A simple way to overcome the zero lower bound of interest rates for central banks: Evidence from the Fed and the ECB within the financial crisis

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Klose
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-87
Author(s):  
Jens Klose

Exchange rates are expected to adjust according to the stance of monetary policies, which are in normal times differences in interest rates set by the central banks. This interest rate parity does, however, no longer hold if central banks approach the zero lower bound on interest rates and switch to measures of quantitative easing. Therefore, the author estimates exchange rate changes based on the different stance of the monetary base, which is an indicator of differing monetary policies in the countries. The results reveal that indeed exchange rates movements in the Dollar-Euro-Rate can be explained by differences in the monetary base, since the zero lower bound has become binding. However, the influence depends crucially on whether the monetary base is increased or decreased and whether the other central bank is also expanding or reducing its balance sheet at the same time. Keywords: monetary base, exchange rate, Fed, ECB. JEL Classification: E52, E58, F42


2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (10) ◽  
pp. 3154-3185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric T. Swanson ◽  
John C. Williams

According to standard macroeconomic models, the zero lower bound greatly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy and increases the efficacy of fiscal policy. However, private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current short-term rate. Put differently, longer-term yields matter. We show how to measure the zero bound's effects on yields of any maturity. Indeed, 1- and 2-year Treasury yields were surprisingly unconstrained throughout 2008 to 2010, suggesting that monetary and fiscal policy were about as effective as usual during this period. Only beginning in late 2011 did these yields become more constrained. (JEL E43, E52, E62)


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Mathias Binswanger

Zusammenfassung: Als Folge der jüngsten Finanzkrise ist der Einfluss der Zentralbanken auf die Geldschöpfung weitgehend verloren gegangen. Denn die Kontrolle über Reserven funktioniert nur solange, wie diese knapp sind und deren Bezug an bestimmte Bedingungen geknüpft werden kann. Seither halten die Geschäftsbanken in den ökonomisch wichtigsten Ländern de facto dermaßen viele Reserven, dass sie nicht mehr auf die jeweilige Zentralbank angewiesen sind. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich sowohl für die FED als auch für die EZB aufzeigen. Dies führt zu geldpolitisch neuen Herausforderungen, die bisher kaum beachtet wurden. Die Einflussmöglichkeit der Zentralbanken auf den Geldschöpfungsprozess der Geschäftsbanken wurde noch nie in so großem Stil ausgehebelt. Deshalb müssen Zentralbanken in Zukunft ihr Repertoire an geldpolitischen Massnahmen erweitern. Nur mit dem Drehen an der Zinsschraube wird man den Geldschöpfungsprozess in Zukunft kaum mehr in gewünschter Weise beeinflussen können. Summary: As a result of the recent financial crisis, the influence of central banks on money creation has largely disappeared. Controlling this process only works as long as money creation of commercial banks also leads to a need for additional reserves from the central bank. However, the large asset purchase programs of monetary authorities after the financial crises resulted in an enormous increase in reserves at commercial banks. Therefore, commercial banks have enough reserves to create additional money at large amounts and do not depend on central banks any more. This development is indicative for both the FED and the ECB. Therefore central banks face the challenge how they can restore their influence on the process of money creation. Just lowering or increasing interest rates, which was the major way of conducting monetary policy in the past, will not work anymore in the future.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1371-1400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adiya Belgibayeva ◽  
Michal Horvath

The paper revisits the literature on real rigidities in New Keynesian models in the context of an economy at the zero lower bound. It identifies strategic interaction among price- and wage-setting agents in the economy as an important determinant of both optimal policy and economic dynamics in deep recessions. In particular, labor market segmentation is shown to have a significant influence on the length of the forward commitment to keep interest rates at zero, the magnitude of the fiscal policy responses as well as inflation volatility in the economy under optimal policy.


2013 ◽  
pp. 01-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric T. Swanson ◽  
◽  
John C. Williams ◽  

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