (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(1): 119–139, 2010; Consci Cognit 21(2): 742–746, 2012a; in Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in philosophy of mind. Palgrave, 2014) has recently presented a number of different anti-physicalist arguments appealing to the conceivability of ghosts, entities whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. If ghosts are conceivable, this would rule out a priori physicalism. If the conceivability of ghosts entails that they are metaphysically possible, then this forms the basis for arguments against a posteriori physicalism. Drawing on work on conceivability by Peter Kung (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(3):620–663, 2010, Noûs 50(1): 90–120, 2016) and my own discussion of arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies (O’Conaill in Mihretu P Guta (ed) Consciousness and the ontology of properties. Routledge, New York, 2019), I shall argue that ghosts are conceivable, but that what allows us to conceive of them (our ability to make certain stipulations about the scenarios we conceive) undermines the belief that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. While this does not undermine Goff’s argument against a priori phyiscalism, it suggests that a posteriori physicalists need not be haunted by ghosts.


Film Matters ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-164
Author(s):  
Olivia Outlaw
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  

Review of: Wes Anderson’s Symbolic Storyworld: A Semiotic Analysis, Warren Buckland (2018) New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 224pp., ISBN: 9781501316524 (hbk), $115.00


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 871-872
Author(s):  
ERIC DENHOFF

This monograph summarizes the results of the Conference on Neurological Disability as a National Problem held at Arden House, Harriman, New York, in December, 1955. It was attended by more than 50 highly qualified specialists with various interests in the field who met to explore the realistic possibilities of meeting the problems posed by more than 10 million patients suffering from more than 300 clinical entities loosely grouped together as "neurologic disabilities." Neurologic disabilities are defined as those disorders which are associated demonstrably with dysfunction, disease, or injury of the nervous system, the brain, the spinal cord, and the peripheral neuromuscular connections.


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