3. Phenomenology without Reduction: The Realism of the Original Phenomenological Movement

2020 ◽  
pp. 62-79
2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-165
Author(s):  
Andrew Barrette ◽  

This paper investigates a moment in the history of the phenomenological movement and offers an argument for its enduring significance. To this end, it brings to light, for the first time in a half-century, Manfred Frings’ rejected and so unpublished translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II. After considering the meaning of the term Leib, which Frings renders ‘lived-body’ and to which the editor suggests ‘organism,’ a brief argument for the living tradition of phenomenology is given. It is claimed that the enduring significance of the document is found in the elucidation of the need to renew the phenomenological tradition through a collaboration across generations. Thus, even in its supposed “failure,” Frings’ translation gives data to future thinkers for insight into both their own life and the life of the ideas of phenomenology itself.


1962 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 587
Author(s):  
V. J. McGill ◽  
Herbert Spiegelberg

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 196-209
Author(s):  
Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj

The paper aims to identify and explain the absence of eco-phenomenological perspective in Polish philosophy. Eco-phenomenology, which emerged as the specialized area of phenomenological movement in the 1980s, explores relations between human beings and nature. The lack of it in Poland, as the paper argues, is not only due to the specific political situation, but primarily because of the great impact of Jozef Tischner’s “philosophy of drama,” which has strongly anthropocentric implications.


Author(s):  
Tom Rockmore ◽  
William J. Gavin ◽  
James G. Colbert ◽  
Thomas J. Blakeley

Author(s):  
Sarah Borden Sharkey

Edith Stein was among the first women to earn a doctorate in philosophy in Germany, defending her dissertation in 1916. She worked as Edmund Husserl’s assistant and was deeply involved in the early phenomenological movement. Her later writings are marked by an interest in bringing phenomenology into conversation with contemporary science, classic medieval metaphysics and Carmelite spirituality. In her most mature philosophic works, Stein embraces the modern turn to the self, but argues that that turn, carried out fully, leads to classic metaphysical questions and classic categories, such as form, matter and transcendentals. These categories, for Stein, must nonetheless be reinterpreted in light of contemporary science and recent concerns for history and individuality. Stein’s academic writings cover a large number of issues, including the nature of intersubjectivity, individuality and the state, women, educational theory, medieval metaphysics and figures such as Heidegger, Teresa of Avila and Pseudo-Dionysius. In addition to philosophic works, Stein also translated texts by Newman and Aquinas and wrote theological studies, short plays and an autobiography.


Author(s):  
Roderick M. Chisholm ◽  
Peter Simons

Brentano was a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna. He made significant contributions to almost every branch of philosophy, notably psychology and philosophy of mind, ontology, ethics and the philosophy of language. He also published several books on the history of philosophy, especially Aristotle, and contended that philosophy proceeds in cycles of advance and decline. He is best known for reintroducing the scholastic concept of intentionality into philosophy and proclaiming it as the characteristic mark of the mental. His teachings, especially those on what he called descriptive psychology, influenced the phenomenological movement in the twentieth century, but because of his concern for precise statement and his sensitivity to the dangers of the undisciplined use of philosophical language, his work also bears affinities to analytic philosophy. His anti-speculative conception of philosophy as a rigorous discipline was furthered by his many brilliant students. Late in life Brentano’s philosophy radically changed: he advocated a sparse ontology of physical and mental things (reism), coupled with a linguistic fictionalism stating that all language purportedly referring to non-things can be replaced by language referring only to things.


2019 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-243
Author(s):  
Matt E.M. Bower

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.


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